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ABSTRACT 
Audit quality has been a focus of interest and research in advanced countries such as 
the UK and US for several decades given the role of auditors' reports in the decision- 
making process used by investors. Arguably, emerging markets, such as that in Libya, 
do not enjoy the same level of audit quality as developed markets, and this poses a 
dilemma for both investors, and those seeking to attract investors. This study explores 
that problem from the perspective of oil companies and audit firms in Libya, with a 
view to recommending a framework for audit quality in Libya. 
As a means of investigation, five themes were examined: size of the audit firm, the 
provision of non-audit services (NAS), the length of auditor tenure, level of 
competition in the audit market, and fees for audit services. The research population, 
reached through a questionnaire survey and interview sample, came from both the 
demand and supply sides (Libyan oil companies, and audit firms working in Libya). 
Participants were asked to comment on their perceptions of the influence of the five 
themes on audit quality in Libya. The findings showed that respondents were not 
sufficiently satisfied with the current level of audit quality in Libya, and expressed 
dissatisfaction with the role of the LAAA as one intended to enhance the level of 
audit quality. 
Regarding the five themes pursued, this study revealed that a positive association 
exists between the, size of the audit firm and audit quality, and that Big Four audit 
firms were considered to be superior to other audit firms. Such superiority was seen in 
relation to resources and audit technology, and the consequent motivation to perform 
as professionally as possible. 
The provision of NAS to audit clients was found to provide auditors with greater 
experience of the client's industry and greater access to the client's accounting 
system. Additionally, such an arrangement was considered to enhance audit quality, 
but simultaneously it was also believed that a separation of NAS from audit services 
was desirable since auditors are perceived to have greater credibility when the 
demarcation is clear. 
r 
Auditor tenure was found to be influential in as much as a long relationship was 
believed to impair the independence of the auditor, and consequently impact 
negatively on the level of audit quality. Mandatory rotation was seen to be positively 
associated with audit quality, leading to a dilution of any relationship between the 
client and auditor. 
Competition within the Libyan audit market was found to be high but this was not 
believed to impact unfavourably on audit quality. 
Finally, a positive relationship exists between audit fees and audit quality. It was 
perceived that a firm charging high fees spends more audit hours with its clients and, 
hence, has a greater opportunity to provide high audit quality. It was seen that both 
audit fees and audit hours were influenced by audit quality, and that audit hours and 
audit quality were higher among initial audits. 
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There are many definitions of the term `Audit Quality' that are usually changed 
in accordance with the parties involved in it. DeAngelo (1981a) asserts that 
Audit Quality refers to the market-assessed joint probability that an auditor 
discovers and reports material financial statement errors. Similarly, according 
to Epstein and Geiger (1994), 70% of investors believe that an audit should 
provide absolute assurance that there are no material misstatements or fraud in 
financial statements. Indeed, as auditors are subject to litigation that might 
follow a bad audit when assessing business risk, it can be assumed that they 
would act with the utmost professionalism, as a means of protecting 
themselves. However, over the last decades, the Anglo Saxon world has 
experienced a spate of corporate failures, financial scandals and audit failures, 
which have placed the audit quality debate firmly on the agenda of the 
accounting profession, regulators and the public. Certainly, there has been 
widespread concern for some time among regulators about audit quality (see, 
for example: DeAngelo, 1981a; Knapp, 1991; Arrunada, 1999,2000; Carey, 
2006; Clark, 2007). 
Since the outcome of audit quality is unobservable, it is very difficult to 
measure it (Wooten, 2003). That said, there have been many attempts on the 
part of researchers who have identified certain attributes that are displayed in 
financial statements (see, for example: Knapp, 1991; Behn et al, 1997; Wooten, 
2003). 
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Considering the literature on the same topic, a significant amount of theoretical 
and empirical research has been devoted to defining the nature and extent of 
the relationship between the different variables of audit quality and the level of 
audit quality, such as size of the audit firm, the provision of non-audit services 
(NAS), the length of auditor tenure, the level of competition in the audit 
market, and the fees for audit services. 
In respect of audit firms, DeAngelo (1981a) has highlighted that size may be 
influential in promoting audit quality, Big Eight, and other large audit firms 
appear to be more able to detect inaccuracies than small audit firms, and more 
frequently report these. In 1998, Becker et al consistently found that the then 
Big Six (becoming the Big Four in 2002) auditors were more likely to spot 
anomalies and refuse to accept the use of extreme accruals, or even qualify the 
audit report, than their counterparts in smaller audit firms. However, being a 
large audit firm is not a cast iron guarantee of quality, as has been observed in 
the cases of Enron and WorldCom, which whilst being exceptions, do 
nonetheless leave room for the argument that firm size and audit quality are not 
related, as proposed by Imhoff (1988). Indeed, Chandler (1991) has added 
weight to this position, suggesting that it quality might be a feature of 
individual auditors rather than the size of the firm they work for. 
Whether firm size has a bearing or not, the degree of familiarity with an audit 
client is definitely believed to impair the auditor's ability to be completely 
detached, and in this respect, the provision of non-audit services (NAS) is 
believed to have the potential to undermine audit quality. In this respect, 
auditor independence is brought into question because of the possibility that 
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auditors may actually audit their own work, and simultaneously forge interests 
that coincide with those of management (Panel on Audit Effectiveness, 2000). 
The opposing argument, however, is that by providing NAS to its clients, audit 
firm gains the potential to enhance its knowledge about the client, thus being in 
a better position to discover problems. Hence, NAS may increase audit quality 
provided that there is sufficient demarcation between the parties performing the 
different types of service. Furthermore, a client who purchases both audit and 
NAS from one firm, may have an increased dependence on its auditor, thus 
minimising the possibility of the switch threat (see, for example: Abdel-Khalik, 
1990; Craswell, 1999; DeFond et al, 2002). Given these opposing perspectives, 
it is not surprising that the debate surrounding the provision of both audit and 
NAS to audit clients attracts many contributors, and extensive argument has 
been reported in this respect (see, for example: Craswell, 1999; Beattie and 
Feamley, 2002; Abu Bakar et al, 2005; Hay et al, 2006; Chung and Kallapur, 
2003; Mitra, 2007). 
Auditors may also acquire a deep understanding of their clients' businesses as a 
result of long tenure, and hence be in a better position to produce a quality 
audit. The argument in this respect is that too short a period of engagement 
does not allow for a proper understanding of the business being audited to be 
gained, and therefore, the likelihood that audit quality will suffer is a distinct 
possibility. However, it is also noted that auditors who have been engaged for a 
very long time may become complacent, miss errors (Burton and Roberts, 
1967; Shockley, 1982), and become less independent (DeAngelo, 1981b; 
Mautz and Sharaf, 1961). The rotation of auditors has thus been implemented 
in many audit environments as a quality assurance mechanism. At the same 
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time, however, it is also suggested that periodic rotation might actually be 
damaging to audit quality (see, for example: Hoyle, 1978; Myers et al, 2003). 
Another serious consideration in recent years, has been the fee income received 
by audit firms from clients who purchase both audit and NAS from them, since 
where the NAS fees are high, there is a strong incentive for audit firms to want 
to retain such clients, and hence, the audit process may be conducted with less 
rigour in the interests of pleasing the client (Levitt 1996) 
Finally, there is also a debate concerning the potential influence of the market, 
whether this be competitive or otherwise, on the quality of audit services 
offered by firms. In this respect, it is accepted that in a competitive market, 
firms that do not offer a quality product will not survive, and therefore, the 
economic theory that competition drives quality is applied to the argument. 
Regardless of the possible influences on the audit process, however, over the 
years, society has acknowledged the value added from audits of publicly-held 
companies, since they provide assurance to different groups of users of 
financial statements. As noted by Sherer et al (1997), the audit function is the 
main mechanism for providing such reassurance. This kind of reassurance is 
required because the widening segregation between ownership and 
management, promotes a potential conflict of interest between shareholders 
and management concerning financial statements. Since financial statements 
are one of the means used to evaluate management's performance, managers 
could misrepresent the information contained within them. Moreover, the users 
of financial statements are interested to know the actual financial position of 
the audited entity, and not what the entity might like it to be. Additionally, 
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reassurance is needed because there are increasing concerns about the quality 
of audit services, resulting in the main, from the recent corporate failures. In 
this respect, Clark et al (2007) argue that the corporate collapses such as those 
of Enron, WorldCom and Paramalat, result in the media and regulators paying 
more attention to the adequacy of corporate governance and audit quality. 
The key role of the audit function is to report whether the financial statements 
of entities show a true and fair view to the users of financial statements, who 
include investors, creditors, taxation authorities, and clients, all of whom 
generally rely on the information contained within these documents when 
making their business decisions. Gaffney et al (1991) confirm this, arguing that 
the primary purpose of audit reports is to inform users of the level of 
confidence that can be placed in a set of financial statements. Thus, the auditor 
adds value because management's representations on its performance and 
stewardship are examined and reported by an expert outside the management's 
control. 
However, despite the important role of the auditor, some aspects of the auditing 
function are still ambiguous and have not received sufficient attention in 
auditing research, especially in developing countries. One of the important 
questions regarding the issue of audit value is what levels of audit quality are 
perceived by financial statement users? 
It is accepted that high service quality is the most important driving force for 
business sustainability in today's competitive global marketplace (see, for 
example: Shawn and Dana, 2008; Feamley et al, 2005; Carizon, 1987; Rust 
and Oliver, 1994; Al-Mogbel, 2006). The quality of service is a measure of 
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how well the service level provided matches customer expectations, and in the 
case of the audit function, this is best determined by the clients of audit fines, 
since they are able to give unbiased opinions on the level of audit quality, 
whereas the audit firms themselves are not (Ismail et al, 2006). 
1.2 Aims and Objectives of the Study 
Given the introductory discussion concerning the audit function and the crucial 
aspect of quality associated with this, this study aims to obtain an in-depth 
understanding of the current perceptions of the audit quality level in Libya. The 
focus of the research is on the concepts of firm size, the provision of non-audit 
services (NAS), the length of auditor tenure, the level of competition in the 
audit market, and the fees for audit services. The study will be conducted on 
both the demand side (Libyan oil companies) and on the supply side (audit 
firms working in Libya). The research objectives are as follows: 
1. To examine the current perceptions of the level of audit quality in 
Libya from the viewpoint of oil companies and audit firms. 
2. To investigate the relationships between selected variables perceived 
as surrogates of the level of audit quality from the perspectives of 
Libyan oil companies and audit firms. 
3. To identify improvements which could be introduced into the Libyan 
auditing environment. 
4. To make recommendations based on the findings of this study in audit 
to improve audit quality in Libya 
S. To contribute to the literature of auditing. 
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13 Research Questions 
In order to achieve the research aims and objectives, which as previously stated 
are to understand the current perceptions of audit quality in Libya, using firm 
size, the provision of non-audit services (NAS), the length of audit tenure, the 
level of competition in the audit market, and the fees for audit services as 
surrogates for quality, the following research questions have been established. 
1. What are the perceptions of the oil company and audit firm respondents 
of the current level of audit quality in Libya? 
2. What are the perceptions of the oil company and audit firm respondents 
concerning the impact of different sizes of audit firm on audit quality? 
3. What are the perceptions of the oil company and audit firm respondents 
concerning the impact of the provision of NAS on audit quality? 
4. What are the perceptions of the oil company and audit firm respondents 
concerning the impact of long tenure on audit quality? 
S. What are the perceptions of the oil company and audit firm respondents 
concerning the impact of a highly competitive environment on audit 
quality? 
6. Is the level of audit quality reflected by the audit fees? 
7. What can be done to improve the Libyan auditing environment? 
1.4 Statement of the Problem 
The concept of audit quality is very broad, but in general terms, it is perceived 
that auditing quality depends on the ability of the auditors to carry out a 
thorough examination of the accounts and detect possible errors or anomalies, 
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and on their willingness to provide an objective opinion of these accounts. 
Cautious considerations of these two dimensions and the quality safeguards 
that are provided by the market are crucial for regulations to be efficient 
(Arrunada, 2000). In addition, the quality of opinion provided by the audit firm 
is an important determinant of its long-term survival. However, audit quality is 
not easy to judge, which makes it particularly sensitive to the behaviour of the 
individuals who engage in audit work (Herrbach, 2001). In this vein, Ismail et 
al (2006) state that "audit quality is the probability that the auditor will both 
discover and report a breach in the client's accounting system, and this depends 
on the auditor's technical capabilities". In respect of the Libyan market which 
is the focus of this study, it seems that it is important to observe and analyse 
the elements of audit quality in the literature. By doing this, and using the 
outcomes as a basis for a questionnaire exercise with oil companies and audit 
firms, the study will be able to examine the perceptions and attitudes of oil 
companies and audit firms that operate in the Libyan market. The literature 
indicates that there are several elements, which shape the perception of the 
quality of audit service. Among these are: audit firm size, non-audit services, 
and the audit tenure in respect of a given client (Ismail et al, 2006). 
1.5 The Research Methodology 
The first concern for a researcher when preparing to collect data for a study, is 
which is the best way to gather that data and what methods should be applied 
for analysis. The prime issue is to ensure that the ideas are pursued in a 
scientific manner, and that the methods adopted are appropriate for the aims 
and objectives. This needs some consideration because there is no particular 
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data collection technique that is effective in every situation, and in the social 
sciences, data can be obtained in either formal or informal settings, and involve 
verbal (oral and written), and/or non-verbal acts or responses. The combination 
of these two types of responses results in four major forms of data collection, 
these being: observational methods, survey research, secondary data analysis, 
and qualitative research (Punch, 2005). There are two main approaches to data 
collection: quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative research follows the 
positivist philosophy, which implies the application of a numerical approach to 
the issues under investigation, particularly with respect to data collection and 
analysis (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). According to Nachmias and Nachmias 
(1996), this method relies on hypotheses derived deductively from theory. 
These hypotheses contain variables that can be measured and analysed using 
statistical procedures. Nettleton and Taylor (1990) state that through statistical 
data analysis, quantitative methods provide accurate measurements for social 
action by explaining the causal relationships between phenomena, and 
measuring these relationships using objective and systemic criteria. 
In contrast, qualitative research follows the phenomenological approach to 
investigation, which is concerned with the means to increase the richness of 
data relating to the social processes surrounding a problem being examined 
(Van Maanen, 1979). According to Nachmias and Nachmias (1996), this 
method uses inductive reasoning to allow the researcher to generate theories. 
Thus, the researcher poses questions and the data gathered in response are in 
the form of words. Bryman (1988) indicated that qualitative research is 
generally used to provide in-depth insights about the phenomenon under 
investigation. 
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This study uses questionnaires and semi-structured interviews, and each of 
these methods is discussed below, although more detail about these two 
research instruments appears in Chapter Four. 
The questionnaire survey is one of the most commonly used research methods 
for collecting data, perhaps because of its relative ease of administration and its 
flexibility, and the type of information gathered by this method varies 
considerably, depending on the survey's objectives. Most questionnaire 
surveys are conducted in order to quantify certain factual information, such as 
to identify the characteristics of a particular group, measure attitudes, and 
describe behavioural patterns. However, certain aspects of the questionnaire 
survey may also be qualitative in order to provide causal explanations or 
explore ideas (Zikmund, 2000). 
The questionnaire has the advantage of increasing the generality of the data 
collected and ensuring greater veracity in respondents' answers (Manson and 
Bramble, 1978). Moreover, questionnaires are less expensive than other 
methods, they can produce quick results, they can be completed at the 
respondent's convenience, they can offer a considered and objective view on 
the issue, and they can cover a large number of samples. 
Likewise, the interview is also a popular technique of data collection in social 
research. Qualitative studies employ an unstructured form of interviewing, 
such as intensive interviewing, while quantitative studies employ 
predominantly structured interviews (Sekaran, 1992). In the structured form, 
the interview resembles a questionnaire with the difference that it is conducted 
face-to-face. This type of interview is highly structured and strict procedures 
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are followed. Interviews can, however, also be completely unstructured, where 
there is no guidance at all other than the notion that a general theme will be 
explored, or they can be semi-structured, containing elements of both 
structured and unstructured interviews. Within this type, questions can be 
closed or open depending on the research topic and purpose, and type of 
information sought to achieve the research objectives. Additionally, interviews 
can be undertaken with groups of people rather than with individuals, and as a 
result more responses are gathered at the same time. This technique is referred 
to as the focus group. Another benefit of interviews is that they allow dialogue 
between the researcher and the interviewee, and this means that valuable 
information might come forward that would not have done so had there been 
no conversation. 
In order to accomplish the research objectives, focus groups will be used as a 
pilot study from which to develop the questionnaire. Focus groups are normally 
associated with a phenomenological methodology, being used to gather data 
relating to the feelings and opinions of a group of people who are involved in a 
common situation (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). It is necessary to have firm 
ideas before conducting focus group exercises, and these will be provided by a 
review of the literature relating to audit quality. 
Two further stages of the fieldwork will be undertaken. The first, after the 
design of the questionnaire, will be a questionnaire survey with a number of oil 
companies and audit firms working in Libya, aimed at identifying the main 
problems concerning audit quality and explaining the relationship between the 
variables chosen as surrogates for audit quality and the level of audit quality. 
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The second stage will be a series of structured interviews, which will be carried 
out after the completion of the first stage and the analysis of the responses to 
the questionnaire survey. These interviews will be conducted with 
representatives from both the oil companies and the audit firms. From the use 
of these two procedures, it is envisaged that sufficient research data will be 
gathered to fully answer the research questions. 
The research study has been designed in such a way that it can easily apply the 
aspects of audit quality on Libyan samples without the need to specify 
unnecessary data and analysis. The quantitative approach will be used to help 
in tracing the concept of audit quality development. Oil companies are used as 
respondents and all types of service offered by audit firms are examined, for 
example, tax, secretarial services, and audit services. More details concerning 
the methodology of the study are presented in Chapter Four. 
Audit quality cannot be measured purely by the level of accuracy in the audit 
performance, and in this respect, the issue of timing is also important. In using 
Libya, a developing country, as its focus, this study, therefore, takes into 
account elements of timing in terms of where a country is in its stage of 
development. 
1.6 Contribution to Knowledge 
Audit quality is a very important issue in the development process of nations. 
Many countries throughout the world and especially the developing ones have 
not yet established their own complete and effective standards for audit quality. 
Therefore, this study will contribute by presenting features of audit quality that 
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are suitable as benchmarks in respect of the developing countries. The original 
aspect of knowledge in this study is the application of the already-existing 
measures of audit quality in an environment that has never witnessed such 
practices. Although some of the developing countries do have their own audit 
systems, they are still far behind and require up-dating and proper 
implementation. Libya is a rapidly developing country, and this is especially so 
after the relatively recent political stabilisation and the open policy it has 
started to adopt in the aim of securing a better future for the nation. Amid these 
rapid changes and the fact that the country is striving to catch up with the 
developed nations, good audit quality measures have to be considered because 
these are an important part of the change process. One outcome of this study 
will be the identification of certain criteria to be the beginning of such 
measures in the country, and on which future studies can build. 
Taking Libya as a case study limits the scope of the investigation, and hence, 
provides the opportunity for a tightly-focused and in-depth exploration of audit 
quality issue. This is necessary since the Libyan auditing profession has only a 
short history, and the body of literature concerning the relationship between the 
variables that influence audit quality, refers in the main to observations from 
developed countries, with just a few examples of practice in the developing 
world. Consequently, this study with its narrow focus, will contribute to the 
understanding of audit quality issues in non-western environments in general, 
and in Libya in particular. Additionally, it will identify opportunities for 
improvement in audit quality, and at the same time help auditors to improve the 
auditing profession in the Libyan market. The importance of audit to the 
developing countries was noted by Epstein and Geiger (1994), who found that 
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70% of investors believe that the audit should provide absolute assurance that 
there are no material misstatements or fraud in the financial processes, which is 
a vital issue for the developing countries, as it is often a condition of foreign 
aid that all attempts to combat fraud and corruption are made. 
When exploring the literature, it can be seen that a substantial amount of 
theoretical and empirical research has been devoted to defining the nature and 
extent of the relationship between different variables of audit quality and level 
of audit quality. Those variables range from audit firm size to the provision of 
non-audit services, the length of auditor tenure, the level of competition in the 
audit market, and fees for audit services. The research will contribute to the 
literature on audit quality by applying those standards to a developing country, 
Libya. 
Another contribution can be seen in the methodological approach of this study. 
In Libya, it is not common to use more than one research method, whereas this 
study triangulates data by combining the findings from the questionnaire 
survey which examines the variables across a large number of cases, with the 
findings from the interview exercise, which allows for an in-depth 
investigation of the factors affecting the audit quality. This combination may 
provide a better explanation of the research problem, which is the main driver 
for choosing the appropriate research methods rather than concentrating on 
scoring epistemological points (Burns, 2000). Additionally, the study will 
provide: 
- Empirical evidence on the attitude of auditors in oil companies in Libya. 
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- An assessment of the influence of the Libyan environment on the issue of 
audit quality. 
-A contribution to the Libyan accounting and auditing literature by 
providing the first detailed and comprehensive research study on the 
perception of audit quality. 
-A framework that enriches accounting studies in general and audit quality 
in particular. 
- Quality information in respect of improving the audit process in the Libyan 
market. 
1.7 Conference Presentations Based on the Thesis 
(a) The 18 `h National Auditing Conference, 18th/19`h April 2008, Cardiff 
University. 
(b) Conference on the PhD Experience, Hull University, 17th/18th November 
2008. 
(c) Sawan N, Pegum R and McMahon C. An Investigation into the Perception 
of Oil Companies and Audit Firms on Factors Affecting Auditing Quality 
in Libya, Salford Postgraduate Annual Research Conference (SPARC), 
7`w8`h May 2009, Salford University. Presentation based on the main study 
results. 
(d) Sawan N, Pegum R and McMahon C. An Investigation into Factors 
Influence on Audit Quality in Libya. The 2°d Annual BLW Research 
Student Conference, 201h May 2009, Liverpool John Moores University. 
Presentation based on the main study results. 
(e) Sawan N, Pegum R and McMahon C. The Current Perception of Audit 
Quality in Libya. The 2°d Academic Symposium of Libyan Students in the 
UK, 20th June 2009 at the University of Bradford. Presentation based on 
the main study results. 
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1.8 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into the following seven chapters: 
Chapter One: introduces the research problem and the purpose of the 
research. It explains the aims and objectives, identifies the research questions, 
and provides a summary of the research methodology. It also stresses the 
significance of the study in terms of its contribution to knowledge, and 
indicates the dissemination of information it has yielded so far to the wider 
academic community. Finally, the general structure of the study is provided. 
Chapter Two: presents an overall study of the auditing profession in the 
Libyan environment, and is divided into three parts. The first part considers the 
role of accounting in the environment, together with a brief review of the 
historical background, population and climate of Libya. Libya's history, its 
position as a developing country, and some aspects of Libya's culture are 
highlighted in this section. The second part focuses on the Libyan oil sector, 
and the Libyan oil economy. The third part is devoted to the auditing 
profession in Libya and includes: a presentation of the history of accounting in 
Libya, a consideration of the nature of accounting education in Libyan 
universities, and an examination of the regulatory framework in respect of 
Libya's auditing profession. 
Chapter Three: analyses the extensive literature regarding audit quality, 
highlighting the various issues associated with it. It begins by focusing on 
auditing as an activity and pays attention to the definition of auditing, the 
importance of auditing, and the objectives of external auditing. It focuses 
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briefly on audit quality, considering definitions of audit quality, and auditor 
attributes. The chapter then concentrates largely on the empirical literature 
relating to studies of selected variables, namely, size of the audit firm, the 
provision of Non-Audit Services (NAS), the length of auditor tenure, the level 
of competition in the audit market, and the fees for audit services, which are 
used as surrogates to examine audit quality in various countries. 
Chapter Four: discusses the methodology adopted to carry out the study and 
the particular techniques used to gather data. The research objectives, study 
sample and population details are presented, and a discussion of the 
philosophical assumptions that guide the research, and thus justify the chosen 
methodology, is provided. The two methods of data collection (quantitative and 
qualitative - survey and interview) employed in the empirical fieldwork are 
discussed in detail, as are other methodological issues, such as the pilot 
exercise conducted with academic personnel, audit firm staff and with Oil 
companies' staff in Libya. 
Chapter Five: presents the findings of the survey relating to the general 
perception of audit quality in Libya, conducted with the personnel in Libyan oil 
companies and audit firms between February to April 2008. It gives a 
descriptive analysis of the demographic data relating to the two groups of 
respondents, and then proceeds to reports on the findings of the survey 
addressing each of the variables in sequence, and presenting the findings in 
tabular and textual form. Thereafter, the future development of audit quality in 
Libya is discussed. 
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Chapter Six: analyses the data collected from the twenty-five interviews 
conducted in Libyan oil companies (with internal auditors, financial managers, 
and accounts managers), and audit firms working in Libya (with managing 
partners, audit supervisors, auditors and regulators working in the LAAA). 
These findings are analysed and interpreted in order to provide in-depth 
evidence of the main issues that this study attempts to address. In addition, the 
findings of the interviews are linked with the questionnaire findings to provide 
a comprehensive picture of the factors that strengthen audit quality in Libya. 
Chapter Seven: provides a summary of the different chapters, focusing on the 
findings of the study, and the recommendations associated with those. 
Additionally, the chapter considers the limitations of the study, and presents 
some guidelines and directions for future research. It concludes the research, 
asserting that the findings of the study provide important directions for the 
Libyan government in regulating the audit profession and thereby promoting 
Libya to foreign investors, not just in the oil sector but in other areas of the 
economy. 
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Figure 1.1: Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter One: Chanter Four: 
Introduction to the Thesis 
Chapter Two: 
The Libyan Environment 
Chapter Three: 
Academic Literature Review 
Research Methodology 
Chanters Five and Six: 
Findings of the Thesis 
Chapter Seven: 
Summary and Conclusions 
19 
CHAPTER TWO 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE LIBYAN ENVIRONMENT 
2.1 Introduction 
For many decades, the development of the Libyan economy and its population 
were suppressed by colonial powers such that prior to the discovery of oil in 
the 1950s the country was backward in comparison with others of similar 
cultural and religious heritage. Consequently, in comparative terms, it is only 
fairly recent that Libya has witnessed social and economic development, and 
this has come about almost entirely as a result of the discovery of oil, and the 
Socialist Revolution. However, it is undoubtedly the case that since this 
fortunate turning point in Libya's economic history, growth occurred on a rapid 
scale since the revenue from oil exportation allowed for the development of a 
whole range of social services, and other activities such as importing and 
exporting, agriculture, investment, and new industry. This national progress 
has, unsurprisingly, resulted in a much greater need for financial information 
that existed before the 1950s, and in response, an accounting discipline has 
gradually been evolving in Libya. That said, the economic sanctions imposed 
on Libya in the 1990s caused a period of stagnation in economic growth, and in 
the expansion of human capital, such that with the recent economic revival 
brought about by the removal of sanctions, there is now a heavy demand for 
policy that ensures the credibility of Libya's accounting profession, seen in the 
practice of auditors who are able to exercise their independence in the 
fulfilment of their professional duties. This chapter will, therefore, examine the 
practice of auditing in Libya. 
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However, some background detail about the wider Libyan environment is 
required before considering the accounting profession in detail, since it is 
accepted that an appreciation of any organisation's relationship to its 
environment can only be gained by reference to its wider social context (Lowe 
and Puxty, 1989, cited in Bait-El-Mal, 2000). Consequently, the first task of 
the chapter is to present a brief review of Libya's history and how it stands 
today. Thereafter, the chapter is arranged in three major sections. The first 
addresses the role of accounting in the Libyan environment, the second focuses 
on the Libyan oil sector, and the third concerns Libya's auditing profession. In 
the initial section, which addresses the Libyan context, a brief review of 
Libya's historical background, population and climate of Libya is presented. 
Included within this review are cultural traditions and the gradual development 
of the Libyan nation. In the next part, a comprehensive account is offered of 
the Libyan oil economy. The final part features the history of accounting in 
Libya, the character of accounting education within the country, an 
examination of the law pertaining to the auditing profession, and an assessment 
of research efforts into accounting and auditing. Where suitable, comparisons 
with some aspects of auditing in the UK are made. 
2.2 Brief Historical Background 
2.2.1 Geography and Population 
Libya is a large country, situated in the middle of North Africa, and covering 
approximately 1,775,500 sq km (685,524 sq miles). This expanse of territory 
makes Libya the fourth-largest country in Africa, and one-half the size of 
Europe. It has a long coastline with the Mediterranean Sea, reaching almost 
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2,000 km (1,250 miles). However, over 90% of the country is desert or semi- 
desert, and only 1.5% is fertile. This fertile area is essentially the coastal strip 
which enjoys a Mediterranean climate, the rest of Libya experiencing a 
Saharan climate (Attir and Al-Azzabi, 2002). 
Algeria and Tunisia are to the west, Egypt and the Sudan to the east, and to the 
south, Niger, Chad and the Sudan are found. Hence, Libya occupies a strategic 
position linking Eastern and Western Africa, and Southern Europe with the rest 
of Africa. 
According to the 2005 census, the population of Libya is 6,000,566 (Libyan 
Secretariat of Economic and Planning, 2007), and there is a high concentration 
of people in North Western and North Eastern coastal districts in Tripoli and 
Benghazi, which are Libya's two largest cities. Currently, the population 
growth rate is 3.5%, believed to be one of the highest rates worldwide, and not 
surprisingly the vast majority of the population (almost 50%) is young, being 
less than 20 years old. Again, as expected, given Libya's climatic conditions, 
the majority of the population (86%) lives in urban areas. This situation gives 
Libya one of the highest urbanisation rates in the world. 
Islam and the Arabic language characterise Libyan culture. Libyans, all of 
whom are Sunni Muslims, are influenced in all dimensions of life by their 
emotional attachment to their Islamic faith. That said, Libya's history is one 
that has attracted many expatriates and at the moment there are over a million 
foreigners living in the country. Clearly, many of these people have different 
religions and there are numerous Christian sects, and Indo, Chinese religions 
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(Attir and Al-Azzabi, 2002), who are all catered for with appropriate places of 
worship. 
2.2.2 Pre- and Post-independence Libya 
Libya's history is long and can be traced back 3,000 years, since when various 
civilisations have flourished in the area, with the Jarmanite civilisation 
probably being the oldest on Libyan soil (Angelo, 1984). The words `Libya' 
and `Libyan' come from the name of the tribe who lived in North Africa to the 
west of Egypt. This tribe was known to the Egyptians in the 13th century as the 
`Levu' also named the `Lebu' (Abuarroush, 1996). Actually, the history of this 
part of the world has been closely related to the history of mankind since the 
dawn of humanity, and as noted by Humphreys et al (2000: 520), Libya's 
history "has few parallels with the rest of the Middle East". 
Many periods of foreign colonisation and military invasion are recorded in 
Libyan history, since invasions have occurred by the Phoenicians, Greeks, 
Carthaginians, Ptolemies, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines, Sicilians, Spaniards 
and the Knights of Malta. Indeed, the three major cities of Tripoli, Leptis 
Magna, and Sabratha on the western coast were settled by the Phoenicians 
arriving from Lebanon, while Benghazi and Cyrene on the eastern coast were 
settled by the Greeks who also made improvements to the already elaborate 
irrigation system, and in so doing developed agriculture (Fisher, 1990). 
Despite such developments, however, the Libyan people suffered the continual 
oppression of colonisers, and have been left disregarded, deprived, poor and 
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ignorant. Such circumstances have had a direct effect on the values, mindsets, 
attitudes and behaviour of the Libyan people. 
Islam was brought to Libya in AD 642, since when the attitudes, behaviour, 
beliefs and values of the Libyan people have been influenced by its teachings. 
Libya entered a new era of socio-cultural, political and economic development 
during the Islamic Empire. Arabs controlled the region until the 1500s when it 
was invaded and fell to European rule for about 40 years (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 1997-98), before the Ottoman Empire changed that situation 
(1551-1911) (Gzema, 1999). In the latter part of Ottoman rule, in the second 
half of the 19`h century, the early beginnings of a modernisation process were 
seen when modem schools, hospitals, municipal facilities, a publishing house, 
newspapers and a number of new regulations were established, albeit being 
restricted to just one city, and not being available to the wider Libyan 
population (Attir, 1992). This situation continued in effect with the Italian 
invasion in 1911 because whilst they ousted the Turks, they nonetheless 
modernised Libya purely for the benefit of Italian settlers. Naturally, as part of 
this process some Libyans were able to educate their children, but there was no 
progression beyond elementary education allowed for Libyan nationals. Italy's 
defeat in the Second World War brought British and French military 
administration to Libya for almost a decade (Attir, 1992). 
Independence was declared on 24`h December 1951, by King Idris Al-Sanusi, 
Libya's one and only King, and from then until the end of April 1963 a federal 
form of government operated, after which the Unitary system was introduced 
and this remained in force until the overthrow of the sovereign regime on the 
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Ist September 1969, which marked the Libyan Revolution. That brought the 
Libyan Arab Republic into existence, a name which was later changed on 3`a 
March 1977 to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Alhossomi, 
1984) 
2.3 The Libyan Environment and its Accounting Practices 
It is generally believed that the main objective of accounting is to produce 
information for decision-making, and as observed by Alhashim and Arpan 
(1992), this perception accounts for one of the reasons why accounting is 
performed differently from one country to another because people themselves 
are different. 
Chambers (1966) stated that the foundations of accounting lie in the 
features of the surrounding environment, rather than in the obvious 
characteristics of existing rules. Hence, it is essential to consider any 
accounting phenomena, including corporate reporting and disclosure, 
within the framework of the context in which they operate (Arpan and 
Radebaugh, 1985; Belkaoui, 1985; Alhashim and Arpan, 1992). The 
environment is therefore extremely pertinent in helping to identify 
what is appropriate accounting practice. The idea that each country has 
its own financial reporting practices that emerge as a result of country- 
specific factors of an economic, social, political, and regulatory nature, 
is confirmed by Hagigi and Williams (1993). From this understanding 
it is natural to expect variations in practice around the globe. Indeed, as 
observed by Briston (1990: 215), "each country is different and has 
different needs. The purpose of accounting is to serve society. As a 
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consequence, accounting is likely to be influenced by the different 
political, economic, social and religious environments in which it 
operates". In respect of such variation, Mueller (1968) suggested four 
contributory elements as follows: 
1. State of economic development: national economies differ in their stage of 
development and in terms of nature, as can be seen by the range of 
advancement among the developed and developing countries. 
2. State of business complexity: national economies differ in their 
technological and industrial know-how which create variance in their 
business needs as well as their business output. 
3. Shade of political persuasion: national economies vary in their political 
systems, from the centrally-controlled economy to the market-oriented 
economy. 
4. Reliance on some particular system of law: national economies have 
different supporting legal systems, for example they may rely on either a 
common-law or code-law system, and/or they may have protective 
legislation and unfair trade and antitrust laws. 
As Belkaoui (2000,1991 and 1989) observes, the environmental conditions 
likely to influence the determination of the accounting profession include: 
a. Cultural relativism, whereby accounting concepts in any given country are 
as unique as any other cultural traits. 
b. Linguistic relativism, whereby accounting as a language with its lexical 
and grammatical characteristics is seen to affect the linguistic and non- 
linguistic behaviour of users. 
c. Political and civil relativism, whereby accounting concepts in any given 
country rest on the political and civil context of that country. 
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d. Economic and demographic relativism, whereby accounting concepts in 
any given country rest on the economic and demographic context of that 
country. 
e. Legal and tax relativism, whereby accounting concepts in any given 
country rest on the legal and tax base of that country. 
Clearly, it is important for any discussion of accounting principles and 
practice in Libya to be grounded in an understanding of the potential 
effect of these environmental factors within the context of developing 
nations, and in this respect, it should be understood that as nations are 
at different stages of development, it is unlikely that a blueprint in this 
respect will be achievable. Moreover, the extent of the influence of any 
one factor or cluster of factors (economic, cultural, political, and/or 
legal) cannot be predicted because of the specific features of each 
country. Furthermore, researchers (Cooke and Wallace, 1990; 
Belkaoui, 1983) have argued that environmental variables do not 
operate in a vacuum and consequently there is every chance that they 
might be found to inter-relate. 
2.4 Political and Economic Influences 
The behaviour of organisations, and the people within them is affected 
in many ways by a country's political and economic systems, and 
accounting is variously influenced by such factors. Furthermore, in 
countries where governments stipulate accounting rules, and where 
major changes in government often occur, so too might the accounting 
procedures in force (Alhashim and Arpan, 1992). 
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This precise scenario occurred after the Al Fateh Revolution, when 
Colonel Muammer Gaddafi introduced dramatic changes, the most 
fundamental being the Declaration of the Popular Revolution in 1973, 
and the later Declaration of the system of Direct Democracy in 1977. 
The Popular Revolution was announced by Colonel Gaddafi on 15th April 
1973, and resulted in a five-point programme (translated by the Libyan 
Secretariat of Information, 1979) as follows: 
1. The repeal of all administrative laws currently in force and deciding each 
case on its (own) merits. 
2. Purging the country of the politically sick. 
3. Freedom, all freedom, is for the toiling masses of the people. 
4. Declaration of an administrative revolution. 
5. Declaration of a cultural revolution 
As observed by Hudson (1977), the Popular Revolution aimed to introduce an 
element of grass-roots spontaneity, voluntarism, and direct democracy on the 
one hand, and on the other hand, to replace the existing Arab Socialist Union 
which had failed to generate such aims and objectives. Bearman (1986) later 
argued that the Popular Revolution aimed to combat bureaucratic inefficiency, 
the lack of public interest and participation in the sub-national governmental 
system, and the problems of national political co-ordination. The vehicle for 
achieving such objectives was the system of `Peoples' Committees' which 
were functionally and geographically-based, and which became responsible for 
local and regional administration. These Committees, in the scope of their 
administrative and regulatory tasks and the method of their members' 
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selection, exemplified the concept of direct democracy that Gaddafi proposed 
in the first volume of The Green Book 3, which was published in 1976. 
On 2nd March 1977, a completely new system of government, known as the 
principle of the `Authority of the People', was introduced by Gaddafi himself. 
He had campaigned for this so convincingly that he secured its acceptance in 
an extraordinary session of the General People's Congress GPC under his 
chairmanship. 
The Declaration of the People's Authority was made by the GPC and 
contained, as stated by the Secretariat of Information (1979), the following four 
points: 
I. The official name of Libya will henceforth be the Socialist People's 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (SPLAJ). 
2. The Holy Koran is the law of society in the SPLAJ. 
3. Direct popular authority constitutes the basis of the political system in the 
SPLAJ. Authority is for the people and no one else. 
4. The people exercise their power through the People's Congresses, People's 
Committees, Syndicates, Unions, Professional Associations and the GPC. 
Their functions are to be defined by law. 
5. Defence of the homeland is the responsibility of every citizen, male and 
female, and by general military training the people will be trained and 
armed. The method of preparing the military institutions and general 
military training will be regulated by law. 
Coming through the Declaration of the People's Authority was confirmation of 
Libya's traditions and customs that stressed the collective rights and 
obligations of families and tribes. Given the position of the Declaration within 
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the workplace, it can thus be seen that tribal and family collectivity is 
institutionalised in peoples' work-related practices and social relationships 
(Wright, 1981). 
The first wave of government reforms were implemented in 1987 and 1988 
when self-management or collective ownership businesses were allowed. 
Simultaneously, certain public enterprises were privatised, and restrictions on 
private wholesale trade were removed. Subsequent reform in September 1992 
included privatisation legislation which effectively progressed the move to 
offer a number of public-sector enterprises for privatisation, thereby identifying 
those economic sectors in which the private sector and individuals could invest. 
Production, distribution and service activities in industry, agriculture, transport, 
commerce, finance, tourism and the private practice of professionals, were all 
included, as was the establishment of privately-funded businesses, along with 
family and individual activities. 
Unfortunately, Libya's developmental efforts met an obstacle in 1993, when 
UN sanctions were imposed on the country as a lever to persuade the Libyan 
government to hand over two suspects connected with the Lockerbie airline 
bombings in 1988 in Scotland. These sanctions involved a ban on military 
sales, air communications, and the purchase of some equipment required for 
the advancement of the oil and gas industry. The GPC responded by 
introducing a series of liberalisation measures aimed at reducing public 
expenditure and removing any funding that contributed to such expenditure. It 
also promoted private investor initiatives in different sectors (Vandewalle, 
1998). In 1997, the State issued Act Number 5, which concerned Foreign 
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Capital Investment Encouragement. The Act encouraged foreign investments 
in areas that would result in a transfer of modem technology, a multiplicity of 
income resources, and which would contribute to the development of the 
national products, so as to help Libya enter into the international markets. 
In 1999, the two suspects were handed over and in consequence, the UN 
sanctions were suspended, but not lifted. This suspension enabled some 
progress to be made in Libyan development, which had been severely restricted 
during the period of sanctions, and which had caused a situation where much 
reliance was placed on the attempted modernisation of the oil and gas sector. 
The sanctions were finally lifted after the Libyan Government reached a 
settlement with the families of the Lockerbie victims in 2003. On the 19th 
December 2003, Libya, Britain and the United States reached an agreement 
whereby Libya would abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in 
return for improved relations. The United States then rescinded its ban on 
travel to Libya and authorised US oil companies with pre-sanction holdings in 
Libya, to negotiate for their return to the country once economic sanctions 
were completely removed (Otman, 2005). 
A gradual improvement in relations between Libya and the US followed, and 
in April 2004, when the US economic sanctions against Libya were ended, a 
written statement from the White House Press Secretary was issued to the 
effect that US companies were to be allowed to buy or invest in Libyan oil and 
products, and that US commercial banks and other financial service providers 
could participate in and support these transactions (Otman, 2005). 
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Since that time, and with more cordial relationships with European countries 
and the USA, Libya has become re-instated on the world stage, and a number 
of international companies have invested in the country. In an attempt to give a 
greater role to the private sector in economic activity, the government has 
persisted with its privatisation policy to allow the privatisation of some 
manufacturing and service companies (Central Bank of Libya, 2007). 
2.5 Libya as a Developing Country 
There is a rich literature on the issue of what constitutes a developing or 
developed country, and this includes debate on the actual words to be used to 
describe the status of countries when making comparisons of their social and 
economic advancement. Higgins (1968) writing almost half a century ago, 
noted that the United Nations does not use the term `under-developed' in 
preference to the adjectives `developing' or `less developing', yet he took the 
position that the term `under-developed' should indeed be used to describe a 
country where more half the population lives in poverty. He also observed that 
in political terms, a country is classified as under-developed if it declares itself 
as so by applying for foreign aid, and if other countries provide this. He further 
added that an under-developed country would typically have more than one- 
third of its labour force engaged in agriculture, and be characterised by both 
technological and regional dualism. 
However, two decades later, Gilbert (1986: 7) argued that "the distinction 
between developed and less developed, rich and poor, powerful and 
subordinate is only a preliminary one" and that a more complex typology is 
required in this respect. Morrish (1988) argued that in less developed countries, 
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people left the countryside to find work in urban areas, and that industries 
faced difficulties because of lack of experience, and outdated transport 
systems. These initial classifications of countries by their economic 
achievement is nevertheless both controversial and imprecise, since there is 
always the potential for ethnocentric or normative considerations to influence 
both the formulation of the original taxonomy and the categorisation of 
countries on the basis of it. Poor countries, relative to more developed ones, 
have been variously labelled the Third World, the South, the less developed, 
developing, and the other world. 
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that some of the characteristics of less 
developed countries can actually be seen exist in developed countries, Beddis 
(1995) noting that whilst the USA is without doubt, one of the richest and most 
powerful countries in the world, it has nonetheless, much poverty and 
unemployment, and some nutrition experts estimate that 40 million Americans 
are hungry or inadequately fed. Beddis (1995) also reports that a survey of 
eight cities revealed that the demand for emergency food and shelter rose 
between 100-500% during the Reagan Administration. Likewise, Bakhshi 
(1991) reported that in some countries, such as India, there are areas that are as 
well developed as the so-called developed countries, while other parts were 
less developed than the least developing countries. Hence, it can be seen that 
within the literature, there is no perfect definition of a developing country, nor 
are there precise standards that can be imposed to categorise a country as such. 
Actually, in 1986, the Overseas Development Council classified developing 
countries as those with a per capita annual income of less than US$2,000, and 
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Libya, along with the USA, UK, Australia and some other countries recorded a 
figure of more than US$5,000 in this respect (Gilbert, 1986). Indeed, Beddis 
(1995: 29) has observed that "in Libya, there have been striking improvements 
in housing, education and health care, and special attention has been given to 
the rights of women in all these developments". He goes on to say that the 
majority of Libyans have far higher living standards now than before the 
discovery of oil and the rise of the Revolutionary Committee. Consequently, 
there are some aspects in which Libya can be considered as developing, and yet 
others in which it can be said that Libya is advanced. 
2.6 Social and Cultural Influences 
Libya's social structure is characterised by the extended family, the clan, the 
tribe and the village, all of which are major influences in the everyday life of 
individuals and communities alike. The family in Libyan society is by no 
means nuclear, including father and mother and their unmarried and married 
sons and daughters with their families as well as many more distant relatives 
and kinsmen such as grandfathers, aunts, cousins, nieces and nephews (El- 
Fathaly and Palmer, 1980). As highlighted by Agnaia (1996), this close 
relationship with one's family imposes a regulatory framework in respect of 
members' behaviour, because an individual's actions can both enhance the 
respect for a family and tribe, or damage its reputation. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, the behaviour of family members is controlled by the greater family, 
and individuals are expected to obey and respect the rules and traditions of the 
family, clan, tribe and village. 
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As already noted, the Islamic religion and Arabic language which originated 
during the period of Arabian influence, are the two dominant elements in 
Libyan culture, and in this respect, Farley (1971) documents that these 
elements of Libyan culture laid the foundation for the social homogeneity of 
the Libyan people. Indeed, as Zarrugh (1959: 11) documented, 
"it can be confidently asserted that the years of Arabic, 
Turkish, and Italian rule and the final short period of British- 
French rule all left their mark on the religion, social and 
political life of the people. But of all these conquests and 
occupations, none had a more profound and lasting effect 
than Arab conquest for throughout all these centuries the 
country has remained Arab in culture and Islamic in 
religion. " 
So, it can be seen that family, religion and language significantly affect the 
attitude and behaviour of people in Libyan and Arab society (Aghila, 2000). 
2.7 The Libyan Oil Sector 
Libya is the second largest oil producer in Africa, attracting revenues from oil 
and gas exploitation that make up between 75-90% of Libyan income, and 
standing as one of the biggest North African suppliers to Europe (Central Bank 
of Libya, 2006). It was in 1955 when the first oilfields were discovered in 
Libya by the Esso Company, which subsequently became the Sirte Oil 
Company. Six years after this discovery, in 1961, exports began from the Sirte 
Basin (Otman, 2005), and from that time the Libyan oil industry has been an 
important and attractive area for foreign investment. Whilst the sanctions 
imposed between 1992 and 1999 marked a halt in foreign involvement in the 
Libyan oil industry, that trend has now reversed and the oil and gas industry is 
once again thriving, the plan within the oil sector being to increase production 
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to three million barrels per day by 2010. Indeed, since mid-2004, much foreign 
investment has been made in Libya's oil and gas industry and now the entire 
sector is buoyant (Otman, 2005), with almost all companies being actively 
engaged in exploration activities. For example in 2004, the NOC announced its 
acceptance of bids under the framework of Exploration and Production Sharing 
Agreements (EPSA), and in January 2005 it officiated a bid-opening session at 
which 11 blocs went to US companies, whilst others went to companies from 
India, Canada and Australia (NOC, 2006). 
Clearly, the oil sector is a major contributor to Libya's national development 
not only in terms of revenue and technology transfer, but from the viewpoint of 
creating employment and expanding human capability, since the NOC requires 
all foreign investors in the sector, who undoubtedly require large numbers of 
employees, to "employ Libyan nationals and accept responsibility for training 
20% of these nationals annually, either locally or overseas" (NOC 2006). 
2.7.1 The Libyan Oil Economy 
As a renter state, and a key producer of high quality and low sulphur oil and 
gas, and because of its strategic position in respect of the Mediterranean and 
European markets, Libya's economy is almost totally underpinned by oil 
(Table 2.1). Indeed, it is the world's eleventh largest oil producer, and a 
member of the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
(World Markets Research Centre, 2002), with known oil reserves amounting to 
at least 30bn barrels, and possibly rising to 50bn, given the potential for future 
exploration and discovery. One key reason for Libya's low costs of oil 
production is that the reserves lie close to the surface. The dominance of the 
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industry is shown in the period 2000-2005, when the percentage of oil exports 
to total exports reached above 97%. 
According to the World Markets Research Centre (2002), Liquefied Natural 
Gas will increasingly become a key source of foreign exchange revenue, and 
the country is eager to exploit its potential. Exports to Italy and other central 
European markets started in 2003, as also did a joint Libyan/Italian venture to 
develop both onshore and offshore reserves. 
Table 2.1: Libyan Exports in the Period 1996-2005 
This joint venture includes the finalisation of the Western Libya Gas Project, 
the subsequent construction of a gas processing site, and the proposed 
construction of a 1,200km pipeline from the coast in the north of Libya to 
Sicily. As a means to improve production, the government also wants to 
upgrade its main plant, in the hopes of raising production capability to one 
billion cubic metres a year, from the present 4.5m. 
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2.8 The State of the Accounting and Auditing Profession in Libya 
As fully acknowledged and noted earlier in this thesis, a comprehensive 
analysis of the accounting profession in a particular country can only be made 
if that country's cultural characteristics are considered and appreciated as 
having influence upon how the profession develops and is maintained. In 
cultural terms, Libya complies with the Arab country classification identified 
by Hofstede (1984), and hence within Libyan society, there are high levels of 
power distance and uncertainty avoidance demonstrated. This carries through 
into the accounting profession, which essentially is not well developed (El- 
Sharif, 1980; Bengharbia, 1989; Selway, 2000). However, it is accepted that it 
has been influenced the most by the UK and the US accounting systems 
(Kilani, 1988), which themselves have emerged individualistic societies with 
low levels of uncertainty avoidance. This is in contrast to the prevailing 
circumstances in Libya, which is collectivist in nature, and as mentioned 
already, where levels of uncertainty avoidance are expected to be high. Given 
these cultural considerations, it might be anticipated that the accounting 
systems in operation in Libyan businesses may fall short of providing the 
appropriate kind and quality of financial information required by government 
and investors. 
The origins of the accounting profession in Libya are not certain, but evidence 
does exist to show that in the last half century (since the 1950s), there have 
been several influential factors in the development of the profession. In 
particular, the education system, the teaching of accounting academics, the 
preferences of international companies, the expertise of international 
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accounting firms and to some extent, the rapid changes in the Libyan social, 
economic, political and legal environment, have all played their part in shaping 
how accountants operate. And, not surprisingly, with the presence of 
international oil companies in the country, the accounting profession from its 
early days of development, has adopted standards and methods of operation 
similar to those in the UK and US (Kilani, 1988). 
With the establishment of the Faculty of Economics and Commerce at 
Garuonis University in Libya in 1957, it became possible to study accounting, 
and indeed, it became a popular subject. The principal influences upon the 
curriculum came from professional bodies and universities in both the UK and 
the US (Bakar and Russell 2003), the latter being influential because large 
numbers of Libyans studied in American universities during the 1970s (Kilani, 
1988). Furthermore, the position of the US in international economics was 
powerful, meaning it was recognised as a leader in both accounting practice 
and education, and thereby worthy of copying. 
However, despite these early efforts in Libyan accounting education, the 
regulatory body in Libya - the Libyan Accountants and Auditors Association 
(LAAA) - is relatively young, being in existence for only 35 years, having been 
established by Law No. 116 in 1973. The responsibilities of the LAAA are 
essentially to oversee and supervise the accounting profession, whilst at the 
same time ensuring its development and the continuing professional 
development of its members through the provision of national and international 
conferences and seminars (Saleh, 2001). Since the establishment of the LAAA, 
more formality has been introduced the profession, but in reality, very little has 
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been achieved by the body in terms of building a theoretical base for 
accounting as a profession, and a much-needed Code of Ethics that would 
improve professional practice, is sadly missing (Bakar and Russell 2003). 
Consequently, it can be argued that the LAAA has not succeeded in fulfilling 
its obligations as a regulatory body and is not operating in the public interest. 
Moreover, there have been few efforts by the LAAA to promote continuing 
education and training amongst accounts as a means of improving the status of 
the profession (Shareia, 1994). Hence, the Libyan accounting profession has 
poor status. 
Basically, the LAAA ignores its obligations by failing to specify uniform audit 
report requirements and by not requiring its members to pass professional 
examinations, using only university accounting education as the criterion for 
membership (Kilani, 1988). Furthermore, although the accounting profession is 
defined as in the UK and US (Kilani, 1988), environmental differences mean 
that the profession does not actually operate in the same way, confining itself 
to external financial reporting and external auditing (Bait El-Mal et al, 1973; 
El-Sharif, 1981; Kilani, 1988). 
2.8.1 Libyan Accounting Education and Academic Research 
It was 1954 when accounting education began in Libya, with the establishment 
of the School of Public Administration that had responsibility for training 
government employees in the field of accounting (SPLAJ Secretariat of Work 
and Civil Services). In 1957, in co-ordination with the UN, the School of 
Public Administration became the Institute of Public Administration. Almost a 
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decade later, in 1968, the Institute was upgraded to include nine different 
academic departments, including the Department of Accounting, and was 
named the National Institute of Public Administration. University level 
accounting education also started in 1957 with the founding of the Faculty of 
Economics and Commerce. After the 1969 Revolution, much more attention 
was paid to Higher Education, and consequently, several accounting Faculties 
were established in different cities in Libya during the 1980s and 1990s. 
It is observed (Kilani, 1988) that between the years 1957-76, the English 
accounting curriculum was adopted in the Libyan universities, using 
accounting textbooks that were either British and written in English, this being 
the majority, or produced in Arabic, having been translated from English or 
written by Arabian writers who had graduated from British Universities. 
Mahmud (1997: 267) confirms this historical development, noting that "the 
analysis of the accounting education system in Libya shows that the old system 
(1957-1976) was British-orientated in all its elements (curriculum textbooks 
and faculty members), whereas the new one (1979 present) is American 
orientated". This was explained by Kilani (1988: 175) as resulting from the fact 
that "since 1977 with the return of Libyan nationals from the US, the American 
accounting system was adopted in Libyan universities instead of the British 
education system in the Libyan universities". 
Mahmud (1997) concluded that the UK's influence was strong in the old 
Libyan accounting education system. The accounting programme for the 
Bachelor's degree in the old (British) system required four years, whereas the 
new (American) system is based on sixteen week semesters instead of a full 
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nine month academic year. Until the early 1970s, most of the accounting 
teachers were Egyptian nationals who had graduated from British Universities 
while a few were British, American and Canadian (The Libyan University, 
1973). The shift from British-oriented textbooks to American-oriented 
materials came about, according to Kilani (1988), from the fact that most 
university teachers undertook their education in American Universities. 
Of course, there needs to be a strong relationship between accounting 
education, the practices observed in the profession, and research activity, and it 
is clear that each of these three components influences, and is influenced by, 
the other two. They are, indeed, complementary, for instance, in terms of 
accounting practices and education, it can be argued that accounting education 
is considered as the starting point for developing an accounting profession. 
Additionally, education provides the profession with fresh blood that sustains 
the profession. The profession in turn, provides the practical experience that is 
then used in the content of lectures to classes, as well as the financial support 
for accounting programmes at many colleges and universities. With regard to 
the link between the profession and research, the profession usually provides 
the data and funds required for research projects, and then reap the benefits in 
terms of being made aware of best practice. Finally, the relationship between 
accounting education and research is evident, since as noted by Bait-El-Mal 
(1990), research underpins education which becomes stale without it. Research 
enriches education, while education equips an accountant with professional 
competence. In fact, however, there has been little activity amongst staff 
members of accounting departments in Libyan universities, and what research 
has been undertaken has been on a small scale only. 
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Research on a small scale has been conducted via projects forming part of the 
requirements for either MSc or PhD degrees. In this regard, after the 1969 
Revolution, the Libyan government devoted more attention to Higher 
Education and offered many scholarships for Libyan graduates to pursue their 
education abroad, either in the USA or the UK, as was the then government 
policy in respect of accounting students. This policy was interrupted, however, 
since political issues had negative effects upon the relationship between Libya 
and the USA and UK. The relationship with the USA began to sour in 1979 
when the American Embassy in Tripoli was mobbed, and three years later in 
1982 the American government banned oil imports from Libya and all exports 
from the USA to Libya were stopped. The relationship with the UK began to 
go wrong with the killing of a British policewoman during a demonstration 
outside the Libyan Peoples' Bureau in London in April 1984. This event led to 
the break in diplomatic relations between the two countries. The relationship 
with the USA worsened in 1986 when the previous sanctions were 
strengthened because of alleged continued terrorist activities. In that year, the 
Reagan administration froze all Libyan assets in the USA, and American 
warplanes bombed Tripoli and Benghazi suspecting that there had been Libyan 
involvement in the bombing of a Berlin nightclub. The most negative effect on 
the Libyan relationship with the USA and the UK was the Lockerbie disaster, 
in which a 747 aircraft exploded over Scotland, and two Libyans were 
suspected of planting a bomb on board. As a result, the American and British 
representatives to the UN Security Council succeeded in convincing the 
Council to impose sanctions on Libya from 1992 until 1999. One outcome of 
all these political events was a sharp decrease in the number of students who 
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were sent to the USA and the UK, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Consequently, there exists an extreme skills gap and shortage of academic 
accountants within Libyan universities and institutes, and this negatively 
affects the quantity and quality of accounting and auditing research. 
During the period between 1992 and 1999, foreign involvement in all Libyan 
industry was severely reduced as a result of the sanctions and embargoes 
imposed, although after sanctions were removed Libya returned to the 
international community. Since mid-2004 foreign investment has been 
forthcoming and the entire sector seems poised for new development (Otman, 
2005). 
Since that time, and with more cordial relationships with European countries 
and the USA, Libya has become re-instated on the world stage, and a number 
of international companies have invested in the country. In an attempt to give a 
greater role to the private sector in economic activity, the following years have 
witnessed a continuation of the privatisation policy of some manufacturing and 
service companies (Central Bank of Libya, 2007). 
As part of this return to normal political relations, the Libyan government once 
more paid attention to Higher Education and offered many scholarships for 
Libyan graduates to pursue their education abroad, for example the General 
People's Committee of Higher Education offered scholarships for 11,000 
students during the period between 2006 and 2008, and other sectors, such as 
banking, offer their employees similar opportunities (GPC of Higher 
Education, 2009). The government policy is to focus on the USA and the UK 
as providers of accounting education. Additionally, the oil sector is an 
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important sponsor of such education, since it is a major contributor to Libya's 
national development. This is seen not only in terms of revenue and technology 
transfer, but from the viewpoint of creating employment and expanding human 
capability, since the NOC requires all foreign investors in the sector, who 
undoubtedly require large numbers of employees, to "employ Libyan nationals 
and accept responsibility for training 20% of these nationals annually, either 
locally or overseas" (NOC 2006). 
It is the function of the National Oil Corporation (NOC) Training Department 
to source and administer training courses and conferences for the Libyan Oil 
Sector, and in this respect it looks to the UK, Europe, Middle East, and North 
America as providers. Through its own resources, it provides training, and 
organises courses for its clients. It also arranges conferences, technical craft 
courses, and supports university courses at postgraduate level (NOC, 2009). 
Over 400 training courses are arranged annually, catering for the needs of over 
1,000 trainees per month. As an example of such activity, the figures for 2002 
are offered, which show that nearly 2,500 staff attended training courses in the 
UK and throughout the world. 
Undoubtedly, the investment in accounting education and training, made 
initially to satisfy the needs of the oil companies, has had a spin-off effect 
within the country generally, as the British and American accounting practices 
have been transferred from the oil and gas sector to other sectors with the 
movement of employees in and out of the sector (Saleh, 2001). 
45 
2.8.2 Accounting Professional Body in Libya 
It was not until 1973 that auditing regulations were introduced in Libya. Prior 
to that time, there was no requirement for business enterprises to have their 
financial statements scrutinised and certified by an independent auditor. 
Instead, it was only necessary for such documents to be agreed by the legal 
representative of the taxpayer (the business) and this person could simply be a 
chartered accountant (Law No. 64 of 1973). On 20th December 1973, however, 
the Libyan government finally enacted Law No. 116 of 1973, which 
established the LAAA as a body which would develop the auditing profession 
in Libya. The LAAA was given the following objectives: 
1) To organise and improve the condition of the auditing profession and raise 
the standards of accountants and auditors professionally, academic, 
culturally and socially. 
2) To organise conferences, seminars and to participate in such conferences 
and seminars internally and externally and to keep in touch with new 
events, scientific periodicals, lectures, and so on. 
3) To establish assistance and pension funds for its members. 
4) To increase cooperation between its members and to protect their rights 
and 
5) To take action against members who violate the traditions and ethics of the 
profession. 
2.8.2.1 Registration as a Chartered Accountant in Libya 
It is not permitted for any accountant in Libya to perform any kind of auditing 
activity without being registered as a chartered accountant with the LAAA 
(Law No. 116, article 32). This regulation is intended to guarantee that all 
audits are performed by people who have the appropriate qualifications, and 
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who are at the same time, properly supervised. LAAA registration in itself can 
only be obtained if the following conditions are met. 
1. Citizenship: applicants for membership of the LAAA must be Libyan 
citizens. 
2. Residence: applicants should reside in Libya. 
3. Educational experience: applicants should have an accounting degree from 
the Faculty of Economics and Commerce of a Libyan university, or any 
other recognised university or higher institute. For applicants to be 
registered in the accountants' register they must have at least five years' 
experience of accounting work in an accounting office after graduation. 
Those who have a degree higher than a bachelor's degree are exempt from 
the experience requirement, provided that the higher degree required four 
or more years training. Those who are already practising the profession 
who do not have a University or Higher Institute degree should be 
registered as working auditors on condition that they may only be 
considered as accountants or auditors' assistants. 
The Executive Memorandum of Law No. 116 of 1973 explains Article 24 of the 
law which relates to the required qualifications and experience for registration 
with the LAAA, as a chartered account which are: 
1) Doctoral degree in accounting, auditing, taxation or costing from any 
recognised Arab or international university. 
2) Membership of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales. 
3) Membership of the American Accountants Association. 
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4) Any certificate equivalent to those mentioned above obtained from any 
recognised university or institute specialising in accounting or auditing 
that required four years or more for graduation. 
5) Bachelor's degree in accounting in addition to five years' experience of 
accounting work in an accounting office or doing one of the following 
jobs: 
- Manager or head of an accounting or auditing department in the 
Treasury Ministry. 
- Accountant or auditor working for the Accounting Council. 
- Accountant or auditor working for the Taxation Authority. 
- Manager or head of an Accounting department in a public bank or 
enterprise. 
- Teacher of accounting or auditing in any public university or 
institute. 
- Any other jobs equivalent to the jobs mentioned above approved by 
the LAAA. 
6) Three years' experience of work in a capacity mentioned above, in 
addition to the following: 
- Membership of the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants 
in England or any equivalent certificate. 
- Membership of the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants 
in England or any equivalent certificate. 
- Membership of the Taxation Association in England or any 
equivalent certificate. 
2.8.3 The Libyan commercial code 
The Libyan Commercial Code (LCC) was issued in 1953 and has been 
amended a number of times. It covers rules on corporation books and records 
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keeping and financial reporting. The LCC version 1972, Article No. 58, 
requires that each enterprise must have at least the following books: a journal, 
an inventory book and balance sheet book. 
However, before being used, the books must be notarised by the Court of First 
Instance. According to the statement made by the government in 1972, Article 
No. 570 corporations (joint stock companies) are required to keep the 
following records: 
1) a register of members; 
2) a register of bondholders; 
3) a minute book of members' meetings; 
4) a minute book of director's meeting; 
5) a minute book of statutory auditor's meetings; 
6) a minute book of executive committee's meetings and 
7) a minute book of bondholders' meetings. 
Further, the provisions of LCC state every corporation's board of directors is 
responsible for preparing a balance sheet and a profit and losses account once a 
year. Article 573 of LCC details the items of assets and liabilities that must be 
reported in any corporation's balance sheet. The financial statements are to be 
reported to the general assembly of shareholders for approval (Libyan 
Government, 1972 Article 572). A copy of an approved balance sheet and 
profit and losses account must be submitted to the Commercial Register (CR) 
within thirty days of its approval. This is to be accompanied by the director's 
report and auditing board report (Libyan Government, 1972, Article 583). 
2.8.4 Tax Law 
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The first tax law used in the country was the Italian tax law in 1923. After 
independence the new government asked for technical help from the UN to 
reform its economy, and continuation of the 1923 Italian tax law was one of the 
UN's recommendations (Bait-El-Mal, 1981). In 1968, the government had used 
the Italian tax law, which was used before independence with modification to 
suit the Libyan environments. This law became the first unified tax law to be 
implemented in Libya (El-Sharif, 1981). Before the last version of the present 
tax law in early 2005, there was a second attempt to establish a tax law to suit 
the Libya in 1973. According to Bit-El-Mal (1981: 51), the new tax law No. 64 
1973 shows no significant differences from the previous one. 
2.9 Summary 
This chapter has examined in detail, the practice of auditing in Libya. In doing 
so, it has initially considered the Libyan context in the full knowledge that the 
auditing profession has necessarily been influenced in its development and 
current operation by the national environment. The fact that Libya is a large 
country with a relatively small population concentrated in the coastal strip area 
has been highlighted, as also has Libya's strategic position in respect of Africa 
and Europe, which essentially places it well for trade, although in historic 
times, this also acted as a magnet for colonisers who all left their mark on the 
country. It has been particularly noted that during the Italian occupation, the 
beginnings of an accounting system emerged, and with the development of the 
oil and gas industry, the accounting profession in particular, has been 
influenced by the UK and the USA, whose standards and procedures have been 
imported. 
50 
It has also been shown how the Al Fateh Revolution brought about a series of 
reforms over several years, such that now privatisation legislation has 
progressed substantially, and much foreign capital is now vested in businesses 
in Libya, although it remains that the oil sector is fundamental in underpinning 
the country's economy. Given the importance of preserving efficient operations 
within the oil sector, the performance of accounting and auditing professionals 
has been shown to be of special interest to Libya, and the chapter has given this 
matter detailed consideration. In this respect, the history of accounting 
development, education and academic research, has been discussed, and it is 
noted how, since the normalisation of Libya's relationships with the rest of the 
world, once again graduates are being sent abroad for postgraduate education 
and training in the accounting/auditing field. The LAAA, established in 1973 
as the regulatory body, has been considered in detail, and it has been noted that 
its remit is in keeping with that of similar organisations elsewhere in the world. 
In particular, the requirements for registration with the LAAA are shown to be 
demanding, and this stands as a signal that the aim is to produce a reputable 
profession. 
Unfortunately, however, the political rifts between Libya and the UK and USA 
during the 1980s and 1990s did stem the flow of graduates from these 
countries, and hence the flow of new academic accountants and this has had a 
negative influence on the auditing and accounting research in Libya, which it is 
important to remedy. The next chapter provides an in-depth review of the 





This chapter aims to provide a brief review of the extensive literature that has 
been developed on audit quality in terms of some selected variables, and is 
organised as follows: the first four sections focus on auditing, providing a 
definition, a consideration of its importance, the demand for auditing services, 
and auditing objectives. Section five introduces the concept of audit quality, 
and in sub-sections addresses its definition, issues relating to auditor 
independence, and the attributes of professional auditors. The chapter 
progresses to address the factors that impair and enhance audit quality (section 
3.7), and specifically, the size of the audit firm, the provision of non-audit 
services (NAS), the length of audit tenure, the level of competition in the audit 
market, and fees for audit services are considered. These variables are all 
considered as surrogates, which are used to examine audit quality in various 
countries. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary. 
3.2 Definition of Auditing 
As a profession, accounting is concerned with gathering information regarding 
financial matters, and summarising and communicating this information. It is 
particularly associated with business organisations and a wide range of players 
are involved make use of the information provided, such as creditors, banks, 
government agencies, shareholders, investors, and financial analysts. 
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Within the discipline of accounting, auditing stands as a particular function, 
which according to the American Accounting Association Committee (AAAC) 
(cited in Dunn, 1996) is a means of systematically and "objectively obtaining 
and evaluating evidence regarding assertions about economic actions and 
events to ascertain the degree of correspondence between those assertions and 
established criteria and communicating the results to interested users". Arens et 
al (1997: 20) describe accounting as a procedure whereby "a competent, 
independent person accumulates evidence about quantifiable information 
related to a specific economic entity for the purpose of determining and 
reporting on the degree of correspondence between the quantifiable 
information and established criteria". 
Clearly, and as expected, these definitions have some common ingredients, the 
first of which relates to the need for objectivity and independence. A second 
common theme is the gathering of relevant information, and from these first 
two features, it follows that for the auditor to perform his/her job effectively, 
s/he must be properly qualified and competent to source the appropriate 
information, and conduct a comprehensive investigation in a totally objective 
and independent fashion, before reaching conclusions on what the information 
conveys. 
A third feature that is implied in both definitions is the fact that auditing is 
regarded as a systematic process, thereby highlighting a set of rules to be 
followed. A final commonality is the business of communicating the outcome 
of the process such that the users of the audited information reported can 
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establish the amount of agreement between an organisation's financial goals 
and their actual achievement. 
3.3 The Importance of Auditing 
As already indicated, auditing is part of the wider discipline of accounting, and 
its specific purpose is to verify that an organisation's financial and economic 
information present an objective indication of the organisation's financial 
situation. Implicit in this is the idea that any developments, whether positive or 
negative, will be revealed in the audit. In many countries it is a legal 
requirement for all public companies to instruct independent auditors to 
examine their financial affairs, since "the audit function is intended to prevent 
doubt arising about the quality of the financial accounting information that the 
law requires the company to present to its shareholders" (Lee and Kenley, 
1985: 10). Audited financial statements also represent a way to confirm or 
correct information received earlier by the market. Effectively, audited 
statements play a part in assuring market efficiency, since they curtail the 
existence of information which is wrong and hence, may damage the market. 
The importance of the audit process, is therefore, seen in respect of the users of 
audited financial information, who can range from principal shareholders right 
down to members of the public, who can easily be affected by a financial crisis 
in a company that might appear at first sight to be quite unrelated to them. Such 
users turn to independently-audited documentation in the expectation that the 
financial information is both (1) unbiased and contains no management spin, 
and (2) neutral with respect to the various groups it involves. Such published 
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financial information is also important as the basis on which judgements are 
made for investment, and lending decisions (Gill et al, 1999). 
The need for independent audit within the general business environment can be 
seen to arise from four circumstances, which are identified by (AAA, 1973) as 
being: 
1. Conflict of interest (potential or real): This may occur between the 
provider of information, and the eventual user, and may be reflected in 
bias in the information given for general consumption. 
2. Consequence: Often financial information is used as a basis for 
decisions that will have significant consequences, and as seen above, 
without independence in the auditing process, information may be 
offered that is biased, misleading, irrelevant or incomplete. 
3. Complexity: With the growth of a more sophisticated business 
environment, the information to be communicated has become more 
complex, and users have found it more difficult or even impossible, to 
obtain direct assurance about the quality of the information with they 
are presented. 
4. Remoteness: Sometimes, the recipient of financial information is not 
close to the source of that information, and is unable to personally and 
directly check its quality (Hermanson et al, 1993). 
3.4 The Demand for Auditing Services 
Depending on the reasons why an audit is performed and hence, the focus of 
the audit, the type of auditing services differs, and in this respect there are 
many varieties of service that can be performed. The demand for auditing 
arises from three sources according to Benston (1985), the first being from 
owner-managers, professional managers, and investors who wish to ensure 
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contract compliance. Government represents the second source, and the 
general public (i. e. clients, citizens and watchdogs) the third. 
In the case of owner-managers, the rationale for audit is, as noted by Benston 
(1985), concerned with the possibility that employees may attempt to make 
personal gains and consequently, may misreport their activities. The potential 
for them to do this is believed to be reduced by an internal audit process but 
the possibility still remains that collusion may take place between the auditor 
and the audited, and therefore, an external audit performed by an independent 
expert is a better way of monitoring employee performance. Moreover, outside 
investors (shareholders) may wish to secure independent assessments from 
external auditors because they want to guard against any temptation for owner- 
managers to use company resources for their personal benefit. Clearly, owner- 
managers are in a prime position to do this, leaving outside investors with little 
opportunity to directly monitor their actions, so an independent auditing 
process ensures that owner-managers are doing their jobs professionally and 
ethically. Such a process is both beneficial to investors and owner-managers 
since it makes management actions transparent and this helps to safeguard the 
reputation of the owner-managers themselves. Sometimes also, owner- 
managers want to withdraw from active management and to employ instead 
professional managers, and clearly in these instances, owners want guarantees 
that professional managers and employees have no opportunity to make false 
reports for personal gain. In all these circumstances, the role performed by 
auditors in respect of guaranteeing the credibility of financial statements is 
crucial. 
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In the case of government requirements for audit, these emerge from the need 
to be able to assess taxation obligations, and also to be certain of an 
organisation's stability, especially if government is a likely investor, and 
greater confidence in financial reports is promoted by independent auditors. 
Government financial reporting requirements differ in their degree of 
complexity, and the more complex they are, and the higher the cost involved 
to an organisation by not complying with these, the greater the need to engage 
the services of a professional auditor. 
In the case of public demand, it is customers, citizens and watchdogs, who 
have a stake in this respect, since the financial condition of producers is of 
both direct and indirect concern to the general public, even in respect of non- 
governmental products and services. In the banking sector, for example, there 
is a clear need for the general public to be informed since personal deposits are 
entrusted to banks, and complete assurances are required regarding banks' 
effective management. Hence, there is a demand for auditing services. 
Likewise, the general public has an interest in the management of government 
monopolies since the resources of such enterprises are in public ownership, 
and there is always the possibility that officials might misuse these without 
proper accountability. Again, independent auditing guarantees effective use of 
public resources, and at the same time, protects the reputation of officials. In 
respect of watchdog organisations with responsibility for monitoring other 
organisations, they too require audit services as part of their method for 
carrying out their supervision role, since without these they would be unable to 
report to the general public that the organisations within their remit were 
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operating properly. Watchdogs want legislation or government regulations that 
require corporate and government reports to be certified by auditing. 
Pike (2003), however, also provides another reason for the demand for 
auditing services, this being information asymmetry, and his point is 
confirmed by the history of the development of auditing, which shows that 
with increasing separation of ownership and control, and increasing 
specialisation of auditors, the symmetry of information between auditors and 
owners diminishes and this is problematic (Pike 2003). 
Figure 3.1: The Demand for Monitoring 
Titman and Trueman (1986) argue that an entrepreneur who wishes to provide 
favourable publication information about a firm's value will employ a higher- 
quality auditor and investment banker than an entrepreneur who has less 
favourable information to disclose. Consequently, audited reports resolve 
information asymmetry, thereby providing a more appropriate valuation and 
pricing of the firm. 
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3.5 Objectives of External Auditing 
The role of external auditors in financial statements has been documented by 
the British Standard, Statement of Auditing Standard SAS 100, Objectives and 
General Principles Governing an Audit of Financial Statements. This 
emphasises that an audit in this context has the primary goal of enabling 
auditors to provide an assurance that financial statements in their totality 
properly reflect an accurate picture of a given financial situation, and have 
been produced according to the required accounting procedures. The IFAC 
Handbook (IFAC, 1997: 50) is clear that the purpose of external auditing is "to 
enable the auditor to express an opinion whether the financial statements are 
prepared in all material respects, in accordance with an identified financial 
reporting framework", and this is confirmed in the ISA Exposure Draft 
(2004: 56). Clearly, to form an opinion, auditors must collect enough audit 
evidence. The main audit objectives can be seen as: 
" To make sure that financial statements do give a true and fair view of 
an organisation's financial position, and inform users if, in the auditor's 
opinion, there is misrepresentation or insufficient evidence for the 
auditor to say whether or not there is fair presentation. 
9 To emphasise management's responsibility in preparing the financial 
statements since it is 'management who supply information to the 
auditor and who decide what to disclose, where there is choice in this 
matter. 
" To explain the auditor's role in reviewing financial statements, and the 
fact that it is his/her responsibility to discover material errors, illegal 
acts and other irregularities. Only by acting in this investigative way, 
can an auditor show his/her efforts to find any misrepresentation in the 
financial documentation s/he is reviewing. 
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3.6 Audit Quality 
According to the literature, auditing has an influence on the integrity of 
financial information, since the greater the level of the audit, the greater it is 
likely that more accurate information will be presented (Colbert and Murray, 
1998; Davidson and Neu, 1993; DeAngelo, 1981a; Lennox, 1999a). This idea 
is, however, one that is usually taken for granted because it is hard to obtain 
empirical measures of audit quality, and there is disagreement in the literature 
as to whether one should assume that audit quality can differ. Indeed, several 
writers (see, for example: Choi et al, 2008; Nichols and Smith, 1983; Simunic, 
1980; Wyer et al, 1988), have not been able to identify any instances of 
variation in audit quality, whereas others have found evidence of differences 
(see, for example: DeAngelo, 1981a; DeFond et al, 2002; Francis, . 
1984; 
Lennox, 1999c; Reisch, 2000; Rushinek and Rushinek, 1990; Vanstraelen, 
2000). Undoubtedly, the value of an auditor's report is ultimately connected 
with the rigour with which the audit process has been approached. 
In recognition of the difficulty in measuring audit quality, scholars have chosen 
to use surrogates for audit quality, which have included: the size of the audit 
firm, the provision of NAS, auditor tenure, and audit fees (see, for example: 
Shawn and Dana, 2008; Feamley et al, 2005; DeAngelo, 1981a; Al-Mogbel, 
2006; Jensen et al, 2005; Palmrose, 1988; Beatty, 1989; Rushinek and 
Rushinek, 1990; Burgstahler et al, 2006; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Deis and 
Giroux, 1992; O'Keefe and Westort, 1992; Gonthier-Besacier et al, 2007; Jang 
and Lin, 1993; Mutchler et al, 1997; Geiger et al, 2006b; Colbert and Murray, 
1998; Lennox, 1999b; Morris and Strawser, 1999; Krishnan and Schauer, 
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2000; Krishnan, 2005; Chung and Kallapur, 2003; Ashbaugh et al, 2003; 
Frankel et al, 2002; Gul et al, 2003; Watts and Zimmerman; 1983; Ghosh and 
Moon 2005; Bae et al, 2007). 
In the following sub-section, these various factors that have been taken as 
substitutes for audit quality are briefly considered. 
3.6.1 Definition of Audit Quality 
A precise definition of audit quality is difficult to identify, since some scholars 
consider the concept in relation to the extent to which the audit conforms to the 
required auditing standards (Krishnan and Schauer, 2001; McConnell and 
Banks, 1998; Tie, 1999). However, other writers accept that audit quality has 
multiple dimensions, resulting in varied definitions, the classic one perhaps 
being provided by DeAngelo (1981a) who suggests that audit quality is the co- 
existing probabilities that an auditor will discover and also report any 
infringement in a client's system of accounting. A similar approach is taken by 
Lee et al (1999) who make the point that when confronted with material errors 
in a financial statement, an auditor will not accept this, and will instead make 
some qualification on that statement. According to some researchers (see for 
example: Beatty, 1989; Titman and Trueman, 1986), the accuracy of the 
information reported on by the auditors, will be reflected in the audit quality. 
Palmrose (1998) agrees with this idea, defining audit quality in assurance 
terms, since the aim of the audit process is to give an assurance about the 
accuracy of financial statements. The probability that such statements are free 
from bias and mis-representation is embraced by the term audit quality, which 
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is reflected in the results of the audit process. Of course, the question remains 
as to how the users of audited financial statements actually assess their level of 
assurance and reliability. The definition of audit quality, according to Palmrose 
(1988), is restricted to something that can only be seen after the event. 
An auditor's ability to determine whether a financial statement contains fact or 
fiction is derived from his/her professional expertise, which should encourage 
him/her to report accurately and disclose any incorrect statements. However, 
an auditor's behaviour in this respect (his level of independence/objectivity) 
may be influenced by several factors, such as economic dependence on a client 
(Lord, 1992), competition in the audit market (Shockley, 1981), and the policy 
of the audit firm to which he belongs (Johnstone et al, 2001). 
According to Francis (2004), audit quality is positively associated with 
earnings quality, and as noted by Raghunandan (1993), auditors' reports are 
used by investors, together with other financial statements to help in making 
decisions concerning investment. Consequently, audit quality is important for 
the general public. 
Perhaps because it is recognised that audit quality is important and of great 
relevance to a much wider population than might be thought initially, the idea 
that audit quality should be tied to standards, as indicated in the first paragraph 
in this section, is popular. In this respect, Sutton (1987) argues that audit 
quality should be defined as the degree to which auditing conforms to a set of 
pre-determined standards related to the characteristics determining marketplace 
value and the service's performance of the function for which it was designed. 
Hence, as Reed, Trombley and Dhaliwal (2000) comment, audit quality relates 
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to the degree to which the process follows the prescribed standards for 
auditing, the extent to which the client's expectations of the client are met, and 
the degree to which the social responsibilities of the profession are satisfied. 
Moizer (1993) believes that a true definition should emphasise the two main 
conditions of a quality audit, these being that it is both technically competent 
and independent. Technical competence is taken to mean that the auditor has 
the expertise to know what evidence is required, and that s/he has the ability to 
interpret this accurately and is able to identify frauds and errors if present. An 
independent auditor must either correct, or disclose any material frauds and/or 
errors that s/he has detected, but an auditor who is not independent may choose 
not to do so. Ideally, there should be a positive relationship between expertise 
and independence. 
The two common factors in the many definitions coming forward from writers 
in the field are demand and supply in respect of independent and competent 
auditors. 
The use of these substitute definitions may allow for variations in legal systems 
and differences in the efficiency of capital markets that may exist between 
developed countries and developing countries since the legal system and 
capital markets in developed countries are likely to be more efficient than those 
in developing countries. 
3.6.2 Auditor Independence and Audit Quality 
According to Pike (2003), auditor independence is the foundation of the 
auditing profession, and as argued by Richard (2006), high levels of audit 
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quality rely on the proper balance between the auditor's independence, 
competence, professional and personal relationships. 
Higson (2003) without auditor independence, the issue of whether the figures 
in the financial reports are correct is seriously called into question, meaning 
that in fact an audit carried out in such circumstances is actually a waste of 
time. Pike (2003) recognises that the requirement for auditor independence 
resolves conflict between auditors and owners, since the auditor must abide by 
standards set by the profession. As a result, the importance of auditor 
independence is a variable that should be considered in research activity. 
Over recent years, however, an increasing concern has emerged in connection 
with auditor independence and the resulting audit quality, since it is accepted 
by the SEC and the AICPA, and the literature in the field, that high quality 
audits are required to underpin the proper operation of the capital market 
system. During the 1990s, various influences brought changes in the audit 
field. Firstly, the importance of revenue from non-audit activities to audit firms 
increased. Secondly, legal reforms decreased the liability of audit firms as also 
did the ability to organise as limited liability entities. Combined with these 
events, some of the largest audit firms merged. This raised developing 
anxieties about auditor independence and audit quality, apparent in comments 
from SEC regulators (Wallman, 1996; Saul, 1996; Schuetze, 1994; Levitt, 
1998; Turner, 1999,2000). It is fair to say that the profession itself tried to 
stem concerns about increasingly-impaired independence and the resulting 
decreased audit quality, but there is no doubt that difficulties surface when an 
auditor is not independent and is thus, less motivated to perform a quality 
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audit, and if misstatements are detected but go unreported, it is not easy to 
identify quality and independence. 
According to the A1CPA and SEC, independence is generally defined as a state 
of mind that is conducive to objective and unbiased judgements in relation to 
the reporting of financial matters. However, regardless of the search for total 
independence, academic research concerning the psychology of decision- 
making suggests that it is not possible for rational human beings to operate in 
the absence of bias (Bazerman et al, 1997). DeAngelo (1981a) believes that 
one should talk in terms of the probability of disclosing a material 
misstatement if discovered, by an auditor who may have economic incentives 
not to do so (DeAngelo 1981 a). Theory suggests that the characteristics of both 
the auditor and the client, together with the existing relationship between them, 
are likely to be influential on auditor independence and audit quality. 
There is a difficulty, however, concerning DeAngelo's (1981a) definition, that 
being the problem of actually recognising independence in the auditing 
process, since the only opportunity to observe breaches is when they are 
brought to the attention of the client. Hence, it is not possible to gauge the 
conditional probability. It is perhaps more useful to take features that are 
observable, for example audit quality, and personal circumstances, and infer 
from the level of quality whether the auditor is independent or otherwise. Good 
quality in the situation where the auditor has incentives to bend the rules, can 
be taken as a demonstration of independence, as too can a hard-earned 
reputation for quality. Such reputation is the product of various public 
messages regarding the audit firm's commitment to quality (Ippolito, 1990, 
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Gallouj, 1997) and of other observable factors, for example the absence of 
litigation, the lack of audit failure, or the compulsory provision of 
documentation that reports on the accuracy of previous estimates for different 
accounting periods. Given that there are not many opportunities to observe 
quality, they assume greater importance. Indeed, much research has probed this 
issue of how independence is perceived, and the consensus is that the concept 
of perception is of no value in this respect (Farmer et al, 1987; Lowe and Party, 
1994; Pearson, 1985). 
Clearly, audit quality is associated with the degree of independence 
demonstrated by the auditor, as promoted by the variables already mentioned 
(firm size, tenure, fees, and NAS), but it is also a function, as noted by Richard 
(2006), of the appropriate balance between auditors' freedom and their 
personal and professional relationships with the client. In this connection, a 
study by Kleinman et al (1998) examined the interaction between auditors and 
clients on auditor independence, finding the need to achieve a professionally- 
acceptable balance. Their model of the relationship between auditor 
independence (as shown by audit firm characteristics) and audit quality is 
provided as Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2: The Relationship between Audit Firm Characteristics and Auditor 
Independence and Audit Quality 
3.6.3 Auditor Attributes and Audit Quality 
The literature and standards governing audit conduct, do highlight a number of 
factors that can promote and strengthen audit quality, all of which can be 
categorised as ability and professional conduct (Catanach and Walker, 1999). 
Auditor attributes covering such characteristics as ability to scrutinise, 
technical competence, knowledge, experience, industry specialisation, 
technological proficiency (Catanach and Walker, 1999), and professional 
scepticism (IAASB, 2004b), are seen to be pre-requisites. 
With respect to industry specialisation, it has been confirmed by several studies 
(Balsam et al, 2003; Owhoso et al, 2002) that auditor knowledge of the 
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industry provides the auditor with the capacity to be more effective and to 
report lower discretionary accruals than those of non-specialist auditors, and 
according to other studies (Hogan and Jeter, 1999; Solomon et al, 1999) to 
promote high quality. It is also found (Lys and Watts, 1994) that technological 
proficiency is a positive attribute of auditors since this allows for the provision 
of more structured audit activities that improve audit quality. 
ISA 240 states that auditors should demonstrate a questioning mind, a critical 
assessment of audit evidence, and proper planning and execution of an audit 
(IAASB, 2004a). It also places a duty on auditors to identify any fraudulent 
activities (IAASB, 2004b). Clearly, this regulation is aimed at developing 
professional scepticism in the interests of a rigorous audit process. 
Likewise, the AICPA (1991: 4-12) stipulates the need for auditors to display 
their independence, objectivity, integrity, due professional care, and judgement 
(Catanach and Walker, 1999; Porter et al, 2003), and the APB (2004) focuses 
on the requirement for integrity, objectivity, and independence as ethical 
standards to be upheld in the auditing process. The IFAC (2005) emphasises 
independence as the key attribute from which integrity, objectivity, and 
professional scepticism follow. All of these characteristics signal the absolute 
requirement for the absence of any personal bias whatsoever within auditors 
(Porter et al, 2003). 
Unfortunately, the difficulty in measuring audit quality has led researchers to 
use different variables as surrogates for audit quality, such as size of the audit 
firm, auditor tenure, the provision of NAS, competition, and fees for audit 
services. This research attempts to elicit professionals' perception of these 
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factors with the aim of gaining insight into audit quality factors that may be 
unobservable by the public. 
3.7 Factors Impairing and Enhancing Audit Quality 
3.7.1 Size of the Audit Firm 
The literature indicates that satisfactory levels of audit quality are usually more 
evident in large audit firms than in small ones, the reason being that the larger 
the firm, the higher the number of clients, and the greater the probability that 
the range of services provided is bigger. This minimises dependency on 
particular clients. Additionally, large firms have more resources and are able to 
take steps to publicise their services and develop a reputation. As a result of 
this, they are usually considered as providing a high quality service, and the 
size of the audit firm has, therefore, been used as a surrogate for audit quality 
(DeAngelo, 1981 a). Large audit firms (the Big Four for example) can devote 
much investment to the provision of training courses and other resources 
necessary to ensure their staff are competent, able to perform the audit function 
to a high standard, and are less likely to be compromised by actions of clients 
(DeAngelo, 1981b; Dopuch, 1984; Gul, 1991; Wilson and Grimlund, 1990). A 
discussion of firm size, its characteristics and the various empirical studies that 
have identified its relationship with audit quality now follows. 
Size of audit firm is identified in different proxies in the literature. Several 
researchers have considered this in terms of the provision of multi-services to 
many clients (DeAngelo, 1981a; Dopuch, 1984; Gul, 1991; Wilson and 
Grimlund, 1990), in terms of the proportion of fees charged for both audit and 
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NAS (Shockley, 1982), as the audit firm's market share revenue (Gul, 1991; 
Porter et al, 1996), or on the basis of internationality (Jang and Lin, 1993; 
Mutchler et al, 1997; Krishnan, 2003) using variations between the Big Eight, 
Six, now Four, and non-Big Four. 
3.7.1.1 Features of Audit Firms 
Other features of audit firms such as the size and number of audit clients, are 
also regarded as signals of quality. In this respect, it has been suggested by 
researchers that large audit firms produce a higher level of audit quality than 
small audit firms (see, for example; Colbert and Murray 1998; Davidson and 
Neu 1993; DeAngelo 1981a; Lennox 1999b), although the profession itself 
rejects this idea. In fact, large audit firms are increasingly criticised on the 
basis of their size, by both regulators and smaller firms within the auditing 
profession. 
This is an issue about which the literature offers much debate because whilst 
on the one hand, large audit firms usually provide highly-structured training 
programmes and aim to differentiate their audit approaches from their 
competitors, thereby showing relatively higher levels of consensus (Lin et al, 
2003), some researchers do, on the other hand, argue that audit firm size has no 
influence on quality, since there is homogeneity across different sized audit 
firms due to professional standards, and consequently the size of an audit firm 
should be irrelevant in the selection of an auditor. 
Nonetheless, audit quality may be enhanced by the possession of greater 
resources, and potentially more powerful technological capabilities, and 
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consequently as some researchers point out (Beatty, 1989; Titman and 
Trueman, 1986), larger firms that possess such enhanced resources have more 
potential to produce accurate and precise information than smaller audit firms, 
not least because they may be able to attract top performing auditors. With 
these supposed capabilities, the prestigious big audit firms may be preferred by 
large organisations, such as bankers and underwriters, who can afford to pay 
their enhanced audit fees (see, for example:; Nichols and Smith, 1983; 
Simunic, 1980; Wyer et al, 1988). 
3.7.1.2 Size of Audit Firm and Audit Quality 
A number of reasons exist to explain the importance of the relationship 
between firm size and audit quality. One of these is the fact that audit firm size 
is immediately observable and can therefore be readily used as an indicator of 
audit quality; and another justification is that if a positive relationship can 
indeed be demonstrated between size of audit firm and audit quality, then a 
rationale is provided for the demand for continuing professional education in 
all audit firms, irrespective of their size. Thirdly, if audit quality and size are 
shown to be related, the structure of liability insurance premiums could also be 
affected (Colbert and Murray, 1998). Nevertheless, despite these arguments for 
the importance of audit firm size in producing a quality outcome, it is still 
suggested that audit quality is independent of firm size (Arnett and Danos, 
1979). However, audit firms do provide differing quality audits, increasing 
with the size of firms, in response to varying demands for quality amongst 
clients because different companies have different levels of agency costs 
(Arrunada, 1999). The extent of the debate on this particular issue suggests a 
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difficulty in reaching a policy decision on it, and it is argued (Arnett and 
Danos, 1979) that it is unfair to distinguish between large and small audit firms 
if professional standards and qualifications are maintained throughout the 
sector. They comment: "If we assume that the quality of the auditing is the 
same regardless of the size of the firm performing it, the banker would be 
supplied with the same information on which to base his decision; in this way 
the size of the firm should not necessarily be a consideration" (Arnett and 
Danos, 1979: 6). 
Arguments in the opposite direction are many, and Naser and Al-Khatib (2000) 
have indicated that good quality corporate reporting is associated with the 
status of the audit firm since those that are affiliated to large international firms 
are known to publish high-quality information. These large international audit 
firms do have a reputation it is true, and arguably in order to protect this, their 
audit quality and credibility, must be consistently good. This may, of course, 
be reflected in audit fees. 
Recent research by Michael (2007) has demonstrated that clients audited by 
large firms generally have lower abnormal accruals, and are more likely to 
meet the benchmark earnings targets of small profits and small earnings 
increases. Additionally, Michael (2007) found that large offices are more likely 
to issue going-concern reports. Clearly, there is a substantial difference in audit 
quality depending upon the size of the audit company, larger ones producing 
higher quality audits. Indeed, Abu Bakar et al (2005) reported that audit firm 
size appears to be the most influential factor in securing audit quality and 
auditor independence. 
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This position was noted by DeAngelo (1981a), but she suggested a theoretical 
basis, this being that the relationship between clients and incumbent auditors is 
a two-sided monopoly, in which both parties wish to retain their established 
relationship, because neither one has a perfect substitute available. Clients need 
auditors with good reputations, and in turn those auditors need clients who can 
afford to pay them, so an end to their relationship would be damaging on both 
sides. Additionally, this theory predicts an inverse relationship between the size 
of the start-up transaction costs and auditor turnover. When auditors earn 
client-specific quasi-rents, audit quality is not independent of auditor firm size, 
as these quasi-rents serve as collateral against opportunistic behaviour, when 
subject to loss from the discovery of audit quality that is lower than expected. 
This suggests that the bigger the audit firm, as measured by the number of 
current clients, and the smaller the client as a proportion of the audit 
company's total quasi-rents, the less incentive there is for the auditor to behave 
opportunistically, and the greater the perceived audit quality. Hence, there is 
greater incentive for large audit firms to supply higher quality audits to avoid 
any damage to their reputation. Consequently, audit firm size serves as a proxy 
for audit quality. 
Offering a different viewpoint on the relationship between firm size and audit 
quality, Dopuch and Simunic (1980) argue that a product-differentiation theory 
can explain many of the apparent monopolistic characteristics of the industry. 
They suggest that different auditing firms are perceived by investors to offer 
auditing services that are qualitatively different, and specifically the former Big 
Eight ( now Big Four) are considered to be more credible than other auditing 
companies. Dopuch and Simunic (1980) consider audit quality to result from 
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the number and extent of audit procedures performed by the auditor, and this in 
turn relates to the resources available to audit firms, since these may allow for 
more powerful tests to be performed. In order to test this hypothesis, Nichols 
and Smith (1983), using a market model methodology on event studies, 
examined whether positive abnormal returns accrue to organisations that move 
from being audited by non-Big Eight to Big Eight auditors, and also whether 
negative abnormal returns accrue to firms which move in the opposite 
direction. They found an apparent positive, but not statistically significant, 
reaction from the market, and consequently did not offer strong support for the 
Dopuch and Simunic (1980) argument. In fact, it has not been determined 
whether this disagreement comes from a weakness in the model, or its 
application by Nichols and Smith (1983). 
Reputable auditors' performance, as perceived by investment bankers and their 
clients, at the time of an Initial Public Offering (IPO), was investigated by 
Menon and Williams (1991), since this is a time when a change to the auditing 
arrangements may have occurred. Their study examined the nature and 
frequency of auditor changes prior to the IPO, and identified the characteristics 
of firms seeking a higher level of auditor credibility by the use of logistic 
regression. All companies that had filed a final prospectus with the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1985 and 1986 for their IPO of 
common stock were included, but in fact there were fewer instances than 
expected of auditor change in companies about to go public. However, where 
such changes did occur, they were in the majority of cases, of small auditors 
being displaced by larger, more reputable ones. 
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Using a sample of audit working papers of 308 Quality Control Reviews 
(QCR) from the period 1984-1989, Deis and Giroux (1992) examined 
independent school district audits and audit quality determinants provided by 
small and independent CPA firms in Texas. Their most important finding was 
that larger firms had less deficient paperwork than smaller firms. In contrast, 
Knapp (1991), investigating the effect of key audit variables in the assessments 
of audit quality of a sample of audit committee members, found no significant 
effect of auditor size on the discovery assessments, although there was more 
probability of disclosure among the Big Eight. 
Jang and Lin (1993) used a similar sample to that of Menon and Williams 
(1991), to examine the relationship between independent auditor selection and 
trading activity. They considered the trading volumes of IPO stocks for 30 days 
after initial offering, and using regression techniques, found trading volume on 
the first trading day to be significantly larger for companies audited by Big 
Eight audit firms than for firms audited by non-Big Eight audit firms. Whilst 
for several subsequent days there was no clear difference, the daily volume was 
smaller for Big Eight audit firms' clients than for the others. 
Davidson and Neu (1993) used management earnings forecasts as another 
surrogate to test the association between audit firm size and audit quality. The 
authors found that a higher level of quality is associated with larger forecast 
errors, since management had fewer opportunities to minimise the difference 
between forecasted and actual income. 
Thus, if larger audit firms provide higher-quality audits, they will be associated 
with larger forecast errors, all else being equal. Likewise, but in a different 
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context, Lee et al (2001) used the Big Six and non-Big Six auditors as a 
surrogate for differentiation of audit quality when investigating the relationship 
between accuracy and bias of earnings' forecasts provided in Australian IPOs. 
They found Big Six auditors' forecasts to be more accurate than non-Big Six 
auditor's predictions, and that Big Six auditors were more conservative than 
their non-Big Six auditors, and produced less optimistic forecasts. 
O'Keefe and Westort (1992) considered the reasons why several studies have 
found a positive relationship between large firm size and the probability of 
error detection. They identified these as being: firstly, personnel in large firms 
become more specialised, and secondly, CPAs in larger firms are involved in 
significantly more continuing professional education than CPAs in small firms. 
Hence, audit teams in big firms are expected to have greater technological 
knowledge than those in small firms, and to be more skilled in the detection 
and correction of errors. 
Research by Krishnan and Schauer (2000) found a relationship between a 
firm's participation in a peer-review process, and financial disclosures, which 
were more likely to be made when such a review was in place. The reason 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) is that large audit firms are often in partnership 
with others and each partner is liable for the firm's debt so peer-review 
monitoring is required to protect all parties' reputations and financial standing, 
and according to Beattie et al (2001), to stand as an additional guarantee of 
auditor independence. Some large audit firms also establish their own internal 
quality review. In the UK, independent units, such as the Joint Monitoring Unit 
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(JMU) and the ACCA monitoring unit are responsible for reviewing the audit 
quality of audit professionals. 
Colbert and Murray (1998) contributed to the literature, which concentrates 
mainly on the larger audit firms, by conducting research with a nationwide 
sample of 422 small firms selected from the Private Companies Practice 
Section (PCPS), the Peer Review Programme (PRP), and the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), which provides 
comprehensive measures of audit firm quality. They found a positive 
association between firm size and audit quality in firms that perform audits, 
reviews, and compilations (but not in firms that perform reviews and 
compilations, but no audits). Hence, audit firm size is only a useful quality 
surrogate for firms that conduct audits. 
Mutchler et al (1997) point out that Big Six auditors were more likely than 
their non-Big Six counterparts to issue going-concern opinions, suggesting that 
larger firms are prepared to take an aggressive in issuing an appropriate 
opinion, that they have better technical ability to detect the going-concern 
issue, or have more clients with such issues. Additionally, auditors are less 
likely to issue going-concern modifications to larger companies which later go 
bankrupt, possibly because they are more confident that larger companies can 
sit out their financial difficulties, or maybe because they fear that issuing the 
going-concern modification will itself precipitate failure. Similarly, Morris and 
Strawser (1999) assert that banks receiving modified audit reports from Big Six 
audit firms were more likely to continue, and not face closure by the regulators 
than those receiving modified audit reports from non-Big Six audit firms. In 
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contrast, banks with non-modified audit reports from non-Big Six audit firms 
were more likely to be closed than those receiving non-modified audit reports 
from Big Six audit firms. Hence, banks audited by the Big Six are more likely 
to be allowed to continue, consistent with regulators' perceptions that 
economic reporting incentives may result in Big Six audit firms being more 
likely to modify their opinions to reflect going-concern uncertainties. On a 
similar theme, Krishnan and Schauer (2000) examined the relationship between 
firm size and audit quality in a sample of 164 Voluntary Health and Welfare 
Organisations (VHWOs), using their compliance with eight Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAPs) disclosure requirements as the audit 
quality measure. Investments, valuation of fixed assets, form of audit report, 
cash donations and pledges, donated materials and services, presentation of 
statement of functional expenses, presentation of balance sheet and other 
statements, were the principles. The auditors were considered as three groups: 
the Big Six, large non-Big Six, and small non-Big Six. It was found that the 
extent of compliance increased as organisations moved from small non-Big Six 
to large non-Big Six and from large non-Big Six to the Big Six. Furthermore, 
other influential factors in respect of audit quality were identified, these being 
client size and financial health, which had a positive relationship, and client 
wealth which had a negative impact on audit quality. Geiger et al (2006b) 
observe that when compared with non-Big Four firms, Big Four firms 
significantly reduce their issuance of going-concern modifications to 
bankruptcy clients after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 
suggesting lower quality reporting for Big Four firms. 
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In a more recent study, Chung and Kallapur (2003) found that incentives 
offered to auditors definitely compromised their independence. This issue was 
related to client importance and was based on the economic theory of auditor 
independence. They used ratios of client fees and NAS fees divided by audit 
firms' US revenues as surrogates for audit practice, business revenues and 
measure of client importance, and examined the association with abnormal 
accruals in the Jones Model using a sample of 1,871 clients of Big Five audit 
firms. No statistical association was reported between client importance ratios 
and abnormal accruals in part of the sample based on size, and client 
opportunities, as proxies by business and geographical segment diversification. 
In another study in a similar context, Krishnan (2003) explored the relationship 
between audit quality and pricing of discretionary accruals, finding that Big Six 
clients, report lower amounts of discretionary accruals than non-Big Six 
clients, and the relationship between stock returns and discretionary accruals is 
greater for firms audited by Big Six auditors than for those audited by non-Big 
Six auditors. Furthermore, the discretionary accruals of Big Six auditors' 
clients have a greater association with future profitability than those of non-Big 
Six auditors. And finally, the stock market acknowledges the superiority of Big 
Six auditors over non-Big Six auditors only for discretionary accruals. Overall, 
the outcomes of Krishnan's (2003) study are consistent with the idea that 
higher audit quality is associated with Big Six auditors, and this is reflected in 
the security returns of the clients of Big Six auditors. 
In recent research, Choi et al (2008) indicated that a fee premium is charged by 
large audit firms because they face higher legal liability costs, and hence, have 
more incentive to make a better effort than smaller firms. These researchers 
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suggest that the fee premium decreases as the legal regime becomes stronger 
because small auditors have a higher audit failure rate than Big Four auditors, 
and increase audit fees significantly more to compensate for their increase in 
legal liability costs. 
Hudaib (2003) has identified audit firm characteristics which are perceived as 
necessary for high independence, and hence audit quality, and these appear in 
Figure 3.3. Large audit firms that have large numbers of clients and offer 
multi-services are in a better position to resist client pressure, and hence are 
believed to produce high audit quality and high independence. Consequently, 
auditor independence can be considered as the factor that covers most audit 
quality variables. 
Figure 3.3: Power in Withstanding Pressure Based on Audit Firm and Auditee 
Characteristics 
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The literature on firm size has clearly highlighted that whilst different samples 
and methods have been used by different researchers, there is a positive 
relationship between firm size and audit quality. Specifically, large audit firms 
have more resources which they can direct to the recruitment and training 
process, thereby providing them with the human capability to detect and 
correct errors in financial statements. Moreover, as larger audit firms have 
reputations to preserve, they are careful to report deficiencies. That said, many 
of the differences between large and small firms should be eliminated by the 
maintenance of professional standards and qualifications, and a more efficient 
regulatory framework. 
The literature does show, however, that some studies have not found a 
relationship between audit firm size and measures of quality. In 1988, Imhoff 
surveyed financial analysts, finding that they saw no difference in quality 
between Big Eight and other audit firms. Likewise, the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) argued that audit quality is independent 
of firm size. Additionally, Chandler (1991) found audit quality to be a feature 
of particular auditors, and not firms. All certified public accountants (CPAs) 
meet the same exacting standards for admission to the profession and 
participate in professional education annually (AICPA, 2002). Moreover, all 
AICPA members are subject to three-yearly external review of their auditing 
practice (AICPA. 1992). And, the collapse of Arthur Andersen and the 
opposition to peer review in large audit firms, as found by Fearnley et al 
(2005), would seem to indicate that individuals are responsible for providing 
audit quality rather than audit firms. 
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In addition, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) introduced the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) as a monitor for auditor 
professionalism, and as a replacement for the peer review system because of 
anxieties concerning the potential for compromising quality control among 
peers. Krishnan (2005) has consistently argued that audit quality differs 
between and within audit firms. Hence, it is wrong to attribute audit quality to 
firms on the basis of their size, irrespective of the fact that larger firms have 
more resources. Given the stage in Libya's development, no consensus has yet 
been reached on this issue. 
3.7.2 The Provision of Non-Audit Services (NAS) 
Since the early 1980s, the work undertaken by audit firms has gradually 
changed such that the revenue from audit services has fallen, while that from 
the provision of other services has increased (Abu Bakar et al, 2005; Abdel- 
Khalik, 1990; Craswell, 1999; DeFond et al, 2002; Firth, 1997a). This trend 
has caused some major worries, concerned with the pricing of individual 
services where the auditor performs several different services, and there is 
potential for compromising auditor independence. Types of NAS, their 
characteristics and the empirical studies that have identified their relationship 
with audit quality are now considered. 
3.7.2.1 Definition of Non-Audit Services (NAS) 
The AICPA defines Non-Audit Service (NAS) as: "... the function of 
providing professional advisory (consulting) services, the primary purpose of 
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which is to improve the client's use of its capabilities and resources to achieve 
the objective of the organisation" (cited in Patten and Nuckols, 1978). 
There has been extensive debate (e. g. Barkess and Simnett, 1994; Canning and 
Gwilliam, 1999; DeFond et al, 2002; Firth, 1997a) on the merits of audit firms 
providing non-audit services, the main concern being that NAS is normally 
expressed in terms of economic dependency and mutuality of interest, and this 
is why audit fees must be disclosed in annual reports. If NAS become 
sufficiently important, either in total or in relation to an individual client, the 
economic dependence of the audit firm on these services and clients may result 
in the loss of impartiality and objectivity (Simunic, 1984). 
In the USA, prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) of 2002, confusion existed 
regarding the types of NAS that it was permissible for external auditors to 
perform for a public corporation, and in fact, some of the major auditing firms 
have sold their consulting units in recent years in order to avoid any possible 
conflicts of interest. The SOA attempts to remove any possible conflicts of 
interest arising from the provision out of NAS, by giving more power to the 
audit committee. The SOA explicitly prohibits large scale, big fee financial 
information systems' design and implementation, and IT work. These have 
been very high profit areas for the large auditing firms. Additionally, it 
prevents internal audit outsourcing and `expert' services. Within this context, 
the following nine activities are prohibited: 
1) Bookkeeping or other services relating to the accounting records or financial 
statements of the audit client. 
2) Financial information systems' design and implementation. 
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prepared to jeopardise this in surrendering to any particular client's demands 
to overlook financial problems. 
The economic theory of auditor independence that postulates the potential for 
compromise of independence where incentives to do so are present, was tested 
by Chung and Kallapur (2003), who used a sample of proxy statements from 
1,871 Big Four clients, to determine ratios of client fees to total audit firm 
revenue (to establish economic dependence) and the ratio of the clients' NAS 
services fees to total audit firm revenues. Regression techniques revealed no 
association between abnormal accruals and the client importance ratios, 
providing evidence that is inconsistent with the economic theory of auditor 
independence, but that is in line with the arguments of Goldman and Barleu 
(1974), who assert that NAS increase an auditor's value to the client, thereby 
placing the auditor in a stronger position to resist client pressure. Chung and 
Kallapur (2003) obtained similar findings to those of Mitra (2007), who 
conducted a cross-sectional regression analysis of abnormal accrual 
adjustment of oil and gas companies, finding that abnormal accrual 
adjustments were not related to fees paid for NAS. Mitra (2007) argues that 
industry specialisation and reputation protection are sufficient incentive to 
ensure auditors remain independent and that they actually strengthen 
independence. All of these research studies, concur with the review of the 
NAS literature made by Francis (2006), that suggests there is no direct 
evidence that audit quality is compromised by the provision of NAS to audit 
clients. Santan (2007), in a recent study, also finds no support for the SEC's 
contention that the provision of NAS places audit quality and auditor 
independence at risk. 
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3.7.2.4 The Provision of Non-Audit Services (NAS) and Audit Quality 
The literature on the effect of joint audit and NAS provision on audit quality 
has been analysed from two perspectives. 
Firstly, as noted by Canning and Gwilliam (1999) surveys of accounting 
information users have generally found that the joint provision of audit and 
NAS is considered a threat to independence, essentially because auditors may 
be reluctant to criticise the work conducted by their consultancy divisions, 
since this may result in the loss of revenue for the audit firm. Other incentives 
to compromise are reported as economic dependence on major clientele, and 
the business relationship with audit clients (Porter et al, 2003). Consequently, 
audit and NAS fees are generally used in studies of auditor independence 
(Ashbaugh et al, 2003; DeFond et al, 2002; Frankel et al, 2002; Gul et al, 2003; 
Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). Since the collapse of Enron, this whole area of 
the provision of NAS and auditor independence has become a burning issue in 
research studies (Klein, 2003). But it is possible that even if auditor 
independence is reduced by the provision of NAS, the overall outcome on audit 
quality may be beneficial if there is a greater potential for discovering 
deficiencies. 
The second approach has been to examine the influence of NAS provision on 
audit reporting (Abdel-Khalik, 1990; Barkess and Simnett, 1994; Canning and 
Gwilliam, 1999; Chung and Kallapur, 2003; Craswell, 1999; DeAngelo, 
1981b; DeBerg et al, 1991; DeFond et at, 2002; Firth, 1997a, 1997b; Lennox, 
1999b, 1999c; Palmrose, 1986b; Simunic 1980,1984; Wines, 1994) because 
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auditors can decide whether to disclose deficiencies by giving clean or 
qualified opinions. Hence, audit reports are used as a measure of quality. 
In an analysis of pricing and independence issues associated with the provision 
of NAS by auditors in the Australian business environment, Barkess and 
Simnett (1994) used a sample from the Top 500 publicly-listed companies in 
Australia for each of the years from 1986 to 1990. The study sample consisted 
of 371 companies in 1986,403 in 1987,466 in 1988,463 in 1989, and 391 in 
1990, and the results showed no relationship between the level of NAS and the 
type of audit report issued. 
Wines (1994) investigated potential impairment to auditor independence where 
a higher level of NAS was provided, and analysed 76 audit reports of public 
companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange as at 30th June 1980 by 
dividing the type of audit report into non-qualified and qualified. The results 
demonstrated that companies not receiving an audit qualification of any type 
derived a significantly higher proportion of their revenue from NAS fees than 
company auditors receiving at least one audit qualification. Hence, the 
potential exists for auditor independence impairment when higher levels of 
NAS are provided to audit clients. Wines (1994) also suggested that financial 
statement users, reasonable observers and other interested parties might 
conclude that it was the higher average level of auditor fee gained from the 
NAS revenue that made companies fall into the non-qualified category and that 
auditors were less likely to qualify a company's financial statements when 
higher levels of NAS fees were derived. The inconsistency between the results 
obtained by Barkess and Simnett (1994) and Wines (1994) is explained by the 
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fact that whilst both studies were undertaken simultaneously and in the same 
country, the sample size might have had an influence. Indeed, Craswell (1999), 
who investigated whether NAS provision impaired independence by testing the 
relationship between that and auditor reporting opinions, using publicly- 
available information for 885 Australian listed companies, and time-series data 
(1984,1987 and 1994), which was then regressed, found no support for the 
argument that NAS posed a threat to auditor independence in each of the tested 
years. This outcome is also consistent with Palmrose's (1986b) findings that 
based on the widespread use of incumbent auditors for NAS, clients perceived 
they were generally better off, or no worse off, with the joint supply of audit 
and NAS. 
Furthermore, in a later study conducted in the UK, Firth (1997b) developed a 
model to explain company decisions to commission NAS from the auditor. The 
model was tested with data observations from the 500 largest British industrial 
listed companies, as ranked in The Times 100 financial statements for the year 
ended 1993. The author suggested that companies that face potentially high 
agency-costs purchase relatively smaller amounts of NAS from their auditor, 
and require independent audits in order to reassure investors and creditors. 
Using a different methodology and sample, Canning and Gwilliam (1999) 
investigated the effects of the provision of NAS on perceptions of auditor 
independence within the Irish commercial environment. They used a postal 
questionnaire, and semi-structured interviews, to obtain both breadth of 
coverage and the chance to probe further, finding that perceptions of auditor 
independence significantly dropped when NAS were provided to clients by 
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personnel involved in the audit rather than by either a separate department 
within the audit firm or a completely different firm. The results revealed that 
users of financial statements were willing to accept some reduction in auditor 
independence arising from the provision of NAS if this resulted in firms 
obtaining a higher standard of audit, or better or more cost-effective advice. 
Clearly, it can be seen that results vary according to the samples and methods 
used by researchers. 
In a study by Lennox (1999b) the effect of NAS on audit quality was examined 
using the relationship between early disclosure and the fraction of equity 
owned by company directors, the relationship between financial distress and 
early disclosure, and the relationship between disclosed NAS and audit 
qualification. A negative relationship between early disclosure and directors' 
shareholdings, and between disclosed NAS and audit qualification, was found, 
whereas the relationship between financial distress and early disclosure was a 
highly positive one. The association between the provision of NAS and other 
events of interest encouraged researchers (such as DeBerg et al, 1991) to 
investigate the effects of the provision of NAS on the auditor-client 
relationship using archived disclosures mandated by ASR No 250, which was 
only in effect between 1978 and 1982. No relationship was found between 
decisions to change auditors and NAS provisions, thereby justifying concerns 
that audit firms may attempt, possibly to the detriment of independence, to 
retain high NAS clients. Immediately after a change of auditor, clients were 
found to purchase a lower proportion of NAS from the new auditor, an 
occurrence which the authors suggested, might have been the outcome of a 
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wish to reduce total professional fees or of a reservation about involving the 
auditor in NAS provision until a close relationship had been established. 
It has been accepted that when auditors act as consultants they may be 
scrutinising their own work and developing mutual interests with the client's 
management (Panel on Audit Effectiveness, 2000). Furthermore, because in 
these cases they are serving the interests of management and not shareholders, 
they may also suffer fiduciary conflicts of interests (Gore et al, 2001). 
Interestingly, however, inconsistencies are still found in the research evidence, 
since whilst Frankel et al (2002) reveal a positive relationship between NAS 
fees and discretionary accruals, and a propensity for reporting a small earnings 
surprise, thereby arguing for the separation of audit and NAS in order to 
enhance auditor independence, Ashbaugh et al (2003) replicating this study of 
Frankel et al (2002), but controlling the measures of discretionary accruals with 
firm performance, found outcomes that were in direct contradiction. 
From the literature reviewed so far it is clear that NAS provision by auditors to 
their audit clients is considered as a threat to auditor independence by 
regulators in many countries around the world, and understandably much 
research effort has centred on evaluating the nature of this threat and its 
potential for causing problems for auditors and users of financial statements. 
Evidence has been obtained by using all manner of research instruments, but 
consistently there are conflicting results, and it is also accepted that the 
theoretical relationship between NAS and audit quality is ambiguous. Hence, it 
is hard to draw conclusions from these sources regarding the provision of NAS 
to audit clients. The arguments amongst theorists also emerge in empirical 
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works which do not completely agree with the notion that the provision of 
NAS to audit clients damages auditor independence (DeFond et al, 2002), but 
of course it is also asserted that any evidence that shows impairment to auditor 
independence should be taken seriously (Canning and Gwilliam, 1999), and 
indeed actual damage to independence in appearance has been documented 
(Wines, 1994). As a result, some developed countries stipulate the need to 
disclose the nature of NAS provided and the fees received from them in annual 
reports. 
3.7.3 Length of Audit Tenure 
As there is only limited empirical evidence to support a relationship between 
audit firm tenure and the level of audit quality (Johnson et al, 2002), it is not 
clear whether the problem at which mandatory rotation is aimed as a solution is 
an actual or merely a perception. The idea of mandatory rotation and its 
potential association with audit quality is now discussed. 
3.7.3.1 Length of Audit Tenure and Notion of Mandatory Audit Rotation 
As reported by Hoyle (1978), the idea of mandatory rotation was introduced in 
June 1976 by Ralph Nader and other members of the Corporate Accountability 
Research Group (CARG), who called for congressional legislation that would 
require many public corporations to change external auditors on a five-yearly 
basis. It has since been argued by some researchers that auditor tenure is 
influential in audit outcomes (e. g. Jackson et al 2008; Arrunada, 1997; Sandra 
et al. 2007 ; Dopuch et al, 2001; Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002; Hoyle, 1978; 
Shockley, 1981a; Vanstraelen, 2000; Turner et a! 2008), while others disagree, 
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and differences exist in the regulatory framework in different countries. For 
instance, in Italy and Greece, rotation rules are in force, whilst other legal 
systems have allow a free choice of auditors, for example, the USA, UK, 
Germany, France, etc. (Arrunada, 1997). 
3.7.3.2 The Benefits of Mandatory Audit Rotation 
As the relationship between auditor and client is believed to change with the 
provision of NAS, so too it is expected to change as the association between 
auditor and client lengthens. Consequently, the implementation of mandatory 
rotation for auditors is often introduced as a means of averting actual or 
perceived weaknesses in auditor independence. Many researchers (e. g. Brody 
and Moscove, 1998; Deis and Giroux, 1992; Hoyle, 1978) have suggested that 
audit quality is enhanced by the periodic change of auditors since such rotation 
enables a fresh approach to be introduced to the audit process and prevents the 
auditor from becoming too relaxed in the process. The creativity that is often 
evident in the early years of an audit engagement usually wanes with long 
tenure, and the auditor starts to anticipate the condition of the client's systems 
and the presence of control procedures (Brody and Moscove, 1998). 
Additionally, the periodic change of auditors injects competition into the audit 
market, thereby creating the conditions for audit quality as different firms 
compete for contracts. Simultaneously, this situation sends the message to audit 
firms that they cannot become reliant on a contract, and hence the issue of 
economic dependence is removed. In such circumstances auditors are better 
placed to disagree with management over proper accounting principles and 
auditing standards (Hoyle, 1978). 
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Also, periodic auditor change allows audit firms to check each other's work, 
and there is a strong likelihood that accounting and auditing errors would be 
discovered quickly by newly-appointed auditors rather than being continued 
over many years by the same audit firm. There is also potential for 
psychological advantage to be gained because audit firms know that they are 
themselves to be audited at some point in the near future, and hence are 
encouraged to produce quality audits (Sori, 2005). Furthermore, the physical 
act of rotation adds to the appearance of auditor independence (Abu Bakar et 
al, 2005; Alleyne and Devonish, 2006), even if actual independence is not 
damaged by a lack of rotation (Winters, 1976). As a confirmation of this 
contention, Sandra et al (2007) found that MBA and law students were more 
prepared to make personal investments in corporations where such rotation was 
in operation. They also found that whilst audit firm rotation appeared to 
enhance the perception of auditor independence, the rotation did not change the 
level of confidence in reported earnings. 
On this theme of mandatory rotation, Brody and Moscove (1998) mention two 
benefits, these being: (1) its contribution to auditor objectivity by not allowing 
the situation of the auditor becoming too familiar with a client's system, and 
(2) its contribution to control processes, and to the development of favourable 
impressions among users of audited financial statements. 
3.7.3.3 The Drawbacks of Mandatory Audit Rotation 
On the other hand, however, some researchers highlight disadvantages to the 
practice of mandatory rotation (Hoyle, 1978; Summer, 1998) pointing out that 
short audit engagements are often not appropriate for large complex businesses 
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since it takes time for the external auditor to become fully acquainted with the 
company's audit needs. Hence, it is not expected to see the best audit work in 
the first few years of a contract. Additionally, mandatory auditor rotation has 
the potential for companies to shop around for opinions with audit firms being 
engaged on the basis of how likely they are to give an unqualified opinion, 
rather than on their audit service quality. Moreover, where an audit firm also 
provides NAS, there would be an adverse effect on these other services. 
As clients have responded to advice from their audit firms in respect of their 
development of more efficient internal control systems and working on capital 
budgeting projections, there is a strong danger that the restriction of the audit 
firm to a specified period would remove the time necessary to gain sufficient 
insight into the operations of the business, unless the former audit company 
were able to continue with the provision of NAS separately. Clearly, whilst 
some NAS work could still be undertaken, the larger, more complex problems 
facing management might become impossible for the audit firm to accept. In 
the same context, Johnson et al (2002) argued that audit effectiveness is 
precipitated by audit firms' accumulated knowledge and long-term experience 
of a client's operations and complicated reporting issues, and that mandatory 
rotation would deny this opportunity. Additionally, a smaller amount of client- 
specific knowledge in the early years of an engagement may result in a lower 
likelihood of detecting material misstatements, thereby providing non-rotating 
auditors with a comparative advantage in detecting errors over time as they 
obtain a deeper understanding of the client's business (Beck et al, 1988). 
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The issue of cost is also considered as a disadvantage since as Hoyle (1978) 
highlighted, the possibility of having to relinquish a contract would suggest 
unpredictable future revenue, and may well lead to an increase in hourly 
charges (Hoyle, 1978). Consequently, high audit costs would rise significantly 
in order to underpin the initial audit engagement that demands a complete 
study of the client company, which translates into additional chargeable hours. 
In non-mandatory environments, such start-up costs are incurred only 
occasionally, whereas mandatory rotation implies the periodic payment of an 
extra large audit cost (The Commission on Financial Services and Insurance, 
2005). Discussing this issue of cost, Arrunada (1997) states that the effect on 
cost and price derives from two sources. Firstly, rotation causes a direct 
increase since both explicit and implicit start-up costs are incurred more 
frequently and earlier. The substantial amounts of costs of initial audits are 
increased with each rotation. Secondly, where rotation is required, the pattern 
of competition with the market changes dramatically, and the incentive to 
compete is reduced because audit firms that excel find themselves losing 
ground periodically. 
Moreover, the imposition of mandatory auditor rotation may negatively impact 
upon earnings quality and lead to lower audit quality (Myers et al, 2003). 
Another perceived disadvantage (Ghosh and Moon 2005) indicate that 
mandatory rotation may introduce unintended costs to capital market 
participants. Limiting auditing years may impair the learning curve 
development of predecessor auditors and client firms may not ensure the 
competence of successor auditors. Thus, mandatory auditor rotation may 
increase costs for both clients and auditors (see, for example, Fearnley et al., 
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2002; GAO, 2003) because management may face time-consuming and 
expensive procedures for selecting new auditors and familiarising them with 
firms' systems. 
From what has been seen thus far, there is no consensus within the literature on 
the role of audit tenure in audit quality. Supporters of auditor rotation argue for 
the need to sustain auditor independence to assure quality reporting (e. g. Brody 
and Moscove, 1998; Deis and Giroux, 1992; Hoyle, 1978), while opponents of 
this practice have little faith in its ability to promote auditor independence 
(Winters, 1976). Arrunada (1997) argues that compulsory rotation is not 
justified by its effects on audit quality, since it is likely to damage the two main 
determinants of quality, these being, the auditor's technical competence (i. e. 
the ability to detect irregularities in financial statements), and the auditor's 
independence (i. e. the willingness to disclose in reports any irregularities that 
may have been detected). 
3.7.3.4 Length of Audit Tenure and Audit Quality 
Many researchers have been attracted to the impact of audit tenure on audit 
quality as an issue for empirical investigation (e. g. Jackson et al, 2008; 
Shockley, 1981a; Bae et al , 2007; Arrunada, 1997; Turner et al, 2008; Geiger 
and Raghunandan, 2002; Myers et al, 2003; Chen et al, 2008), since they 
recognise that engagement over a long period promotes an emotional 
relationship from which strong feelings of loyalty may develop, and that 
consequently might impair auditors' professional judgement, and hence audit 
quality (Flint, 1988). 
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Jackson et al (2008) found audit quality to increase with audit firm tenure, 
when proxied by the propensity to issue a going-concern opinion, and that it 
remains unaffected when proxied by the level of discretionary accruals (DA). 
These researchers suggested that audit quality is not improved by the 
imposition of mandatory audit. Moreover, the initial costs associated with the 
start of each rotation place unnecessary financial burdens on both the auditor 
and the client, which can themselves cause much stress. 
Commenting on the depth of an audit relationship, Chen et al (2008), 
researching in Taiwan, found that audit quality improves with audit partner 
tenure (making a comparison with the years before mandatory rotation -1990- 
2001), and that the disadvantages of mandatory rotation are partially 
`managed' by organisations rotating back and forth with just two audit firms 
that they maintain a good relationship with whether they are in their period of 
engagement or out of it. 
Short tenure may clearly be problematic for the reasons indicated. In this 
respect, Anthony et al (1999) produced a model representing the tenure-audit 
quality relationship in mandatory auditor rotation, as presented in Figure 3.4, 
which shows the auditor's ability and professional conduct as the major factors 
affecting performance. Economic incentives and market structure have 
endogenous relationships with both performance and tenure. The implication is 
that the evaluation of the usefulness of mandatory auditor rotation is a complex 
affair, involving more than a simple association test of audit tenure and audit 
quality, since audit failure arises from a mix of factors including those other 
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than tenure, not least of which are variables concerned with national and 
cultural differences. 
Figure 3.4: Tenure-Audit Quality Framework 
In a study conducted by Shockley (1981a), the perceptions of audit firms and 
two groups of financial statement users were examined in relation to 
independence and tenure. Certified public accountants, represented by partners 
from large national (Big Eight) audit firms and partners from local audit firms, 
and financial statement users, represented by commercial loan officers and 
financial analysts, were involved. It emerged that whilst each variable was 
potentially influential on the respondents' perceptions, and that the direction of 
impact could be predicted, tenure did not appear to have a significant impact on 
perceptions of independence. Copley and Doucet (1993a) later found that the 
probability of receiving a substandard audit increases with the length of the 
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auditor-client relationship, using the quality of governmental audit service 
measurements. However, using the Quality Control Review (QCR) findings of 
small independent audit firms in Texas to obtain a relatively more direct 
measure of audit quality between 1984 and 1989, by testing whether audit 
quality decreased as auditor tenure increased, Bae et al (2007), examined 
whether mandatory auditor retention affects audit quality, measured by 
discretionary accruals (DAs) and frequency of modified audit opinions, using 
the mandatory auditor retention law of Korea as a real-world setting. 
Proponents of mandatory retention argue that it improves auditor 
independence, and thus audit quality, and that audit failures are less likely with 
it. Myers et al (2003), as auditor tenure increases, auditors place greater 
constraints on the degree of discretionary and current accruals allowed by 
management. These results suggest that mandatory audit firm rotation may 
have adverse effects on audit quality, as audit quality is lower in the earlier 
years of the auditor-client relationship. 
Deis and Giroux (1992) found that audit quality declined with the length of 
auditor tenure. Importantly, although past studies demonstrated that brand 
name is a useful surrogate for quality differences among auditor size groups, 
this study suggested that quality differences within an auditor size group are 
more complex. Deis and Giroux (1992) attributed such decline to either 
opportunistic behaviour or complacency, whereas the timelier audit reports are 
of higher audit quality and audit quality improves with increased audit hours. 
This last result supports Palmrose (1986b) in his argument that audit hours 
could be an acceptable surrogate for audit quality. 
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Mandatory rotation of corporate auditors has been proposed at European Union 
(EU) level in order to improve audit quality, so Arrunada (1997) theoretically 
analysed the effect of such a requirement on audit cost and quality, asserting 
that rotation would increase the cost of audit, and consequently the cost of fees, 
which in turn would bring the depletion of specific assets and the distortion of 
competition. He also noted that a negative impact on audit quality was likely 
because of the lower technical competence of auditors and fewer incentives for 
independent behaviour, at least for diversified auditors. Vanstraelen (2000) 
studied the annual accounts of two main samples, these being non-bankrupt but 
financially-stressed large companies, and financially non-stressed non- 
bankrupt large companies, submitting to the Belgian National Bank between 
the years 1992-1996. He considered the impact of renewable long-term audit 
mandates on audit quality, from the perspective of the external users of the 
financial statements and queried whether renewable long-term audit mandates 
are influential upon the reporting behaviour of auditors and independence, 
through the following two hypotheses: (1) the longer the auditor-client 
relationship, the less likely the auditor will be to issue an unclean audit report 
(qualified opinion, adverse opinion or disclaimer of opinion), all other things 
being equal; and (2) auditors are more willing to give an unqualified opinion in 
the last year of their official mandate compared to previous years, all other 
things being equal. The results from this study suggested that long-term 
auditor-client relationships substantially increase the probability of an auditor 
issuing an unqualified audit report, and pointed to the auditor's willingness to 
qualify an audit report. 
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Vanstraelen (2000) believed that as tenure was a significant variable in both 
financially-stressed and financially non-stressed firms, the probability of long- 
term tenure decreasing the chances of an unclean audit report. Additionally, a 
significant difference emerged between auditor reporting behaviour in the first 
years and the last year of the audit contract, thereby suggesting that auditors 
were more willing to issue a clean audit report in the first two years of their 
official mandate than in the last year, presuming that the decision to renew or 
cancel the auditor's mandate is already known to the auditor before the last 
audit report within the current mandate is already. The implications of these 
findings suggest that mandatory auditor rotation is necessary in order to 
maintain the value of an audit for external users. 
Experimental methods are potentially useful when archival data are not 
available, since these allow researchers to focus on the impact of mandatory 
rotation constraining constant market, legal, and other institutions, and possibly 
auditors' willingness to compromise their independence. Such methods were 
used by Dopuch et al (2001) to assess whether mandatory rotation and/or 
retention of auditors increases their independence by reducing their willingness 
to issue reports that are biased in management's favour. These researchers 
compared auditor reporting across four regimes: one that did not require either 
rotation or retention; one requiring retention only, one requiring rotation only, 
and a final one that required both rotation and retention. It emerged that in the 
third and fourth regimes auditors' willingness to issue biased reports was 
decreased, relative to the two regimes in which rotation was not imposed. 
Where both retention and rotation were required, the lowest occurrence of 
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biased reports occurred. These outcomes give weight to the idea that auditor 
independence is increased by mandatory rotation. 
Some researchers have, however, found no association between long tenure 
and reporting failures. Geiger and Raghunandan (2002), for example, analysed 
prior audit reports for a sample of companies entering into bankruptcy during 
the period 1996-1998 by testing the relationship between the type of audit 
opinion issued on the financial statements immediately prior to bankruptcy and 
the length of auditor tenure. A significant audit reporting failure was seen to 
occur in the earlier years of the auditor-client relationship than when auditors 
had served those clients for a longer time. Hence, it was more likely to see 
audit reporting failures in the early years of an audit contract than in the later 
years, thereby removing the need for mandatory rotation. Additionally, an 
alternative explanation was given by the authors for their results. They 
assumed that over time, auditors would benefit by the increased knowledge 
they gained about their clients' operations and business processes and be in a 
better position to judge management plans as their tenure increased, thereby 
making them more likely to issue a going-concern modified audit opinion. 
Turner et al (2008) also found audit quality to improve with increased partner 
tenure. They controlled for client size and engagement risk, finding that audit 
partner tenure was significantly and negatively associated with estimated 
discretionary accruals only for small clients with partner tenure of greater than 
seven years, irrespective of risk level. 
Johnson et al (2002) conducted a similar study in which they investigated the 
association between short and long audit tenures with financial reporting 
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quality. They adopted two proxies for financial reporting quality: the absolute 
value of unexpected accruals to proxy for the extent of management 
interventions in reported earnings figures, and the extent to which current 
accruals persisted into earnings in the subsequent year as a proxy for the 
quality of accruals reported in current period earnings. An industry- and size- 
matched sample of publicly-traded companies audited by the Big Six audit 
firms, which had been audited by the same firm for two to three (short tenure), 
four to eight (medium tenure), or nine or more (long tenure) years, provided 
the research population. Evidence of greater management intervention in 
reported earnings and lower-quality accruals was reported for short audit-firm 
tenures. However, in contrast, there was no evidence that long tenure (nine 
years or longer) was associated with reduced financial reporting quality relative 
to the medium auditor-client relationship. 
As a means of overcoming the disadvantages of long audit tenure, the AICPA 
(1992) proposed mandatory periodic auditor rotation. Gietzman and Sen (2002) 
contend that the rotation of audit firms may play a positive public policy role. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 requires that the lead and concurring audit 
partner rotate off the audit engagement after a period of five years. Audit 
partner rotation may be a good alternative to audit company rotation since the 
knowledge of a client's business may remain within the same audit firm and 
may prevent the problem of insufficient audit firms (Bates et al, 1982; Teoh 
and Lim, 1996). According to Carey and Simnett (2006) audit quality suffers 
once an audit partner's tenure exceeds seven years. 
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Consequently, auditor rotation has the advantage of bringing a fresh auditing 
perspective. Auditors will no longer be dependent on any one client and 
management's ability to change the auditor on a whim will no longer be 
considered a threat for them (Gietzman and Sen, 2002). Auditors can perform 
auditing work for each audit engagement in accordance with professional 
standards and without client retention pressure. Auditors are expected to be 
responsible to public stakeholders such as shareholders, investors, creditors, 
and government. Mansi et al (2004) report that longer audit firm tenure is 
related to higher bond ratings and a lower cost of debt, and Ghosh and Moon 
(2005) find it to be associated with greater value-relevance of reported earnings 
and higher Standard and Poors' ratings of the client's shares. 
Knapp (1991) investigated the effect of the length of audit tenure on the 
potential for an auditor to discover material error (discovery assessment) and 
the possibility that the auditor would require the client to correct the error and, 
in the event of a refusal by the client, report the error in the audit report 
(disclosure assessment). The results indicate that length of auditor tenure 
significantly affects discovery assessments, although the Big Eight were 
viewed as more likely to disclose. On the other hand, a negative relationship 
was found between length of tenure and the perceived likelihood that auditors 
would discover material errors between five and twenty years. 
From all these studies, it is clear that a learning curve effect in the early years 
of an auditor-client relationship seems to create a gradual improvement in 
auditor quality, and that it is not always the case that a negative correlation 
develops in the later years. However, where it does, this is interpreted as the 
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outcome of complacency by the auditor, an over-reliance on the information 
provided by the client, and less rigour. 
As a result, the issue of whether to rotate or not still remains. But it must be 
recognised that the independence of the auditor is not the only reason for 
adopting the practice of rotation. In this respect, Winters (1976) suggests that 
the decision as to whether to rotate depends on the costs and benefits to clients 
in the broadest terms. Moreover, if the culture of the audit firm is such as to 
place pressure on its partners to retain clients and bring more business, the 
rotation might not make a difference (George 2004). To this end, a 
concentrated research effort on the auditor rotation question should be 
undertaken by the profession. Such an evaluation could well decide this and 
solve other current problems, such as the nature and extent of the auditor's 
responsibility to the various parties served. Hoyle (1978) argues that outside 
readers of financial statements should receive more specific assurance that the 
auditor has properly carried out his responsibilities, and mandatory rotation is 
not the best means for achieving better auditing. 
3.7.4 The Level of Competition in the Audit Market. 
In relation to the impact of competition (number of bids received) for audits 
based on the quality of resulting audits, as conventional wisdom suggests, 
increased competition and resulting pressure to minimise audit fees have 
contributed to poor quality audits, whereas economic theory generally predicts 
a positive relationship between competition and quality. Copley and Doucet 
(1993b) found that entities receiving a greater numbers of bids for their audit 
engagements were significantly more likely to receive an audit of acceptable 
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Moreover, the suggestion that excessive competition would result in clients 
changing auditors, was also rejected by Beattie and Fearnley (1998), who 
found that whilst the level of audit fees was frequently reported as the main 
reason for auditor switching and served as an influencing factor in the selection 
of new auditors, it was not considered as the main priority in the selection of an 
audit firm. In fact, their investigation discovered that audit fees were 
significantly less important for companies that did change auditors. The issue 
of fee discounting seems to be confined to the small audit companies (Ghosh 
and Lustgarten, 2006), because the competition among them is high, they are 
more likely to negotiate on fees than are the bigger audit firms, in their efforts 
to attract new clients. 
In a recent Middle Eastern study, Al-Mogbel (2006) discovered that despite a 
very competitive Saudi audit market, an unhealthy situation has arisen in the 
price war which has had a large negative impact on local firms that are not 
affiliated to the larger foreign firms. 
On the issue of direct solicitation and direct uninvited solicitation activities 
from auditors and its relationship with audit quality, there has been much 
research (Blair and Kaserman, 1980; Chaney et al, 1995; Chaney et at, 1997; 
Chaney et al, 2003; Hay and Knachel, 2003). In this respect, Blair and 
Kaserman (1980) formulated a model to show that in the absence of 
competition, audit quality would increase, and that auditor income would 
subsequently increase, thereby bringing a quality safeguard. More recently, 
Chaney et al (1995) found no evidence of an association between the incidence 
of auditor alignment from non-Big Eight to Big Eight audit firms and direct 
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Based on the above literature, it can be seen that inconsistencies arise from 
previous research with regard to the effect of competition on audit quality. 
Some research has shown that a high level of competition in the audit market 
was perceived as a potential threat to audit quality and auditor independence. 
Contrary to these results, other studies revealed that audit quality was not 
affected by competition. Moreover, it is observed that this perception, i. e. a 
positive effect on audit quality, was based on the assumptions of economic 
theory that generally predicts a positive relationship between competition and 
quality. Accordingly, more research on this area would provide a better 
understanding of the inherent societal values within which auditors perform 
their work, and would assist in explaining why some actions or behaviours of 
auditors might exist. 
3.7.5 Fees for Audit Services 
In many studies, the fees for audit services have been examined as a factor 
influencing audit quality (see, for example: Jensen et al 2005; DeAngelo 1981; 
Abbott et al. 2003; Simunic1980; Levitt 1996). 
3.7.5.1 Fees for Audit Services and Audit Quality 
Deis and Giroux (1992), studying the effect of auditor changes on audit fees, 
audit hours and audit quality, discovered that the number of audit hours 
represented an acceptable surrogate for audit quality differences among audit 
firms of similar size. They argued, based on their later study (1996) that it was 
also possible to link audit hours with audit fees, asserting that where the audit 
effort declined with audit fees on initial audits, audit quality also declined, 
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although, in their 1992 study, audit hours also emerged as a suitable surrogate 
to measure audit quality. More recently, Jensen et al (2005) found evidence 
that well-developed audit-procurement practices have a minimal combined 
effect on audit fees, but that individual audit-procurement elements are 
associated with audit fees. 
Over the past years, there has been increased scrutiny of the auditing 
profession because of the increasing levels of NAS fees received from audit 
clients and the potential unfavourable influence of these fees on auditor 
independence, and hence audit quality (Levitt, 1996). Such concerns in this 
respect have already been discussed earlier in this chapter, and were the main 
reason why the SEC issued revised auditor independence rules in November 
2000, since when it has been a requirement for firms to disclose, in proxy 
statements filed on or after February 5th, 2001, the amounts of all audit fees 
and NAS fees paid to them. Hence, the association between audit fees and 
audit quality could be considered as depending on two main different 
perspectives: firstly, the potential negative impact of non-audit fees received 
from audit clients on auditor independence, and hence the level of audit quality 
(Levitt 1996), and secondly the relationship between audit fees and audit hours 
(Palmrose, 1986b). 
Simunic (1980) conducted the most influential empirical study in this field, by 
comparing audit pricing for large clients with that for small clients, and making 
inferences regarding the extent of competition and/or economies of 
scale/product differentiation on the basis of this comparison. In Simunic's 
study, a stratified sample of 1,207 companies was mailed during 1977 with a 
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questionnaire addressed to the principal financial officer of the company. This 
effort achieved a 33% response rate, the main finding being that no price 
premium was associated with Big Eight auditors in either the large or small 
client sub-market, and hence, differences in Big Eight concentration across the 
market were irrelevant to the determination of audit prices. This effort by 
Simunic (1980) prompted many derivative studies, but contrary to its results, 
the study conducted by Francis (1984), using Australian data, found a large 
firm price premium in both large and small audit sub-markets. It should, 
however, be noted that substantial size differences were evident in the sample 
companies. Francis (1984) concluded that the observation of systematic price 
differentials between large and small audit firms represented product 
differentiation in the Australian audit services market, and that more 
importantly, higher prices were consistent with higher quality audits. 
A study that had the same objectives of that undertaken by Francis (1984), was 
conducted by Rushinek and Rushinek (1990) in the US, and similar 
observations were made. Additionally, Gist and Pavlos (1995) found large 
firm premiums in their total sample, but not in the large client sub-sample, a 
feature which prompted the authors to offer three plausible explanations for the 
absence of an observed pricing difference in the large client sub-sample. 
Firstly, they suggested that higher monopolistic pricing is offset against lower 
pricing due to the scale economies enjoyed by Big Eight firms when auditing 
large clients. Secondly, they suggested that non-Big Eight firms met 
diseconomies of scale in the audits of large clients; and thirdly, they introduced 
the possibility that smaller audit firms are price followers while large firms are 
monopolistic price setters. However, they rejected their last explanation, given 
121 
the observed price differential in the small client market, which is assumed to 
be competitive. Whilst they recognised that the methodology used could not 
distinguish between the two other competing hypotheses, they did claim that 
the results did not appear to be inconsistent with monopolistic pricing 
behaviour. 
Simon (1985) was another researcher who replicated the study of Simunic 
(1980) by testing the Price Waterhouse premium using a sample of 79 
companies in the US market. Simon (1985) found that the experimental 
variable of Price Waterhouse was positive but not significant, whereas when 
Palmrose (1986a) repeated Simunic's (1980) study he found contrasting results 
with both that study and with Simon's (1985). Palmrose (1986a) used 
Simunic's 1977 data and compared this with US data from 1980, and was able 
to report a premium for the Big Eight, but not for industry specialists. In more 
recent research, Abbott et at (2003) point out that independent and 
knowledgeable audit committees are associated with higher audit fees. 
3.7.5.2 Fees for Audit Services in Developed Countries 
The research efforts in developed countries, such as the USA, the UK and 
Australia, are differentiated by the independent variable chosen. Simunic 
(1984) considered clients' purchase decisions in respect of audit and NAS 
when production functions were interdependent, and he tested for the existence 
and pricing effects of knowledge externalities or external economies. He took 
data from 263 observations of audit fees and other characteristics, and NAS 
fees, in publicly-owned USA companies, representing a stratified random 
sample, finding most importantly, that the purchase of NAS from the auditor 
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was associated with a significant increase in the audit fee. Barkess and Simnett 
(1994) later found the same results. However, such outcomes were not 
obtained by Firth (1 997a), who analysed the determinants of audit fees and the 
derived explanatory models used to predict future fees. He took a sample of 
companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange in 1991 and 1992, reporting a 
negative relationship between audit and consultancy fees, according to whether 
the audit was used as a loss leader and/or whether there were reductions in 
audit costs, returned to clients via lower audit fees. 
Palmrose (1986b) explored the effect of fees for particular NAS (tax, 
accounting-related management advisory services and non-accounting 
management advisory services) on the audit service price, finding a positive 
relationship in respect of the provision of tax, accounting-related management 
advisory services, and non-accounting management advisory services. The 
strongest result pertained to accounting-related management advisory services 
and the advisory services closest to accounting/auditing concerns. The 
association was observed from the perspective of whether NAS were provided 
by the incumbent auditing firm or by another public auditing firm. 
Another study conducted by the same researcher (Palmrose, 1989) investigated 
whether audit fees would change under fixed fees contracting. The sample was 
comprised of 361 public and closely-held companies, issuing audited financial 
statements in 1980-1981, and it was concluded that significantly lower audit 
fees are associated with fixed fee contracts, but that audit hours are not 
influenced by contract type. It was also observed that fixed fee contracting was 
more likely to be employed in the early years of auditor-client relations, but 
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that any pricing unique to initial engagements or price-cutting behaviour was 
not the reason for significantly lower audit fees with fixed fee contracting. 
DeFond et al (2002), exploring the presumption that an auditors tendency to 
issue a going-concern opinion is positively related with auditor independence, 
used a sample of 158 distressed firms with proxy statements that included audit 
fee disclosures, and included 96 firms receiving first-time going-concern 
reports. They looked at whether NAS fees are inversely related to the 
probability of auditors issuing going-concern audit reports, and whether total 
fees are inversely related to the probability that auditors would do this, but 
found no evidence of any significant relationship between NAS fees and 
impaired auditor independence, where the auditor's tendency to issue going- 
concern reports was used as a surrogate for independence. The economic 
theory of auditor independence (DeAngelo, 1981a) suggests that incentives to 
auditors to compromise their independence are related to client importance. 
Chung and Kallapur (2003), using ratios of client fees and of NAS fees divided 
by the audit firm's US revenues as a surrogate for the audit-practice-office 
revenues as measures of client importance, reported no evidence of impaired 
auditor independence as an outcome of different client fee ratios, either in the 
full sample (1,871 clients of Big Five audit firms), or in the sub-sample, where 
encouragements to compromise independence could have been greatest, as 
suggested by the economic theory of auditor independence. Moreover, no 
association was evident between going-concern opinions and either total fees 
or audit fees. 
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In the same context, Geiger and Rama (2003) investigated the link between the 
size of audit and NAS fees and auditor report modification decisions in 
financially-stressed manufacturing companies that filed their proxy statements 
after 5U' February, 2001. They achieved results that demonstrated a significant 
positive association between the volume of audit fees and the chance of 
receiving a going-concern modified audit opinion, but they did not indicate any 
significant association between NAS fees and audit opinion. Moreover, they 
were also unable to identify any significant relationship between the ratio of 
NAS fees to audit fees and reporting decisions. Controlling for the potential 
endogeneity of audit opinions, audit fees, and NAS fees, Geiger and Rama 
(2003) reported the same positive association between audit fees and opinions, 
but no association between NAS fees and audit opinions. 
Somewhat earlier, Deis and Giroux (1996) examined the influence of 
independent auditor changes to fees, independent audit effort, as measured by 
audit hours, and independent audit quality, taking audits undertaken by local 
audit firms in Independent School Districts (ISDs) in Texas as their sample. 
Deis and Giroux (1996) found that both audit fees and audit hours were 
significantly related to audit quality, concluding that audits are differentiated 
products. They also discovered that both audit fees and audit hours were 
impacted upon by audit quality, and that audit hours and audit quality were 
higher in initial audits, thereby adding weight to the earlier conclusion drawn 
by Raman and Wilson (1992) that independent auditors did not sacrifice 
quality to secure a new audit client, although lower audit fees were detected in 
initial audit contracts. 
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Whisenant et al (2003) undertook similar research, examining whether the 
characteristics of clients, auditors, and the auditor-client relationship 
simultaneously determined audit and NAS fees. They considered whether 
previously documented relationships between audit and NAS fees were the 
outcome of biased estimation brought about by the use of endogenous variables 
in single-equation models, but in fact they found no association between audit 
and NAS fees using simultaneous specification of the fee system. 
Gonthier-Besacier et al (2007) came to this issue from a different perspective, 
finding that audit fees (adjusted for company size) increase with the decision to 
contract the services of only one of the Big Four firms. Additionally, it seems 
that an audit fee advantage exists for French companies employing two of the 
Big Four firms for their joint audit. This reduction in fees billed by two Big 
Four firms working together may arise from a more balanced sharing of 
qualifications, skills, and potential risks, between the two. 
Gerrard et al (1994) found the best explanatory power as provided by the 
square root of current assets and the role of internal audit, were not significant 
determinants for audit fees, and Frankel et al (2002) found that NAS fees were 
positively associated with small earnings surprises and the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals, whereas audit fees were negatively associated with 
these indicators of earnings management. Additionally, they found support for 
a negative relationship between NAS fees and share values on the date The fees 
were disclosed, although the effect was small in economic terms. Finally, Bell 
et al (2001) reported that whilst the audit fee charged per hour remains 
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unchanged, audit fees increase as assessments of business risk and audit hours 
increase. 
3.7.5.3 Fees for Audit Services in Developing Countries 
There are few studies on audit fees and audit quality in developing countries, 
but there have been some contributions to the literature. With a focus on the 
Indian audit market, Taylor and Baker (1981) formulated a model to test the 
relationship between government ownership and audit fee levels for both 
public and private sector companies. The audit fees for public sector companies 
were found to be significantly lower than those of private sector companies, 
and a free premium for the Big Eight audit firms in the Indian audit market was 
seen to exist. This was also confirmed by Simon and Burton (1999) in the 
South Korean market, where other variables than firm size, such as complexity 
were not significant. This is in contrast to the existence of a large audit firm fee 
premium observed in many other countries (Francis, 1984; Palmrose, 1986a). 
These variations were considered to be the outcome (Taylor et al, 1999) of the 
completely different regulatory framework in South Korea, particularly in 
respect of the fee-setting process. 
Simon et al (1992) conducted a similar study across three Asian countries, 
namely, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore, to explore the audit fee 
structure for 1987 and 1988. The sample was comprised of 99 Hong Kong, 132 
Malaysian, and 126 Singaporean companies. The logarithm of audit fees was 
regressed on the logarithm of total assets as a proxy for size, with the logarithm 
of number of subsidiaries as a proxy for complexity, and the percentage of 
inventory and receivables to total assets as a proxy for complexity. Whilst 
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these researchers reported broad similarities across the three sample countries, 
they found, importantly, a strong demand for quality-differentiated audits in 
Hong Kong and Singapore, but not in Malaysia, and concluded that national 
culture might be the reason. A study conducted to consider variation in audit 
fees charged by local audit firms as opposed to foreign audit firms, was 
undertaken by Karim and Moizer (1996) in Bangladesh with a sample of 157 
companies operating in 1991. It was found that auditors affiliated to foreign 
audit firms secured higher audit fees than purely local audit firms. 
From these limited instances of studies in developing countries, it can be seen 
that there is little difference between the results obtained, and those found in 
developed countries. This may be attributable to the fact that all those studies 
reported on countries which had previously been colonies of advanced 
countries and hence may have inherited a regulatory framework. 
3.8 Implications of the Literature for Libya 
Whilst Libya is clearly a developing country, it is nonetheless one that has been 
colonised by European powers during the 20th century, and since the discovery 
of oil, and joint ventures with overseas oil companies, it has been closely 
involved with western general management, and auditing practices, particularly 
those derived from the US and UK. Consequently, it can be argued that the 
literature is highly applicable to the Libyan situation since the regulatory 
framework within Libya bears many similarities to the frameworks in the 
advanced nations. 
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3.9 Study Aims and Objectives 
Having reviewed the literature, the researcher is able to formulate a robust aim 
for this study, which is to get an in-depth understanding of the current 
perceptions of the level of audit quality in Libya. The study's scope of research 
focuses on concepts of the size of audit firm, the provision of non-audit 
services (NAS), the length of auditor tenure, level of competition in the audit 
market, and fees for audit services. This study will be carried out both on the 
demand side (using Libyan oil companies) and on the supply side (using audit 
firms working in Libya). The main research objectives are as follows: 
" To examine the current perceptions of the level of audit quality in Libya 
from the viewpoint of oil companies and audit firms. 
" To investigate the relationships between selected variables perceived as 
surrogates of the level of audit quality form the perspectives of Libyan 
oil companies and audit firms. 
" To identify improvements which could be introduced into the Libya 
auditing environment. 
" To make recommendations based on the findings of this study in audit 
to improve audit quality in Libya 
9 To contribute to the literature of auditing. 
3.10 Summary 
This chapter has presented a thorough review of the literature on audit quality 
and the variables that are known to affect it. Initially, a discussion of auditing - 
definition, its importance, the demand for it, and its objectives -was presented. 
Thereafter, an overview has been given of the extensive literature dealing with 
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audit quality. It is difficult to measure audit quality and consequently, 
researchers have used various attributes to act as surrogates, for example, firm 
size, the provision of NAS, auditor tenure, competition within the audit market, 
and fees for audit service. It has been clear from the survey of the literature that 
throughout all the studies, conflicting results have emerged on most of the 
issues highlighted. 
There is a consensus that perceptions of audit quality are potentially influenced 
by the size of audit firms, because these firms possess substantial resources 
which they can devote to recruitment and training, thereby providing 
themselves with good calibre staff. Consequently, these personnel are able to 
implement a sound audit methodology using sophisticated tests that enable 
them to detect potential errors in financial statements and, for as long as the 
retention of their reputations remains important, these audit firms will continue 
to report any such deficiencies. Also, the Big Four possess much larger client 
portfolios, and are in a better position to resist management pressure than are 
smaller audit firms, whose independence may be compromised by their need to 
retain their clients. That said, it is also possible to assert that variations between 
large and small audit firms are likely to reduce and ultimately disappear with 
the implementation and maintenance of professional standards and regulations. 
There appears to be no comprehensive agreement in terms of the relationship 
between audit quality and the size of audit firm, and undoubtedly there is a 
case for more research in this area. That argument leads to development of the 
second question in the current study. 
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The most widely-debated variable in the field of audit quality and auditor 
independence is the provision of NAS by audit firms, which has been regarded 
by regulators in many parts of the world as posing a threat. Not surprisingly, 
much research effort has been directed towards the assessment of the nature 
and size of this threat, including the extent of the problem it creates for auditors 
and the users of financial statements. 
Once again, however, there is no consensus in the literature concerning the 
influence of the provision of NAS to audit clients of auditor independence, but 
irrespective of whether any impairment of independence is caused, it is the fact 
that the perception of independence is damaged by the provision of NAS. Over 
the years it has become a requirement in certain developed countries for 
companies to disclose in their annual reports, both the type of service provided 
and the fees associated with those services. In some cases this must be in 
absolute terms whilst in others it is sufficient to disclose the percentage of the 
NAS fees in relation to the total audit fees. 
Reynolds et al (2004: 32) argue that there is a need for more research in this 
area as "paradoxically, fees paid to the auditor constitute an incentive both for 
and against objectivity". It is clear that more research needs to be conducted to 
resolve the debate over the provision of non-audit services. This debate leads to 
the development of the third question of the current study. 
The issue of mandatory rotation is also a variable that has attracted attention in 
the literature, specifically whether this is helpful in the achievement of audit 
quality, or whether it is detrimental to it. Independence, however, is 
documented as being not the sole consideration when evaluating auditor 
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rotation, and consequently, this stands as another research topic that requires 
more research. The results of such research could be decisive in helping to 
solve other problems that exist such as what responsibility auditors have to the 
various parties for whom they act. The fourth research question stems from this 
recognition. 
Conflicting results were also reported on issues of competition in the audit 
market. Some research has shown that a high level of competition in the audit 
market was perceived as a potential threat to audit quality and auditor 
independence. In this connection Chaney et al (2003) have suggested that in 
order to enhance audit quality, regulators or market mechanisms should 
increase scrutiny and penalties, rather than imposing a ban on competition. 
Other studies revealed that audit quality was not affected by competition. 
Accordingly, more research on this area would provide better understanding of 
the inherent societal values within which auditors perform their work, and 
assist in explaining why some actions or behaviours of auditors might exist. 
This raises the fifth research question of this study. 
The relationship between audit service fees and audit quality is suggested to be 
minimal, and little difference was seen to exist between developed and 
developing countries. This may be because of the effects of their past colonial 
relationships which have left regulatory frameworks in place. The sixth 
research question is concerned with this issue. 
This literature review has highlighted a number of unresolved problems in the 
area of audit quality and a number of areas where gaps in the literature occur. 
There is a great need for more research in this critical area of audit quality. The 
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following chapter will introduce and discuss the methodology adopted in order 






In this chapter, the research methodology and methods employed in the study 
are described. In the first section, the research strategy is presented. Both 
quantitative and qualitative methods were used in the study, and the 
philosophical assumptions that guide the research are discussed in order to 
justify the chosen methodology. Detailed procedures of the research methods 
adopted (questionnaire survey and interview methods) are also discussed. The 
pre-study investigation of the study questionnaire, which was conducted with 
academic personnel, audit firm and oil company staff in Libya, is then 
presented. Finally, the difficulties of conducting interviews in Libya, rather 
than using questionnaires, are explained. 
4.2 Research and Philosophical Assumptions 
According to Bums (2000: 3), research represents "a systematic investigation to 
find answers to a problem". Referring specifically to research in business, 
Sekaran (2003: 5) considers this to be "an organised, systematic, data-base, 
critical, objective, scientific inquiry or investigation into a specific problem 
undertaken with the purpose of finding answers or solutions to it". Clearly, 
both scholars explain the research activity in similar ways. 
The cause and effect element of research is highlighted in social research by its 
attempts to identify, understand and make links between actions, experience 
and change, and it is asserted (Gilbert, 1993) that three essential components 
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are required for rigorous social research, these being: formulation of theory, the 
design of methods for collecting data, and an actual process of data gathering. 
In this respect, it is important initially to give thought to the research strategy 
which is appropriate for a given project, and to the way in which the empirical 
work associated with it will be undertaken. Remenyi et al (2002) make the 
important point that when considering the overall research plan, the particular 
questions to be addressed must be properly articulated, and from these clear 
objectives must be derived. Thereafter, it is crucial to decide upon the research 
strategy, and in this matter the researcher must determine whether a theoretical 
or empirical approach (or indeed a combination of the two) will be appropriate. 
Once the research strategy is formulated, it is possible to develop a conceptual 
framework for the subsequent study, and having made that particular decision, 
the methods of data gathering and analysis, referred to by Remenyi et al (2002) 
as tactics, must be considered. 
Prior to considering the overall research strategy, however, a more 
fundamental exercise relating to the research philosophy is required, and in this 
respect Collis and Hussey (2003) identify two paradigms - positivist and 
phenomenological. They describe these as methods of practice that are founded 
upon people's assumptions about the world and the nature of knowledge. In an 
earlier commentary on this matter, Cassell and Symon (1994: 2) stated that "the 
assumption behind the positivist paradigm is that there is an objective truth 
existing in the world which can be revealed through the scientific method, 
where the focus is on measuring relationships between variables systematically 
and statistically". In this respect, Holloway (1991) asserted that the social 
sciences claimed quantification as the way to ensure scientific rigour, since 
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with reliable and valid measuring instruments, it is possible for a researcher to 
generalise and clearly predict the effects of the presence of particular variables. 
This positivist approach to social research has been defined by Denscombe 
(2001: 299) as one that "seeks to apply the natural science model of research to 
investigations of the social world". The assumption is that identifiable patterns 
and regularities, causes and consequences, exist in the social world exactly as 
in the natural world (Denscombe 2001). Bryman (2004: 11) confirms this 
position by explaining positivism as "an epistemological position that 
advocates the application of research methods of the natural sciences to the 
study of social reality and beyond". Easterby-Smith et al (2002) note that the 
central tenet of positivist thought is that objective methods should be used to 
evaluate social properties, rather than subjective methods involving sensation, 
reflection or hunch. Scott (1997) also argues that no substantial differences 
exist between the methods required to evaluate physical and social phenomena. 
This kind of approach allows for the prediction of phenomena, and 
consequently the possibility of controlling negative ones. As noted by Collis 
and Hussey (2003), the identification of causal relationships between variables 
allows for researchers to link these to existing theory, or create new theory. 
From this brief summary of scholars' ideas in relation to positivism, it is 
apparent that research methods used in the natural sciences are believed to be 
suitable for research in the social sciences. Indeed, Collis and Hussey (2003) 
have suggested that the basic positivist assumption is that studies in human 
behaviour should be undertaken using the same methods as those employed in 
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the natural sciences. This belief justifies arguments that social research is 
scientific 
The positivistic approach has, however, been criticised by many writers who 
believe that it is necessary to define variables before relationships between 
them can be established, and this requires a recognition that subjects cannot be 
investigated without reference to their social environments, since it is these that 
give meaning to their actions and underpin their own perceptions of them 
(Remenyi 1998 and Mashat 2005). Another criticism is that positivism does not 
necessarily remove researcher subjectivity, since as Collis and Hussey (2003) 
note, researchers can easily introduce their own interests and values to the 
research. 
As an alternative to positivism, the phenomenological approach offers the 
researcher the chance to consider the wider sociological environment, in what 
Collis and Hussey (2003) still refer to as a science. They note the derivation of 
the word `phenomenon' from the Greek verb meaning to appear or show. 
Adding to the concept of a phenomenon, Allan (1991: 893) described this as "a 
fact or occurrence that appears or is perceived, especially one whose cause is in 
question". 
Clearly, a phenomenological approach to research is in direct contrast with the 
positivist approach already discussed, since the fundamental premise of the 
former is that the world is socially-constructed, and does not comprise an 
objective reality as the positivists assert. Meaning, rather than facts, becomes 
the focus within the phenomenological paradigm which aims to establish 
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exactly what is happening, why, and what can be learned from the evidence 
(Remenyi et al, 2002). 
Phenomenology has been considered (Cohen and Manion, 1987) as an 
approach which allows for the study of direct experience as being the result of 
other experience, and not as the outcome of some external, objective and 
physically described reality. Because of this benefit, it is argued that this type 
of approach is popular with business and management researchers (Remenyi et 
al, 1998). There is no attempt by phenomenologists to reject the idea that the 
world can in fact be modelled, but they believe this can be accomplished 
through the use of a verbal, diagrammatic, or descriptive framework, and do 
not consider the use of mathematical models to be valuable in this respect. 
Consequently, it can be appreciated that phenomenology represents a 
qualitative approach in which the subjective aspects of human behaviour are 
considered and where the concentration is on their meaning rather than their 
measurement. Scholars describe this as the descriptive/interpretive method, 
believing that through this approach each event can be explored as a unique 
incident in its own right (Remenyi et al 1998, Collis and Hussey 2003; Mashat 
2005). 
4.3 Methodology and Data Collection 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, this study gathers data 
through the use of questionnaires and semi-structured interviews, and both of 
these methods are discussed in detail in the following sub-sections. 
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4.3.1 Quantitative Research Method 
An acknowledged advantage of quantitative research is the fact that large 
samples can be involved which may allow for a legitimate reflection upon the 
attributes of the wider population under study. Findings using such an approach 
may well be assumed to relate to a much bigger population, thus giving great 
value to the outcome of a study (Sarantakos 1998) in that it makes such an 
effort representative of greater populations than can actually be involved in the 
research. As well as providing representativeness, quantitative methods also 
bring the benefit that they use standard measurements. In this respect, Patton 
(1990: 14) argued that "quantitative methods entail the use of standardized 
measures so that the varying perspectives and experience of people can fit into 
a limited number of predetermined response categories to which numbers are 
assigned". 
4.3.2 Aims and Objectives of the Study 
This study aims to get an in-depth understanding of the current perceptions of 
the level of audit quality in Libya. The study's scope of research focuses on 
concepts of the size of audit firm, the provision of non-audit services (NAS), 
the length of auditor tenure, level of competition in the audit market, and fees 
for audit services. This study will be carried out both on the demand side 
(using Libyan oil companies) and on the supply side (using audit firms working 
in Libya). The main research objectives are as follows: 
9 To examine the current perceptions of the level of audit quality in Libya 
from the viewpoint of oil companies and audit firms. 
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" To investigate the relationships between selected variables perceived as 
surrogates of the level of audit quality form the perspectives of Libyan 
oil companies and audit firms. 
9 To identify improvements which could be introduced into the Libya 
auditing environment. 
" To make recommendations based on the findings of this study in audit 
to improve audit quality in Libya 
" To contribute to the literature of auditing. 
433 Research Questions 
As previously stated, the main objective of the study is to understand the 
current perceptions of audit quality in Libya. Those perceptions are in terms of 
firm size, the provision of non-audit services (NAS), the length of auditor 
tenure, level of competition in the audit market, and fees for audit services. 
Some of the research questions were derived from suggestions made by the 
focus group of Libyan PhD accounting students at Liverpool JMU, who had 
sufficient knowledge of accounting in the Libyan business environment. Some 
were derived from prior studies (Palmrose, 1988; Fearnley et al, 2005; Al 
Mogbel, 2006; DeFond et al, 2002; Son, 2005; Arrunda, 1999,2000 and 
Lennox, 1999b , 1999c). The 
following questions have been designed for the 
research study to answer, in order to achieve the research aims and objectives: 
- What are the perceptions of the oil company and audit firm respondents of 
the current level of audit quality in Libya? 
- What are the perceptions of the oil company and audit firm respondents 
concerning the impact of different sizes of audit firm on audit quality? 
- What are the perceptions of the oil company and audit firm respondents 
concerning the impact of the provision of NAS on audit quality? 
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- What are the perceptions of the oil company and audit firm respondents 
concerning the impact of long tenure on audit quality? 
- What are the perceptions of the oil company and audit firm respondents 
concerning the impact of a highly competitive environment on audit 
quality? 
- Is the level of audit quality reflected by the audit fees? 
- What can be done to improve the Libyan auditing environment? 
4.3.4 The Questionnaire Method 
The scope of the research covers concepts of firm size, the provision of NAS, 
the length of auditor tenure, level of competition in the audit market, and fees 
for audit services. Empirical work is considered to be important in this type of 
research, and for this, the researcher used the questionnaire survey method, 
since a questionnaire was determined to be the most efficient and economical 
method of collecting data. Saunders et al (2000: 278) considered the word 
`questionnaire' to be a general term to include all data collection techniques 
that require participants to respond to the same set of questions in the same 
order. Similarly, Collis and Hussey (2003: 173) argued that questionnaires are 
related to both positivistic and phenomenological methodologies, defining a 
questionnaire as "a list of carefully structured questions, chosen after 
considerable testing, with a view to eliciting reliable responses from a chosen 
sample. The aim is to find out what a selected group of participants do, think or 
feel". In the same context, Sekaran (2003: 236) defined a questionnaire as a 
"preformulated written set of questions to which respondents record their 
answers, usually within rather closely defined alternatives". Sekaran (2003) 
viewed the questionnaire as the most efficient and important tool of data 
collection when the researcher knows exactly what type of information he 
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needs and how to measure the study variables. The next section will review 
types of questionnaires in general and those used in the study. 
4.3.5 Types of Questionnaire 
As a means to gather the information necessary to answer the research 
questions documented in section 4.3.3, the researcher carried out a survey 
which covered the concepts of firm size, the provision of NAS, the length of 
auditor tenure, level of competition in the audit market, and fees for audit 
services. Haimon (1998) has reported that the use of advanced analytical 
methods for processing survey data has emerged as one of the foremost 
procedures of social investigation. Survey research is used to measure 
population characteristics, and can consequently be valuable both for 
describing a population, and formulating models that allow for the analysis of 
characteristics. Hence, survey data has both descriptive and analytical 
potential. 
In considering the value of this approach, Gilbert (1993: 95) has reported that 
"sociologists also regard surveys as an invaluable source of data about 
attitudes, values, personal experiences and behaviour". He adds the benefit that 
such surveys can conducted through the use of face-to-face or telephone 
interviews, by sending postal questionnaires. It is also noted that surveys are 
used to obtain people's views, beliefs, feelings, and that these may be sought 
by researchers, either as ends in themselves, or as a means to give weight to 
some argument they wish to propose (Jankowicz, 1995). The various methods 
of conducting a survey as noted above have both advantages and 
disadvantages, which are compared in the following sections. 
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4.3.5.1 Telephone Interviewing 
Interviewing by telephone is cheaper than interviewing face-to-face, costing 
approximately half (Dooley, 1990). The selection of telephone numbers can be 
done in various ways (Czaja and Blair, 1996), for example randomly from a 
telephone directory, or by the researcher's own creation. 
43.5.1.1 Advantages of the Telephone Interviewing 
There are clear advantages to the technique of telephone interviewing which 
are: 
(a) Random digital dialling sampling of general population. 
(b) Improved chances of accessibility to interviewees when compared to 
personal interviews. 
(c) Lower cost than personal interviews. 
(d) Shorter data collection periods. 
(e) Easier administration than a mail survey. 
(f) Fewer people required to conduct the survey. 
43.5.1.2 Disadvantages of the Telephone Interviewing 
The disadvantages are: 
(a) It is less reliable in the case of sensitive questions. 
(b) Non-response (associated with random-digit-dialling sampling) is 
higher than personal interviews. 
(c) Telephone interviewees may produce less good data on income 
questions. 
(d) Respondents may find it difficult to answer long and complicated 
questions. 
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4.3.5.2 Mailed Questionnaires 
This technique consists of the researcher distributing questionnaires and 
covering letters by mail to the selected research sample, and it is usual when 
using this approach, for the researcher to include a prepaid return envelope, 
since this improves the participation rate. 
4.3.5.2.1 Advantages of the Mailed Questionnaires 
The self-administered postal questionnaire is believed to be the most common 
method. As observed by Sarantakos (1998), the postal questionnaire requires 
limited interference from the researcher, and has the additional benefit that in 
comparison with interviews and personally-administered questionnaires (by the 
researcher), it is much less costly in terms of the researcher's time (Hakim, 
1987; Sarantakos, 1998; Sekaran, 2003). Other advantages are reported as: 
(a) Low cost: the most obvious appeal of mail questionnaire is the low cost. 
Sarantakos (1998) identifies the advantages of questionnaires as cost 
effective. The mail questionnaire does not require a trained staff of 
interviewers; the processing and analysis of data are usually cost effective. 
Moreover, the lower cost is particularly evident when the respondents are 
widely distributed over a large geographic area (Sekaran, 1992). 
(b) Accessibility: can reach a high number of respondents who live or work 
over a widely spread geographical area. 
(c) Greater anonymity: it affords the respondent a reasonable degree of 
anonymity. Furthermore, respondents can complete the questionnaires at 
their-own convenience (Sekaran, 1992). Compared to face-to-face or 
Telephone interviewing, there is no personalization involved in a mailed 
questionnaire survey, and thus respondents are likely to give their true 
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opinion rather than an acceptable answer when faced with sensitive or 
controversial issues. 
(d) Reduction in bias error: the use of a mail questionnaire reduces bias errors 
that might result from the personal characteristics of interviews and 
variability in the interviewer's skills (DeVaus, 1990). This method provides 
less opportunity for bias or errors and provides a stable, consistent and 
uniform measure with wide coverage. 
(e) Collecting large amounts of information: a questionnaire enables the 
researcher to obtain a large amount of information from a large number of 
respondents within a short space of time (Babbie, 1995). T his is extremely 
important if the fieldwork has to be completed within a restricted time 
period. 
4.3.5.2.2 Disadvantages of the Mailed Questionnaires 
The mail questionnaire does, however, have several disadvantages. The most 
significant are: 
(a) Requires simple questions: the method lies in the fact that it requires simple 
questions in the sense that the questions have to be straightforward and 
comprehensible solely on the basis of printed instructions and definitions. 
(b) Low response rate: the most serious problem arising from the use of a 
questionnaire as tool to collect data is the low response rate. 
(c) Lack of control: this method offers no control over who fills out the 
questionnaire. 
These disadvantages, coupled with Libya's developing postal system that is as 
yet unreliable and slow, mean that Libyan researchers do not usually use this 
method. 
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4.3.5.3 Personally-administered Questionnaires 
The personally-administered questionnaire is considered by some researchers 
(Collis and Hussey, 2003; Sekaran, 2003) as one of the best tools for data 
collection when the survey is confined to a local area, and the aim is to target a 
particular gathering of people at work, or at home. 
4.3.5.3.1 Advantages of the Personally-administered Questionnaires 
Several advantages of this approach are, according to Collis and Hussey (2003) 
and Sekaran (2003), as follows: 
(a) A high response rate is possible, since the researcher is able to collect 
responses personally and does not have to rely on a third party (the regular 
mail). 
(b) The potential for interviewer bias is removed. 
(c) Any confusion on the part of the respondent about the questions can be 
clarified on the spot by the researcher. 
(d) The researcher can introduce the research topic to the respondents by 
explaining the research themes, and can encourage and motivate them to 
respond frankly. 
(e) Administering questionnaires to large numbers of respondents at the same 
time is less expensive and less time-consuming than conducting 
interviews, even if these are held in the same location. 
(0 Less skill is required to administer a questionnaire than to conduct 
interviews. 
(g) The researcher has an opportunity to check the completeness of 
questionnaires as they are handed back. 
4.3.5.3.2 Disadvantages of the Personally-administered Questionnaires 
There are some disadvantages, which are: 
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(a) It may be more costly than other methods, particularly, if the survey has to 
be conducted with participants who are geographically separated or 
abroad. 
(b) Respondents may be hesitant about sensitive issues. 
In the present study, two types of questionnaire - personally-administered and 
mailed - were adopted. 
4.4 Relevance of Questions to the Research Objectives 
The design of any questionnaire is crucial in the potential of the instrument to 
gain the type of data required to answer the research questions and meet the 
stipulated research objectives. Hence, all the questions should be carefully 
formulated to elicit the information needed, and in designing the questionnaires 
for this study, the researcher bore in mind that: 
(1) Each item in the questionnaire should have a certain role in the study, 
and the point of each question should be clear in order to fulfil its 
purpose. 
(2) Every group of questions in each of the four scales should aim to test a 
certain variable. 
(3) Before including an item in the questionnaire, the decision should be 
made regarding how the responses to that question would be analysed, 
which statistical techniques would be used, and how it should be 
published or presented. 
4.4.1 The Wording of Questions 
It is always necessary to consider each and every question in a survey 
questionnaire in order to ensure that the responses are valid. In this respect, 
Sekaran (2003) suggested that the questions asked, the language used, and the 
actual wording, should meet the respondents' attitudes, and perceptions. 
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Saunders et al (2003) suggested the following guidelines for wording 
questionnaires: 
1- The questions should be clear, straightforward, and use simple language 
and common concepts. Most importantly, questions should use familiar 
vocabulary and known terms. 
2- To clearly show the possible responses to each question, a 
straightforward scale should be provided, from which the respondent 
can choose an answer. 
3- Biased questions must be avoided. A biased question is one which 
makes one response more likely than another, regardless of the 
respondent's opinion. 
4- The questions should be short and direct, because long questions are 
difficult to understand, consume the respondent's time and make the 
respondent less willing to participate. Indirect questions increase the 
probability of the question being misunderstood. 
5- Leading questions should be avoided. A leading question is defined 
(Kumar 1999: 120) as "one which, by its contents, structure or wording, 
leads a respondent to answer in a certain direction". Employing 
emotive language or phrasing a question in a particular way can suggest 
to the respondent how a question should be answered, so that the 
respondent's honest response is not obtained. 
6- Ambiguous wording should be avoided, so that all respondents 
understand the questions in the same way. 
7- Questionnaires should not include negative questions, because these 
may confuse the participants, especially when asking them to indicate 
whether they agree or disagree with a particular statement. Sekaran 
(2003) has suggested the inclusion of some negative questions. 
In this study, the researcher followed these guidelines very closely in order to 
produce the best possible research instrument. 
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4.4.2 The Sequence and Flow of Questions 
A questionnaire that is properly-sequenced facilitates completion, since to 
some extent, respondents can anticipate what questions might be following, 
and can sub-consciously enter a mindset that is ready for them. Sekaran (2003) 
recommends attention be paid to ordering the questions so that they move from 
the general to the particular, and from easy to progressively more difficult 
questions, using what he refers to as the `funnel' approach. Hence, during the 
writer's construction of the questionnaire, certain principles were implemented 
as follows: 
1. Questions on similar topics were grouped together, thereby providing a 
logical flow. The questionnaire was divided into two parts, the first 
collecting demographic information, and the second part gathering the 
content required to meet the research questions. The second part contained 
four sections. 
2. Broad questions were followed by specific questions that were determined 
by the respondent's initial response. 
3. Initial questions were constructed so that respondents had no hesitation in 
answering. 
4. Initial questions were easy and it was emphasised that the reason for 
asking the questions was the researcher's interest in the respondent's views 
rather than a need to test their knowledge. 
5. All questions were relevant to the respondents. 
6. Open questions were kept to a minimum, and placed at the end of the 
questionnaire. 
4.4.3 The Type of Questions 
The decision regarding the type of questions in a survey instrument is really 
one that considers whether to use open or closed questions, because each has 
149 
both advantages and disadvantages (Sekaran, 2003). In this regard, it has been 
observed by Remenyi et al (2002) that exploratory studies are best 
administered using open questions because in these the researcher is neither 
able nor willing to pre-specify the response categories. One benefit of open 
questions is that they allow respondents to provide more information and to use 
their own words to give their personal opinions. Additionally, such questions 
are easy to ask. However, the disadvantages of open questions are quickly 
spotted in that they lengthen the whole process, as respondents spend more 
time answering. This has a number of repercussions: a) the extra time required 
of the respondents may dissuade them from taking part, b) this affects the 
overall response rate because some questionnaires may have so many 
incomplete answers that they have to be excluded from the final usable sample, 
c) the analysis of the responses to open questions is difficult and whilst there 
may be much valuable information there may also be much useless and 
irrelevant data (Remenyi et al, 2002; Sekaran, 2003; Collis and Hussey, 2003). 
Unlike open questions, closed questions require the respondent to answer either 
Yes or No, or to choose a response from several alternatives provided on the 
questionnaire. Whilst these usually do not take the respondent long to 
complete, they can be difficult to design since they must be very clear and take 
account of all possible answers. Additionally, the use of closed questions may 
not provide true or accurate responses since they give a limited range of 
options, and as Vaus (2001) has observed, the respondent must make a choice 
even though it may not be appropriate. In this respect, it is noted (Denscombe, 
2003) that frustration may arise among respondents because they cannot give 
their opinions as they would prefer (Denscombe 2003). That said, closed 
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questions are useful for collecting certain types of data, and their analysis is 
straightforward because the range of answers is limited. Furthermore, because 
of the speed in answering them, it is possible to ask a large number of such 
questions, and given the standardisation of the responses, the answers can be 
compared across respondents. It was decided to use closed questions in the 
main for the questionnaire in this study. 
4.4.4 Scaling Process 
According to Sekaran (2003: 185) a scale is 
"a tool or mechanism by which individuals are distinguished as to 
how they differ from one another in the variables of interest to our 
study. The scale or a tool could be a broad one in the sense that it 
would only broadly categorised individuals on certain variables, or it 
could be a fine-tuned tool that would differentiate individuals on the 
variables with varying degrees of sophistication ". 
Different styles of both open and closed questions were used. The dichotomous 
question, offering only two fixed alternatives, was used to gather information 
about gender, for instance, and multiple-choice questions, providing a range of 
options were used in respect of age, qualifications and experience in auditing. 
Multiple-response questions gave respondents the opportunity to select more 
than one response, as for example when participants were asked to indicate 
who (from a list of individuals) decided what items to include in the audit 
quality plan of the audit firm and oil companies and where participants were 
asked to rank order a response, ordinal scales were used, with the evidence 
placed in categories, and the numbers assigned indicating the ordering of the 
categories (Remenyi et al, 2002). 
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Respondents were asked to show their level of agreement with certain 
statements in the main parts of the questionnaire, the agreement being recorded 
on Likert-type scales. The statements related to: the current perception of audit 
quality, firm size, the provision of NAS, the length of auditor tenure, level of 
competition in the audit market, fees for audit services, and future development 
of audit quality. Respondents were asked to tick one of five boxes on the 
accompanying scale which ranged from (1) strong disagreement to (5) strong 
agreement. This type of scale suggests that every statement has the same 
attitudinal value, weight or importance in order to reflect an attitude towards 
the issues examined by the scale (Sekaran, 2003). 
4.5 The Questionnaire Design 
Some of the questions in the questionnaire were derived from suggestions 
made by the focus group of Libyan PhD accounting students at Liverpool 
JMU, who had sufficient knowledge of accounting in the Libyan business 
environment. Some were derived from prior studies (Palmrose, 1988; Fearnley 
et al, 2005; Mashat, 2005; Al Mogbel, 2006; DeFond et al, 2002; Francis, 
1984; Sori, 2005), and some were suggested by several internal auditors, 
financial managers and accounts managers. Each section of the questionnaire is 
now briefly described. 
Section A: General Information. This section focuses mainly on eliciting 
demographic data about respondents (e. g. number of years of experience in the 
field and their qualifications), and was particularly important for providing 
basic data both for the purpose of analysis, and for testing relationships with 
other variables identified in the study. 
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Section B: The Current Perception of Audit Quality in Libya. This section 
includes questions exploring the general perceptions of audit quality in Libya. 
The idea behind these questions was to give respondents a flavour of the 
questionnaire as a whole, and to obtain their opinion on the overall level of 
audit quality in Libya before moving on to more detailed questions. 
Section C: Factors Impairing and Enhancing Audit Quality. There are some 
difficulties with measuring audit quality, and this has led some researchers to 
use different variables as surrogates for it. Allowing for these difficulties, and 
bearing in mind the auditing environment in Libya, this section of the 
questionnaire was divided into five main sub-sections covering the most 
important variables which can be used as surrogates for audit quality in the 
Libyan environment. These surrogates are: firm size, the provision of NAS, the 
length of auditor tenure, competition in the audit market, and fees for audit 
services. 
Section D: Future Development of Audit Quality in Libya. This section deals 
with respondents' views about the future development of audit in Libya. 
Opinions were sought on ways in which audit quality could be developed and 
enhanced in the future. 
4.6 The Pilot Procedures in Respect of the Questionnaire 
Remenyi et al (2002) recommended that pre-testing of any questionnaire 
should be conducted before finally administering the instrument, in order to 
identify any shortcomings in its design and administration. They suggested that 
the method of pre-testing could be informal, involving consultation with 
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friends, colleagues and experts, or it could be more formal, involving a pilot 
study which is a replication, on a small scale, of the main study. In line with 
Remenyi et al (2002), Sekaran (2003) also stressed the importance of pre- 
testing a survey instrument to ensure that questions are understood by the pilot 
sample, which should be representative of the eventual participants. In this 
respect, it is vital that questions do not suffer from ambiguity, and that the 
wording and measurements used are free from any problems that might 
compromise the responses. Oppenheim (1992) listed the following reasons for 
conducting a pilot study: 
1. To test the reliability and validity of the instrument in order to avoid 
future problems. 
2. To ensure that the instrument will be accessible to the study 
participants. 
3. To confirm future co-operation with the participants. 
4. To test the methodological techniques. 
A number of procedures were employed before conducting the final survey. 
The first step in piloting the questionnaire involved the first draft of the 
questionnaire being prepared in the English language, and presenting this to the 
supervision team as well to the researcher's colleagues (PhD students and PhD 
holders), so that as wide an audience as possible could give their comments on 
it. 
In the second stage, the questionnaire was translated into Arabic with the help 
of colleagues who were expert in the Arabic and English languages. The 
translated draft was discussed with PhD students whose native language is 
Arabic. The two copies, English and Arabic versions, were then sent to four 
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academic staff in Libyan universities. Some amendments were made to the 
Arabic version, and at a later stage the Arabic translation of the questionnaire 
was translated back into English by the same languages experts. After 
comparing the resulting English version of the questionnaire with the original, 
the researcher was satisfied with the accuracy of the translated version. 
The final step in pre-testing the questionnaire was the pilot study itself. The 
data used for this pilot study was collected from two sources: the demand side 
(Libyan oil companies) and the supply side (audit firms working in Libya). For 
the audit firms, data was gathered from employees at all levels in the firm: 
managing partners, audit supervisors, and auditors. 
The purpose of the pilot study was to test the study instrument, in particular, 
the phrasing of the questions, and their clarity, length, and layout, and the 
relevance of questionnaire items to the investigation of the study. 
At this point, 48 questionnaires were distributed to the internal auditors, 
financial managers and accounts managers in eight Libyan oil companies, and 
to the managing partners, audit supervisors and auditors from eight audit firms 
working in Libya: five from Tripoli (the capital city) and three from Benghazi. 
Thirty-nine questionnaires (i. e. 81% of those distributed) were usable, four 
were not returned to the researcher, and five were incomplete. Of these 39,21 
questionnaires were from the Libyan oil companies and 18 from the audit 
firms. Regarding the internal auditors at companies, the researcher distributed 
the questionnaires to the directors of internal audit departments, who then 
distributed them to their staff. 
155 
The respondents were asked to report the time taken to complete the 
questionnaire, and only three failed to do this. The majority of the respondents 
reported that it took between 15-25 minutes, with an average of 20 minutes. 
The following three points summarise the findings on the layout and 
completion of the questionnaire: 
1. No respondents complained about the length of the questionnaire. 
2. No respondents complained about the questionnaire's clarity and 
layout. 
3. No respondents complained about the 5-point scale. 
The SPSS computer program was then used to analyse the data from the pilot 
study, to test the appropriateness of the scales which were used to measure the 
study variables. 
The choice of these statistical tests is related to firstly, the number of variables, 
secondly, to the type of question to be answered, and finally, to the scale of 
measurement (Zikmund, 2000). 
4.7 Instrument Reliability and Validity 
In order to conduct research which is of high quality, it is necessary to subject 
the research design to reliability and validity measures that will provide an 
assurance of the relevance of the issues being measured, and confirm that the 
instruments used are appropriate (Clark-Carter, 2004; Cozby, 2007). 
According to Punch (1998), these two constructs relate to the psychometric 
characteristics of an instrument, and basically seek to guarantee that the 




Validity is an important factor for any empirical research. Therefore, it is 
essential for any successful research to employ a valid tool. Validity is the 
ability of the measurement tool to assess what it is supposed to measure (Aaker 
et al, 1998). Frankfort-Nachmias nd Nachmias (1996) define validity with a 
question in order to make it clear that the researcher is measuring what he/she 
intends to measure. Sarantakos (1998: 78) also maintains that validity is 
concerned with: "the ability to produce findings that are in agreement with 
theoretical and conceptual values". 
Black (1999: 75) reported a similar approach, maintaining: "to ensure validity, 
any instrument must measure - what was intended". This indicates that the 
instrument should be logically consistent and cover systematically all aspects 
of the abstract concept to be investigated. The main problem with face validity 
is that there are no replicable procedures for evaluating the measuring tool. 
Hence, researchers have to rely entirely on subjective judgments (Frankfort- 
Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). Validity needs reliable and valid tools for the 
collection of data as well as consultations with theoretical and empirical 
researchers. Therefore, the validity of the questionnaire in this study was 
obtained from different practical professionals and experienced employees who 
participated in the pilot study. 
4.7.2 Reliability 
In addition to validity, reliability is considered a most important factor. 
Newman and McNeil (1998: 205) defined reliability as: "the extent to which a 
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variable yields the same value on repeated measures". Reliability is a very 
important aspect in any research method. Further, it is concerned with the 
consistency of the results achieved on repeated situations. This is reflected 
when the researcher re -tested the data, using the same test in different 
circumstances. Researchers have adopted alternative methods with 
questionnaires. They look at the consistency of a person's response to an item 
at the same point in time and the degree of agreement between the 
measurements is obtained. 
Researchers use the Alpha coefficient in order to confirm reliability. This 
technique is common in statistical research in examining reliability; coefficient 
Alpha ranges between zero (0) and one (1). The higher the Alpha Coefficient 
is, the more reliable the scale, with 0.7 as the minimum acceptable reliable 
figure (De Vaus, 1990). I n this study, the Alpha Coefficient is used to measure 
reliability on the Statistical Package of Social Science (SPSS) computer 
software. In the present study, the questionnaire achieved a Cronbach's Alpha 
reliability value of 0.810. 
4.8 The Sampling Unit and Questionnaire procedure 
Clearly, the sampling unit must be representative of the general population in 
which a researcher has an interest, and for a questionnaire to produce good 
quality data, the respondents must comprise a proper sample from that 
population. According to Sekaran (2003: 265) the population is "the entire 
group of people, events, or things of interest that the researcher wishes to 
investigate" and as Denscombe (2001) points out, the respondents must be 
chosen on the basis of their appropriateness. The sampling technique used by a 
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researcher, must therefore, be able to provide an appropriate sampling unit, to 
which the research instrument can be directed. Indeed, if this decision is not 
made with careful thought, the whole research process can fail, because as 
observed by Ahmed (1999) whilst the questions may be the right ones, if they 
are addressed to the wrong people, the answers will be completely misleading. 
The data used for this study was collected from two sources: the demand side 
(Libyan oil companies) and the supply side (audit firms working in Libya). 
The data for the Libyan oil companies was gathered from three different types 
of respondents: internal auditors, financial managers and accounts managers. 
The reason for choosing these three groups of respondents, rather than other 
employees in the company, was the fact that the literature of auditing indicates 
that the external auditor usually has more contact with these groups than any 
others. For the audit firms, data was gathered from employees at all levels in 
the audit firm: managing partners, audit supervisors and auditors. 
The main reasons for choosing oil companies was because of their high level of 
organisation and the fact that most of these companies employ staff with 
degrees from the United States or Britain - these two facts enabled the 
researcher to access the right people and obtain good answers to the research 
questions. 
The magnitude of the activities of oil companies, and hence the magnitude of 
the accounting systems, represent an attraction for large numbers of qualified 
accountants, who hold jobs and different accounting backgrounds, a fact that 
allowed the researcher to have access to a large community of accountants, 
with varied careers. 
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4.9 The Response Rate 
Having established (section 4.3.4) that one of the most important issues 
associated with questionnaire surveys is the response rate, the researcher was 
keen to ensure as much useful participation as possible. As Bryman (2004: 98) 
notes, the response rate is "the percentage of a sample that does, in fact, agree 
to participate", and it is well understood that failure in this regard is the main 
drawback to the use of questionnaire surveys (Collis and Hussey, 2003; 
Saunders et al, 2003). Moreover, mailed questionnaires usually produce a 
poorer outcome than personally-administered questionnaires. Various reasons 
exist for non-participation, but most commonly it is the case that people simply 
do not want to answer questions or be involved (Saunders et al, 2003) whilst in 
other cases the chosen respondents may be ineligible to provide relevant 
responses. Clearly, a low response rate is problematic, since as noted by Vaus 
(2001), the desired sample size can be severely depleted by this and bias can 
result. 
In the case of this study, 147 questionnaires were distributed to the oil 
companies between February and April 2008. Of these, 52 went to Internal 
Auditors, 50 to Financial Managers, and 45 to Accounts Managers. 
Additionally, 300 questionnaires were sent to the audit firms working in Libya, 
100 to Managing Partners, 100 to Audit Supervisors and 100 to Auditors. The 
samples from the demand side (internal auditors, financial managers and 
accounts managers), represent the agent of the principal, and conduct business 
on behalf of the principal. Hence, a monitoring mechanism is needed to assess 
their performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Those samples from the 
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supply side (managing partners, audit supervisors and auditors), represent the 
main subjects of the issue of interest who provide certification and/or 
information credibility assessment to the stakeholders (Humphrey, 1997). 
Hasan (2000) has indicated that audit firms and their clients evaluate audit 
quality in different ways, and it was, therefore important to receive responses 
from both sections of the research population. 
Considerable effort was made in order to avoid problems of non-response and 
to ensure the completeness of the questionnaire, which as already indicated, 
was designed with a majority of closed questions which are easy for 
respondents to answer. The questionnaire sample comprised all listed oil 
companies in the NOC and 100 audit firms working in Libya. According to the 
pilot study results, the wording of the questionnaire was simple, the instrument 
was of a reasonable length, and there were no complaints about clarity and 
layout. Most of the questionnaires were personally administered (Managing 
Partner - 52 questionnaires, Audit Supervisor - 52 questionnaires, Auditor - 56 
questionnaires, Internal Auditor - 45 questionnaires, Financial Manager - 47 
questionnaires, and Accounts Manager - 35 questionnaires), and some 
questionnaires were delivered personally by the researcher and returned by 
mail. Therefore, anonymity and other problems relating to mailed 
questionnaires were avoided as far as possible. 
The overall response rate to the questionnaire was extremely encouraging at 
64% (see Table 4.1), Remenyi (2002) suggesting that a response rate above 
60% is considered to be exemplary. The response rates for Internal Auditors 
and Financial Managers'were 86.5% and 94% respectively, higher than those 
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of Accounts Managers, Managing Partners, and Audit Supervisors, which were 
77.7%, 52% and 52% respectively. Some were unable to complete the 
questionnaires, and the researcher was unable to contact respondents outside 
Tripoli because of poor communication facilities, included in which is the 
official postal system. 







Managing Partner 100 52 52 
Audit Supervisor 100 52 52 
Auditor 100 56 56 
Internal Auditor 52 45 86.5 
Financial Manager 50 47 94 
Accounts Manager 45 35 77.7 
Total 447 287 64 
4.10 Qualitative Research Method 
Unlike quantitative methods that primarily consider numerical values, 
qualitative approaches take words as their subject (Bryman, 2004), gathered as 
data in a narrative form through interviews and observations (Sekaran, 2003). 
This type of research is defined by Strauss and Corbin (1998), as research 
whose findings are not obtained through the use of statistical processes or other 
means of quantification. Confirming these definitions, Remenyi et al 
(2002: 288) noted that "qualitative research is based on evidence that is not 
easily reduced to numbers. In some cases the evidence cannot be reduced to 
numbers and any attempt to so do would not be useful. In such cases statistical 
techniques are not sensible and hermeneutic approaches are preferable". 
Hence, qualitative efforts are generally inductive, whereby specific 
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observations lead to general principles, in an exercise that can generate new 
ways of thinking about problems. Quantitative research, in contrast, is about 
using already-existing theories as a vehicle for exploring problems. Steckler et 
al (19992) note the popularity of qualitative research in management literature, 
asserting that this follows from its ability to answer `how' questions. In this 
research project, the interview exercise process was designed to supplement 
and enhance the data obtained from questionnaires. 
4.10.1 Interviews 
It is accepted (Collis and Hussey, 2003) that both positivist and 
phenomenological approaches use interviews as a research instrument. 
Commenting on their operation, Collis and Hussey (2003: 167) noted that 
interviews provide "a method of collecting data in which selected participants 
are asked questions in order to find out what they do, think or feel". However, 
interviews can vary in character, veering towards a more controlled approach 
that sits in line with positivistic thought, or a more relaxed one in which 
phenomenological techniques can be used. The structured interviews with 
closed questions is the preferred strategy with positivists, whereas, the 
unstructured, or semi-structured interview based on open questions and 
allowing for in-depth exploration, is the technique used by phenomenologists. 
May (1997) asserts the usefulness of interviews as a method which can yield 
rich data concerning participants' experiences, opinions, aspirations, attitudes 
and feelings. Moreover, he makes the point that they can be used to maintain 
and generate conversations on a wide range of topics, and Sekaran (2003) adds 
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to this flexibility, noting the different types of interview that can be employed 
according to the situation. 
4.10.1.1 Semi-structured Interviews 
Smith (1972: 119) documented, many years ago, that the semi-structured 
interview is "a process in which the interviewer focuses on a limited number of 
questions or a limited number of points. It may range quite widely around a 
point, but this would be done only as a means of getting the required 
information on that particular point". This type of interview is applicable in a 
wide range of circumstances (Bryman, 2004), and involves the researcher 
producing questions s/he wishes to ask in a given order, but at the same time 
allows for re-sequencing as an interview unfolds. The intention with semi- 
structured interviews is to encourage the interviewee to talk frankly, and this 
can often be achieved by removing some of the rigidity imposed by asking 
questions in a certain order. Semi-structured interviews are useful when 
undertaking exploratory discussions as a means to revealing `what', `how', and 
`why' (Saunders et al, 2000). They have the potential to discover new things 
about issues that have been considered before, and they also allow variation 
from interview to interview in respect of how the questions are asked and 
covered. This does require skill on the part of the interviewer who must be able 
to respond to the flow and change questions to suit, but if the researcher is able 
to do this, much valuable input from interviewers can be gained. Further 
benefits of this type of interview are the interviewer's ability to ask for 
164 
clarification of any response during the course of the interview, and the ability 
to record the proceedings, subject to the interviewee's consent (May, 2001). 
4.10.1.2 Advantages of the interview method 
The interview has several advantages and can be summarized as follows. 
1) Interviews allow the researcher to ask several open-ended questions; 
2) The researcher(s)-can clearly identify him/themselves, him/their status, and 
the purpose of the interview; 
3) Interviews enable the interviewer to explain to each respondent how he/she 
came to be chosen for the sample and why it is important that he/she take part 
in the interview; 
4) Interviews give the interviewer the opportunity to communicate effectively 
and build trust with the respondent to make him/her comfortable, to provide 
truthful data and to answers without any fear of adverse consequences The 
interviewer can modify the questions if this is thought to be necessary and 
5) Interviews enable the interviewee the opportunity to provide the data 
required in-depth. 
4.10.1.3 Disadvantages of the interview method 
The interview method, however, has several disadvantages (Oppenheim, 1992). 
I) Interviews incur higher costs and need more time than a mail questionnaire. 
The cost of an interview studies is significantly higher than that of a mail 
surveys, in terms of the skills needed, training, and especially when interviews 
are spread over a geographically large area; 
2) The flexibility that is the chief advantage of the interview leaves room for 
the interviewer's personal influence and bias. In addition, respondents may bias 
the data when they are aware of possible adverse effects of answering 
Questions on sensitive issues and do not express their true perceptions but 
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provide information that they think is what the interviewer will be happy with; 
and 
3) Lack of anonymity: the interview lacks the anonymity of a mail 
questionnaire. The presence of the interviewer may cause the interviewee 
anxiety, especially if a respondent is sensitive to the topic or some of the 
questions. 
4.11 The Sampling Unit and Interview Procedures 
The sample for the interviews was broadly similar to the sample for the 
questionnaire, which comprised a sample from Libyan oil companies, namely, 
internal auditors, financial managers, accounts managers, and a sample from 
audit firms working in Libya, namely, managing partners, auditors and audit 
supervisors. Regulators working in the LAAA were also included in the sample 
of the interviews, partly due to the fact that, after analysing the questionnaire 
survey, the researcher found it necessary to interview regulators to clarify some 
grey areas found in the analysis, and more importantly, to triangulate the 
sample of the study and to obtain different opinions from different dimensions. 
The total number of interviews conducted with the oil companies was ten 
(three with internal auditors, four with financial managers, and three with 
accounts managers), and the total number of interviews conducted with the 
audit firms working in Libya, was thirteen (four with managing partners, six 
with audit supervisors, and three with auditors). Lastly, two interviews were 
conducted with regulators working for the LAAA. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter (sub-section 4.3.5.3), personal delivery and 
collection of questionnaires was used to help to establish contact with the 
targeted sample for the interview phase. Respondents to the questionnaire were 
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asked to provide their telephone numbers and emails if they were willing to be 
interviewed. Of those who did this, some were contacted to arrange an 
interview, after explaining to them the reason for their selection. The 
interviews were conducted between May and July 2008. Several interviews 
were undertaken to pilot the questions in the interview schedule, as a means of 
ensuring that the questions were clear and unambiguous, and to find out the 
approximate amount of time it would take to finish the list of questions. 
Respondents were asked both open and closed questions. Because of the 
tendency of open questions to lead to a long discussion, resulting in difficulty 
with completing the original questions, the use of these was limited to starting 
a new topic, and closed questions were used to confirm the questionnaire 
findings. 
At the beginning of each interview, the researcher first introduced himself and 
thanked the respondent for agreeing to take part. He then gave the interviewee 
a one-page summary of the study, either in English or Arabic, and assured him 
that his identity and the information he provided would be treated as strictly 
confidential and that no reference would be made to him personally in any part 
of the thesis. The interviewer asked the participant's permission to record the 
interview, as a means of enabling him to recall what had been said during the 
interview, especially since the interviews would have to be translated into 
English. Those respondents who were unwilling to be recorded justified their 
decision on the grounds that they felt more comfortable and able to talk 
frankly, by knowing that there would be no evidence against them, if problems 
should arise later. Where this happened, the interviewer proceeded with the 
interview by taking notes. 
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The interviewer then set the mood of the encounter by asking the interviewee 
for some background information about himself, and after obtaining this 
personal detail, he proceeded with the main part of the interview by asking an 
open question related to audit quality in Libya. This simply asked for the 
participant's views on the current level of audit quality in Libya, and allowed 
the opportunity for free expression of thought, such that the information 
provided was not biased in any way. This question was followed by a series of 
further questions, both open and closed. At the stage when no more new 
responses emerged, the researcher asked the interviewee if he would like to add 
any points which had not been covered in the interview. Finally, the 
participant was thanked for his time, contribution and co-operation. Generally, 
all interviewees appeared relaxed and talked informally, as well as showing 
great interest in the subject matter. They seemed to enjoy expressing their 
opinions on the issues raised in the interviews. 
The interviews lasted between 40 and 75 minutes each, including the 
introduction and explanations. As indicated earlier, at the start of each 
interview, participants were asked to give their permission for the interview to 
be recorded on tape. In order to ensure that each interviewee felt relaxed about 
the use of the tape recorder, it was explained that the tape recorder was being 
used only in order to enhance the accuracy of the recording of the interview. 
Nine of the interviewees were not willing to be recorded, so the researcher took 
notes during these interviews, and immediately afterwards, the full text was 
written down in Arabic from the notes. All the interviews were translated back 
into English. 
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All the questions initially scheduled were used in the interviews, but their 
sequence varied from one interview to another as appropriate. Additionally, the 
researcher invited the participants to raise any other issues not covered by the 
questions. To build trust and confidence between the researcher and the 
interviewee, the more sensitive questions were left to the end of interview, but 
for the purposes of consistency, the interview results were reorganised 
according to the sequence of questions that was set by the researcher. 







12-05-2008 Internal auditor Oil company 3 
28-05-2008 Accounts manager Oil company 3 
16-06-2008 Financial manager Oil company 4 
24-06-2008 Managing partner Audit Firm (Tripoli) 4 
2-07-2008 Auditor Audit Firm (Bengasi) 3 
21-07-2008 Audit supervisor Audit Firm (Tripoli) 6 
21-07-2008 Regulator LAAA 2 
TOTAL 25 
4.12 Interview Analysis 
The main aim of using semi-structured interviews in the study was, as 
mentioned earlier in this chapter (section 4.9.1.1), to understand, support and 
confirm the results obtained from the questionnaire exercise, and to bring 
insight in respect of any gaps that might have been found in the questionnaire 
results. The interviews were intended to address all dimensions of the 
questionnaire survey, and the semi-structured variant was chosen in order to 
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allow participants sufficient freedom to express themselves with confidence. It 
was hoped that the data obtained from the interviewees would be rich and 
detailed. However, interview data analysis can be a very difficult task, and it 
was necessary to plan and implement this carefully to be sure that the outcome 
properly reflected the information collected, which was in this case, largely 
descriptive. 
In respect of data analysis, Miles and Hubernman (1994) suggested the cross- 
case approach, which they further sub-divided into three possible ways 
forward, these being: 
1. Case-oriented analysis where patterns and characteristics of individual 
cases or groups of cases under study are preserved throughout the 
analysis 
2. Variable-oriented analysis where specific variables or themes are the 
focus of analysis across cases 
3. A combination of these two approaches. 
It was decided to use both case-oriented and variable-oriented analysis in an 
effort to overcome any weaknesses presented by just the one approach. This 
strategy facilitated a greater degree of generalisation than is possible with the 
case-oriented approach alone and also allowed for a thorough exploration and 
analysis of the interview data, which appears as a benefit of the case-oriented 
approach. Thus, it was considered that results would be generated that would 
fairly represent the underlying body of data gathered from interviewees. 
In the data analysis, three concurrent activities were evident, as described by 
Miles and Huberman (1994), these being: data reduction, data display, and the 
drawing of conclusions. Data reduction refers to the process of selecting, 
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focusing, simplifying and otherwise transforming the data appearing in field 
notes or transcriptions. As mentioned earlier, in this study, the researcher 
transcribed the interviews to enable a thorough analysis. After transcription, the 
interview data were manually coded using the pre-identified themes, in order to 
reduce the data. As noted by Boyatzis (1998), the themes may be arrived at by 
an inductive process from the raw information, or may be generated 
deductively from theory and prior research. Given the fact that the interview 
questions were formulated in conjunction with the issues raised in the 
questionnaire and that these had been generated from existing theory, a 
deductive approach was used in which the main themes for the interview data 
analysis were similar to those explored in the questionnaire survey, these 
being: general perceptions of audit quality in Libya; audit quality variables, and 
means to improve audit quality in Libya. The relevant data from the coded 
transcripts were then entered into the appropriate matrices for data display in 
order to facilitate the drawing of conclusions. The matrix was useful for 
arranging the data from all the respondents across the various sections. A data 
matrix was provided for each main theme of the study, and for the emerging 
issues related to it. The rows of the matrix represent the variables investigated 
in each broad theme, and the columns represent the types of respondents. 
Initially, the researcher entered the data from the coded transcripts into the 
relevant cells of the matrix, and labelled these according to which transcript 
and page of the transcript they were from, to enable tracing back to their 
sources if this was required. This was an important consideration for the 
researcher. The data in the matrix were then checked to ensure that they had 
been placed in the correct cell, and to keep open the possibility of further 
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analysis. Additionally, each transcript was re-checked to be certain that no 
important coded data had been omitted. As a third step, the data in the matrix 
were analysed to begin the process of drawing conclusions and making 
interpretations. In this respect, some suggestions are offered by Miles and 
Huberman (1994), who recommend noting patterns and contrasts, making 
comparisons, and clustering and counting. In the current study, contributions 
from the different types of participants were compared within each theme to 
establish whether support existed for the questionnaire survey results. It is also 
possible for data in matrices to be further partitioned and clustered, so that 
contrasts between sets of cases on variables of interest can be clarified. 
4.13 Questionnaires versus Interviews 
The decision to engage in both a questionnaire survey and an interview 
exercise was made on the assumption that both would provide insights in the 
business of evaluating the strength of audit quality in Libya. However, a 
purpose of the interviews only, was partly to approach some issues which 
could not be properly dealt with or analysed by quantitative methods. In this 
respect, officials at the Libyan Oil Companies and Audit Firms who were 
represented in the sample of interviewees were expected to provide information 
in a private meeting and explain further issues related to the significance of 
information contained in the current perception of audit quality in Libya and 
audit quality variables. However, whilst interviews are considered an effective 
means of collecting large amounts of data, some restrictions were encountered 
by the researcher when conducting interviews in the study, and these should be 
noted at this point. Firstly, as in Western countries, interviews are time- 
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consuming and therefore costly, and they can be seen as intrusive, which may 
reduce the participants' co-operation. There is also sometimes a problem of 
getting the interview transcripts translated, and there are other problems that 
arise particularly with Libyan interviewees. In this connection the researcher 
found that: 
1. Most of the interviewees found it difficult to describe their problems in 
general, and more specifically, when they were asked about something 
related to their work as Internal Auditor or Financial Manager, 
especially if they were meeting the interviewer for the first time. 
2. Most of the interviewees, especially the key staff, seemed to fear that 
the interview would cover information regarding their institution and 
that their position in their company could be threatened. 
3. Permission to tape-record interviews was refused in some cases, 
because this is an unfamiliar experience in Libyan society and is seen 
by some as threatening. Additionally, some of the respondents who did 
give their permission to record the proceedings, were noticeably tense 
during the interviews. 
The researcher became aware that it was not practical to hope for honest and 
open interviews about such sensitive issues and concluded that the exercise 
was less likely to provide valid information in Libya than it might in Western 
countries 
4.14 Statistical Analyses Employed 
This section considers the statistical tests employed to measure the similarities 
and differences among the groups of respondents in their perceptions of audit 
quality. Statistical analysis is popular among researchers, being used for 
several reasons. Kerlinger (1986) listed four different motives in this respect, 
these being: a) to reduce large quantities of data to a manageable and 
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understandable form, b) to aid in the study of population and samples, c) to 
assist decision-making, and d) to enable the deduction of reliable inferences. 
Parametric and non-parametric tests are the two broad classifications of 
statistical tests, and each is more suited to particular circumstances. Parametric 
tests are believed to yield valid and powerful results as long as certain 
conditions are met. These pre-requisites are (see Siegel, 1995: 19; Siegel and 
Castellan, 1988: 20): 
1. The observations must be independent of error. 
2. The observations must have equal variance in the various treatment 
populations. 
3. The observations must be drawn from normally distributed scores 
in the treatment of population. 
4. The variables must have been measured as at least an interval scale. 
However, in social science research, non-parametric tests are also as important 
as parametric tests, since as pointed out by Siegel and Castellan (1988: 34), it is 
not common for behavioural scientists to obtain data that satisfy all the 
assumptions of the parametric test, which includes achieving the sort of 
measurements which permit meaningful interpretation of parametric tests. 
Non-parametric tests consequently adopt an important role in behavioural and 
social sciences research. Such tests make no assumptions about the distribution 
of scores or other data in the whole population as a whole (they are 
`distribution-free'), and nor do they require measurement on an interval scale. 
Moreover, the data does not have to meet the strict assumptions of the 
parametric methods, such as normality and homogeneity of variance. It is clear 
that the use of the non-parametric techniques is more appropriate in this study, 
as the collected data is weaker than that of an interval scale. Moreover, the 
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statistical test utilised is determined by the information in the scale. According 
to Newbold et al (2003) non-parametric tests are techniques used to statistically 
analyse nominal or ordinal data, or numerical data without the assumption of 
population normality (i. e. distribution-free tests). Such data are usually 
obtained in many settings, including questionnaires surveys. Two non- 
parametric tests were applied in this research: the Mann-Whitney test and 
Kruskal-Wallis test which are discussed in sub section 4.13.1. 
Bereson and Levine (1992) and Siegel and Castellan (1988) have documented 
a number of advantages of non-parametric tests, namely: 
1. Non-parametric statistical tests are typically much easier to learn and to 
apply than are parametric tests. 
2. Non-parametric methods may be used on all types of data. 
3. Non-parametric methods are no less powerful than parametric methods 
when the assumptions of the latter are fulfilled, and are perhaps even 
more powerful in the event of violating the assumptions of parametric 
methods. 
4. Non-parametric methods are normally simple to utilise when the 
sample sizes are small. 
5. Non-parametric methods make fewer, less strict assumptions than the 
parametric approach. 
6. Non-parametric methods provide the solution to the problem without 
testing the parameters of the population. 
7. Non-parametric methods may be more economical than the parametric 
approach due to the fact that the researcher may increase power and yet 
save money, time and labour by collecting large samples of data that 
are more accurately measured, and by solving the problem faster. 
On the other hand, the disadvantages of non-parametric testing arise if all the 
assumptions of parametric testing are fulfilled and the data is to be measured as 
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either an interval or a ratio scale. It was decided that non-parametric tests 
would be used in the present study to facilitate statistical analyses due to the 
nature of the research. 
Once the questionnaire responses were coded according to the respondent 
group category (i. e. internal auditors, financial managers and accounts 
managers of oil companies, and managing partners, audit supervisors and 
auditors of audit firms), SPSS was applied to them, and the various statistical 
techniques used are reviewed in the following section. 
4.14.1 Descriptive and Analytical Statistical Methods 
Researchers note that in general, two types of statistical analysis are used, these 
being descriptive and inferential (Bereson and Levine, 1992; Pallant, 2001). 
Descriptive analysis is the transformation of raw data into an organised form 
that lends itself to easy interpretation to provide descriptive information. 
Usually, this technique involves the calculation of means and standard 
deviation, medians, frequency distributions, percentage distributions, rank, 
skewness, and kurtosis. Inferential analysis is the drawing of conclusions or 
making generalisations from the raw data, and this moves on from descriptive 
analysis to analyse difference and relationships. The aim of inferential analysis 
is to make predictions from the sample statistics about a wider population, and 
this is the approach that was adopted in the current study. In this case, 
inferential statistics were used to evaluate the perceptions of the participants, 
and to analyse the responses in the questionnaire by using frequencies and 
percentages, as well as to find out whether significant differences exist between 
and within respondent groups. The method of statistical inference was used in 
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this research to compare the responses, opinions and perceptions of the 
respondents according to the three respondent groups (i. e. internal auditors, 
financial managers and accounts managers of oil companies) and three groups 
of each respondent category (managing partners, audit supervisors and auditors 
of audit firms). 
Two non-parametric tests: (1) the Kruskal-Wallis test and (2) the Mann- 
Whitney U-test, were used in the study, essentially because they suit the nature 
of the data analysis to be undertaken, as is briefly discussed below. 
The Kruskal-Wallis test is a test of one-way, between-groups analysis of 
variance that allows a comparison of three or more groups (Pallant, 2001). This 
test was applied to establish the relationships among perceptions on issues 
relating to audit quality between the respondent groups. The Mann-Whitney U- 
test allows for testing differences between two independent groups when the 
populations are not normally distributed or when it is not possible to guarantee 
that samples are taken from populations of equal variability. It is an alternative 
to the t-test for two independent samples (Pallant, 2001; Zikmund, 2000). 
Whilst the t-test examines whether the means of two populations differ, the 
Mann-Whitney U-test is more general, looking for differences in means, 
variances or shape of distribution, or any combination of these (Silver, 1997). 
Silver (1997) argues that although the Mann-Whitney U-test is less powerful in 
its conclusions than the t-test, it is nonetheless more flexible in the range of 
circumstances where it can be used. In this study, the Mann-Whitney U-test is 
used to make comparisons of responses from Big Four and non-Big audit 
firms. This test was the most appropriate because the dependent variable is 
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measured on an ordinal scale and the independent variable consists of two 
unrelated group of samples. 
4.15 Triangulation 
The combination of two or more methods of data collection is advocated by 
researchers as valuable in allowing the process of triangulation, which 
essentially gives more credence to the results obtained (Bryman, 2004). This 
could be achieved, for example by the use of interviews, and focus groups, 
both of which would generate qualitative data that would complement each 
other. Hussey and Hussey (1997) note the benefit of collecting both 
quantitative and qualitative data in an attempt to triangulate findings, 
suggesting this to be an advantage for any research project. Considering the 
advantages of triangulation, Webb et al (1966) believed this to result in greater 
confidence in the results, and on the same theme, Saunders et al (2000) 
asserted that triangulation increases confidence that researchers are addressing 
the most important issues. 
The use of quantitative and qualitative measures in this study, through the 
questionnaire survey and interview exercise, served as a means to triangulate 
the data, despite the fact that the interview exercise was found to contain 
several flaws. This problem in itself provided a different insight into the 




This chapter has provided details of the methodology adopted in order to 
achieve the objectives of the study. It has described positivistic and 
phenomenological research paradigms, and considered the approach for this 
study, which combines quantitative and qualitative data (i. e. questionnaires and 
interviews). A comprehensive explanation of the questionnaire and interview 
procedures has also been offered, and the pilot test in respect of the 
questionnaire survey has been detailed. The idea of using both interviews and 
questionnaires, and the problems facing the researcher in conducting the 
interviews, has been discussed, and the reason for combining the two methods 
has been given. The following chapter presents the statistical findings relating 





This chapter reports on the findings of the survey conducted in Libya during 
the period February to April 2008. In doing this, it analyses and summarises 
the questionnaire data that was collected from Libyan oil companies and audit 
firms working in the country. 
The chapter begins with a descriptive analysis of demographic data, the 
purposes of which have been listed by Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch 
(1997: 73) as being to: 
a) Provide preliminary insights as to the nature of the responses collected, as 
reflected in the distribution of the values for each variable of interest. 
b) Help in detecting errors when coding the data. 
c) Present the data in a digestible way (through the use of graphs and tables). 
d) Provide an early opportunity for checking whether the distributional 
assumptions of the subsequent statistical tests are likely to be satisfied. 
The analysis and discussion of the findings on audit quality in Libya are 
presented on a section-by-section basis as indicated in the rationale for the 
questionnaire. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Initially, the descriptive 
statistics of the general information of two groups of respondents: audit firms 
and Libyan oil companies, are presented. The survey results pertaining to the 
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general perception of audit quality in Libya are then documented, after which 
the audit quality variables are considered. Thereafter, the future development 
of audit quality in Libya is discussed, and finally, a brief summary of the 
findings is given before the chapter is concluded. 
In the following sections, responses to the questionnaire are presented in tables. 
Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with a number of 
questions on a scale ranging from 1 to 5, where (1) represented strongly 
disagree, (2) disagree, (3) no view, (4) agree and (5) strongly agree. The means 
reported in each table are calculated on this scale but tests for significant 
differences between respondents using the Kruskal-Wallis and the Mann- 
Whitney tests are based on the full 5-point distribution of responses. 
5.2 Analysis of Section A of the Questionnaire: General Information 
Table 5.1: The Gender of Respondents 
Gender a Frequency Percentage -' Male 236 82.2 
Female 51 17.8 
Total 287 100 
Table 5.1 depicts the basic descriptive statistics of the participants, revealing 
that 82.2% of the participants are males while just 17.8% are females. This 
reflects that most workers in the audit field are males, a feature which is 
explained by the fact that there is no balance between the qualified females and 
qualified males in this field. Moreover, males are more educated than females. 
181 
Table 5.2: The Age of Respondents 
` Fre uenc 'Percentage', 
20 - 29 Years 45 15.7 
30 - 39 Years 87 30.3 
40 - 49 Years 112 39.0 
Over 50 Years 43 15.0 
Total 287 100 
Table 5.2 demonstrates that 15.7% of those surveyed are between 20-29 years, 
30.3% of respondents are between 30-39,39% of respondents are between 40- 
49, with the remaining respondents (15%) being aged 50 years and over. 
Table 5.3: The Position of Respondents 
Position Frequency, Percentage 
Managing Partner 52 32.5 
Audit Firms Audit Supervisor 52 32.5 
Staff Auditor 56 35 
Total 160 100 
Internal Auditor 45 35.4 
Oil Financial Manager 47 37 
Companies Accounts Manager 35 27.6 
Staff Total 127 100 
Total 287 100 
Table 5.3 shows the frequencies and percentages of the positions of 
respondents, and consists of two parts. The first part is the frequency 
distribution of the audit firm positions while the second part displays the 
frequency distribution of the companies' staff. In the first part, Table 5.3 shows 
that 32.5% of the respondents are audit supervisors, another 32.5% managing 
partners, and the remaining 35% being auditors. In the second part, the internal 
auditor and financial manager are seen as being represented in the proportions 
of 35.4%, and 37% respectively, while accounts managers number 27.6%. 
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Table 5.4: The Experience Levels of Respondents 
Experience - Fre uenc v Percentage 
Less than 5 Years 34 11.8 
5 -10 Years 59 20.6 
More Than 10 Years 194 67.6 
Total 287 100 
Table 5.4 depicts the frequency distribution of the experience levels of 
respondents. An increasing distribution was found, indicating a high 
percentage of respondents to have a high level of experience, a fact that should 
improve the quality of responses 
Table 5.5: Academic Qualifications of Respondents 
Academic qualification Frequency Percentage 
First University degree 180 62.7 
Higher Diploma 28 9.8 
Master Degree 47 16.4 
PhD Degree 32 11.1 
Total 287 1 00 
Table 5.5 shows the highest academic qualification held by respondents. From 
this it can be seen that within Libyan oil companies and audit firms, 62.7% of 
respondents hold a first university degree while 9.8% of the respondents hold a 
postgraduate diploma. However, 16.4% of respondents hold a Master's degree 
and 11.1% a PhD. 
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Table 5.6: The Professional Qualifications of Respondents 
Qualification `.... Professional ': , Fre uenc -Percentage- 
None 112 39.0 
ICAEW 24 8.4 
AICPA 19 6.6 
ASCA 10 3.5 
LAAA 122 42.5 
Total 287 100 
Table 5.6 shows the frequency distribution of the professional qualification of 
respondents. A high percentage of respondents (42.5%) have the LAAA 
certificate, the second highest percentage of respondents, 39%, have no 
certificate and just 6.6 %, and 3.5% have the AICPA and ASCA respectively. 
Table 5.7: Types of Audit Firm 
Status x° : -Audit Firm 
-- "" Frequency Percentage 
Local Audit firm 96 60 
Local Affiliated to an Arab and International Audit firm 43 27 
Local Affiliated to one of the Big Four Audit firms 21 13 
Total 160 100 
Table 5.7 shows the frequency distribution of the status of the external audit 
firm of respondents, from which it is seen that 60% of the audit firm 
respondents had worked for local audit fines, 27% had worked for one of the 
firms affiliated to Arab and International audit firms, and 13% had worked for 
a local firm affiliated to one of the Big Four audit firms. Therefore, due to 
differences in audit firm type in the sample, and, more importantly, to facilitate 
statistical analysis, audit firm types were categorised as non-Big Four audit 
firms and Big Four audit firms. 
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Table 5.8: Percentage of Respondents who Received or Provided Non- 
Audit Services 
Audit Firm Staff . 
Oil Com an Staff . Status Frequency- Percentage "Frequency - Percents e 
Yes 120 75 76 59.8 
No 40 25 51 40.2 
Total 160 100 127 100 
Table 5.8 depicts the percentage of Non-Audit Services (NAS) provided or 
received by the audit client(s) by both audit firm and oil company staff, and 
shows that 40.2% of oil company respondents had not received any type of 
NAS from their external auditor, whereas 59.8% had. In contrast, the majority 
of audit firm respondents (75%) reported that they had provided NAS to their 
audit clients, but 25% claimed not to have provided any such service. The very 
large percentage of audit firms that did provide NAS may be explained by the 
fact that an audit firm may audit different types of companies. 
5.3 Analysis of Section B of the Questionnaire 
53.1 The Current Perception of Audit Quality in Libya 
As shown in Table 5.9, an analysis of respondents by oil company and audit 
firm reveals that 68.5% of oil company respondents either agreed or strongly 
agreed with the statement that The current level of audit quality in Libya is 
insufficient (mean values of 3.87). In respect of audit firm respondents, this 
percentage was 56.3% (a mean value of 3.46). This could be due to several 
reasons: firstly, the perceived lack of professionalism among auditors in Libya, 
since 51.9% and 43.8% of respondents (oil companies and audit firms 
respectively) either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that The lack 
of the professionalism of auditors in Libya causes the low level of audit quality 
(mean values of 3.31 and 3.21). Secondly, the LAAA is seen to have 
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contributed nothing as indicated by the fact that 66.1% and 64.4% of 
respondents from the oil companies and audit firms either disagreed or strongly 
disagreed with the statement that The Libyan Accountants and Auditors 
Association (LAAA) plays an important role in developing the profession of 
auditing and enhancing audit quality (a mean value of 2.35 and 2.49). This 
finding is consistent with Mousa (2005) who suggested are the small size and 
limited authority of the LAAA. 
Thirdly, respondents from both the oil companies and audit firms (59% and 
61.3% respectively) believed that the Rules and regulations in Libyan are not 
comprehensive provisions that lack and cause low level audit quality (mean 
values of 3.55 and 3.61). 
Overall perceptions of respondents from both groups can be seen as 66.9% and 
59.4% in terms of either agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statement that 
Most oil companies in Libya prefer audit firms that are affiliated to foreign 
audit firms and audit quality depends on the status of the audit firm e. g. local 
affiliated to a foreign audit firm (mean value of 4.00 and 3.46). This result may 
be due to several reasons: firstly, the international audit firms tend to exercise a 
higher level of professionalism to protect their reputations. Secondly, local 
audit firms affiliated to a foreign audit firm are larger in terms of size and, 
therefore, obtain more exposure from the type of clients they have audited. 

















































C) ö ö ö ö ö ° 












M CV) N CV) CV) It Cl) 
o a ^ i ; O co 









t0 O M N 
U 
Q 
co ° r 
LO 
.., 
g z O co 
N I- 
>fr 
N N N r' r 
&0 Ui clq 
C6 Cl) C) N C) vi 
, Cl "'o to IT L O 
11 ': V) to (7) C6 T- co 
d 
.. , 
Ö Ö Ö Ö p O 
p 
O 
, U p 
co OV ti N co 
`a V 
Q 
"- O M M , C4 v N N 06 N N - Cl) .ý .,.:.., . 
IR 
c 
Wý 17 cd 






























" ? Z! to 9 " :: 3 ra 
ö5 
. ti 0 0.. ^J w .d C` Q% 
°° b a Qßä ?ý 
w4) 
b 
p ms" 0 =1 bV 0 y vi 
cd tz 
o o U 
N wý 
E 




o ý' CL c ýy 8 = "a 41 4) ; t: 
9 
V F co cd rA Q% :' y C ýy O 'O n b .c oq ego q y i. t0 
ý2 to 10 V) 4. 0 a cam 0 
" °o -wS 








- ,. -' 
























O 1ý.. C 
4)) 
































Another interesting finding is that just over half of the respondents (62.2% and 56.9% 
in oil companies and audit firms respectively) either agreed or strongly agreed with 
the statement that Most audit firms in Libya have little idea about new services, such 
as assurance services and Internet reporting (mean values of 3.32 and 3.49), and 
71.7% and 65.7% either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that The 
accounting and auditing curricula in the Libyan education system are insufficient to 
train auditors (mean values of 3.77 and 3.74). This finding is consistent with those of 
Mautz and Sharaf (1961: 159) who stated that "all auditors are first accountants, or at 
least trained as accountants, because one cannot effectively verify accounting data 
unless he has some knowledge of how they were gathered; summarized, and 
classified, and presented. He must know the procedures and practices of accounting 
and be familiar with its devices and techniques. Thus accounting provides a necessary 
background for the study of auditing. " 
From the above analysis, it is clear that responses from oil companies and audit firms 
are not homogeneous; therefore, an attempt is made to isolate the determinants of 
responses. 
Two significant differences at the 1% level were found, as measured by the Mann 
Whitney U test. It was found that although 68.5% of oil company and 56.3% of audit 
firm respondents agreed with the statement that The current level of audit quality in 
Libya is insufficient, the overall responses were significant at the 1% level (Mann 
Whitney U test). This result might reflect the fact that the oil companies appear to be 
aware of insufficiencies and inadequacies in the Libyan auditing environment and are 
unhappy with the situation. This supports the findings in the descriptive analysis (see 
Table 5.9). 
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Moreover, both oil companies and audit firms show a level of agreement with the 
statement Most oil companies in Libya prefer audit firms that are affiliated to a 
foreign audit firm and audit quality depends on the status of the audit firm e. g. local 
affiliated to a foreign audit firm was significantly higher at the 1% level of 
significance in respect of the oil company respondents (66.9% either agreeing or 
strongly agreeing) than the audit firm respondents (59.4% either agreeing or strongly 
agreeing). This mismatch in the responses of the two research populations is 
unsurprising, as companies engaging foreign audit firms are likely to support such a 
statement. 
5.3.1.1 The Current Perceptions of Audit Quality Based on Position 
Table 5.10 shows the overall perceptions of respondents from oil company staff and 
audit firm staff with one significant difference in the distribution of responses at the 
5% level of significance, and two significant differences at the 1% level as measured 
by the Kruskal-Wallis test. Financial managers and account managers had a 
significantly highest mean score (4.00, and 4.04) and audit supervisors, auditors and 
managing partners had the lowest mean scores (3.33; 3.38 and 3.67) for the statement 
Most oil companies in Libya prefer audit firms that are affiliated to foreign audit 
firms and audit quality depends on the status of the audit firm e. g. local affiliated to a 
foreign audit firm. Basically, because the Foreign Investments Regulations in Libya 
Law No 116 allows only Libyans to open audit offices, all foreign audit firms in the 
country, whether Arab, International or one of the Big Four, must be affiliated to a 
local audit firm. Therefore, not surprisingly, audit supervisors and managing partners, 
as Libyan owners would not support this statement, since it apparently favours foreign 
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audit firms over local audit firms, taking into account that in a Libyan context, all 
other staff of audit firms are not usually Libyan nationals. 
Further, with regard to the statement Most audit firms in Libya have little idea about 
new audit services, such as assurance services and internet reporting, the accounts 
managers had a significantly higher mean score (4.14) and audit supervisors had a 
lower mean score (2.90). Again, this is a result that does not come as a surprise, since 
audit supervisors are not likely to support the statement, given that it criticises local 
audit firms. This finding may be interpreted in two ways: either the majority of audit 
clients in Libya are still audited using traditional methods, or the type of sample (oil 
companies) is ignorant about new services, such as assurance services and internet 
reporting. The literature is confirmed by this outcome, since scholars report that 
foreign audit firms perform more powerful and effective tests than local audit firms 
because of their experience and knowledge, and hence, produce higher audit quality 
(Dopuch and Simunic, 1980). 
Table 5.10 shows only one significant difference in the distribution of responses for 
the statement The current level of audit quality in Libya is insufficient at the 5% level 
of significance, as measured by the Kruskal-Wallis test. Accounts managers and 
financial managers had a significantly high mean score (4.00 and 3.94) and auditors 
and audit supervisors had a lower mean score (3.25 and 3.52). This result may reflect 
the situation that financial and accounts managers are more unhappy with the level of 
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5.3.1.2 The Current Perceptions of Audit Quality Based on Type of Audit Firm 
The analysis of current perceptions of audit quality by type of audit firm (Table 5.11) 
shows one significant difference using the Kruskal-Wallis test to determine significant 
differences in the distribution of responses at the 5% level of significance between 
local audit firms, local firms affiliated to an Arab and/or International firm, and local 
firms affiliated to one of the Big Four audit firms (non-Big Four and Big Four). The 
result was found to be statistically significant at 5%. The level of agreement with the 
statement Most oil companies in Libya prefer audit firms that are affiliated to foreign 
audit firms and audit quality depends on the status of the audit firm e. g. local 
affiliated to a foreign audit firm was significantly lower from local, Arab and 
international audit firm (non-Big Four audit firm) respondents than from Big Four 
audit firm respondents. This result may be due to the fact that the Big Four are 
generally perceived as more professional than the non-Big Four in the auditing 
environment and have their own quality standards. This is not surprising, since this 





















w"6 ýo o o o O o O Cl O o O o O o O ö - 4 M N '$ K) st V 
o C LO 0 0 
c v Co Ö Ö co 
M 6 N tt Cr) M 










16. . t N CO) R7 et 

















Ö 0 Ö 0 2 
`Q v ýt v r9) CV) ýf Y 
39 CD 



















CV) C') Cl N) CF) CV) c') N 
Ü 
1 11 1, , t 
c c N ä 
ö 
. 
o b  to 
-Q 44 9 
TJ ý. fýA a = ui 
N R y 
of O 
... 





























ö o O. ä ä C ö 
ö 7ý 
b C yý 
. 
"ý C 





N N G' 
C C 
r) 










.. I . ' U 
%O ^d ý y N 




5.4 Analysis of Section C of the Questionnaire: Factors Impairing and 
Enhancing Audit Quality 
5.4.1 Size of the Audit Firm 
In order to elicit their perceptions of the relationship between audit firm size and audit 
quality, respondents from oil companies and audit firms were asked to indicate on a 
scale ranging from 1, strongly disagree, to 5, strongly agree, their disagreement or 
agreement with the five statements given in Table 5.12. 
The statement The Big Four firms are more risk averse in respect of damage to their 
reputation from public scandals and/or audit failures had the highest mean score 
(3.93), resulting from 70.1% of oil company respondents agreeing or strongly 
agreeing with it. The statement The local audit firms achieve a lower level of audit 
quality had the second highest mean score (3.91) with as many as 71.6% of oil 
company respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with it. 
The statement The companies audited by the Big Four firms are more attractive to 
investors and creditors had the third highest mean score (3.77) based on the responses 
from oil company participants. As many as 63.8% either agreed or strongly agreed 
with this statement. The statement The Big Four Firms achieve a high level of audit 
quality had the fourth highest mean score (3.75), with 70.9% of respondents agreeing 
or strongly agreeing with it. The statements The Big Four firms perform more 
powerful, effective tests and are more credible than others and The size of the audit 
firm is positively associated with audit quality had the fifth highest mean scores (3.65 
and 3.63), with 69.3% and 64.6% of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with 
them, respectively. 
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As many as 66.1 % and 63.8% of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the 
statements The Big Four firms can plan the audit process more effectively and can 
obtain a greater variety of clients and The Big Four firms are more independent and 
more likely to issue qualified reports. These statements achieved nearly the same 
mean scores (3.58 and 3.57). The Statement The Big Four firms can report the real 
financial situation of the clients more readily than other firms had the lowest mean 
score (3.49). 
In the responses from audit firm representatives, the statement The local audit firms 
achieve a lower level of audit quality had the highest mean score (3.96), with 70.7% 
of audit firm respondents supporting it. The statements that The size of the audit firm 
is positively associated with audit quality, The Big Four firms achieve a high level of 
audit quality and The companies audited by the Big Four firms are more attractive to 
investors and creditors had the second highest and same mean score (3.78), with as 
many as (66.9%, 63.8% and 68.1%) of respondents either agreeing or strongly 
agreeing with them, respectively. The statement that The Big Four firms perform 
more powerful, effective tests and are more credible than others had the third highest 
mean score (3.71), 61.9% of respondents either agreeing or strongly agreeing with it. 
The statement that The Big Four firms are more risk averse in respect of damage to 
their reputation from public scandals and/or audit failures had the fourth highest 
mean score (3.70), 63.2% of respondents either agreeing or strongly agreeing with it. 
The statement that The Big Four firms can plan the audit process more effectively and 
can obtain a greater variety of clients had the fifth highest mean score (3.66) with as 
many as 62.8% of respondents either agreeing or strongly agreeing with it. 
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The Statement that The Big Four firms can report the real financial situation of the 
clients more readily than other firms had the second lowest mean score (3.61) with as 
many as 57.8% of respondents either agreeing or strongly agreeing with it. 
The Statement that The Big Four firms are more independent and more likely to issue 
qualified reports had the lowest mean score (3.11) with 48.8% of respondents either 
agreeing or strongly agreeing with it 
Once again, because the overall responses of oil company and audit firm respondents 
were not completely homogeneous, an attempt was made to isolate the determinants 
of responses. 
The analysis of differences between oil companies' and audit firms' responses is 
reported in Table 5.12, which reveals one significant difference at the 1% level and 
one at the 5%, as measured by the Mann Whitney U test. 
An inspection of each sample group's distribution of responses (which is reflected in 
the mean scores) shows a significant difference at the 1% level of significance 
between oil company and audit firm respondents for one of the nine statements, and a 
significant difference at the 5% level for another one of the nine statements, using the 
Mann Whitney U test. These findings suggest that oil company respondents perceived 
the Big Four as producing a higher level of audit quality than non-Big Four audit 
firms, the Big Four firms are more risk averse in respect of damage to their reputation 
from public scandals and/or audit failures, and that the Big Four firms are more 
independent and more likely to issue qualified reports, which is consistent with the 
findings of Michael (2007) who determined that clients audited by large audit firms 
tend to have lower unusual accruals, and are more likely to meet the benchmark 
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earnings targets of small earnings increases. He also found that large audit firms are 
more likely to issue going-concern reports. These results show that there is a 
significant variation in audit quality across different sizes of auditor practice offices, 
with larger offices providing higher quality audits. They are consistent with the 
conclusions drawn by Beatty (1989) and Titman and Trueman (1986) that since large 
audit firms (Big Four) have greater resources and possess identical technological 
capabilities, they are capable of performing more powerful tests. As a result, larger 
audit firms are more likely to be associated with more precise information than 
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5.4.1.1 The Perceptions of Size of Audit Firm Based on Position: 
Table 5.13 presents the analysis by position. Distributions of the responses from oil 
company staff and audit firm staff were significantly different at the 1% and 5% level, 
as measured by the Kruskal-Wallis statistic. 
Overall perceptions of respondents showed one significant difference in the 
distribution of responses at the 1% level of significance as measured by the Kruskal 
Wallis test. Auditors had a significantly lower mean score (2.50) and accounts 
managers and financial managers had the highest mean score (4.26 and 3.49) for the 
statement The Big Four firms are more independent and more likely to issue qualified 
reports. This difference in the responses perhaps indicates that the oil company 
respondents believe large firms are wealthier than small firms and would potentially 
be required to give in to larger claims in the event that they were to be sued. Hence, 
they might be more concerned about maintaining audit quality and their reputation in 
the audit market than smaller firms. The result might also explain why the Big Four 
have been reported as providing higher quality auditing and being more independent 
than non-Big Four firms in the literature (Michael, 2007; Becker et al, 1998; Francis 













ö ö ö ö ö ö ö ö ö 
.; 91 
°' v v er v v ri ýF ri 
o 
Q O) C) N. f- 1) f- 





cý) cM c) c) "t C') c) tt 
ýý 
O O O O O O O O O 
Q O O 
O O O O O O O 
O 0 iÜ o0A 
'7 c) . ýt sY ý! ýt ý. 
fs O M 
N. cV 





0 Ö Ö Ö Ö 
N 
y 
id ' 1.. p 













Ö Ö Ö p) 
p st si 'ýt M ýt '7 `7 N C 
V co 
ý - 0 i 
N) CV) M r) M CV) N 
Q 
O 
Ö Op Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö y 
> 
5a 
ý+ Q C. 














Ö Ö 0 




`1t 4 4 ý! ' tT 'Cf st 
N 
. w C's 
a, 
0000 rn (00 0) ö F- C ° 
13 
ri ri ri v ri ri ai c C 
V 
0 
Z; U S. 2 
0 
0 L. O ayi pÖ 
c d 
. N 




8 O ö y 




0 Ou a ea > E 
am ao vG  ' 0 
w Vo ' V. y y °ý 
y 1o RS 
u 
VU 
9 a * 














wv wN o - Ao 
a 
",, p. (D 
ý -0 0 4 U A! 
0 0 N 
5.4.1.2 The Perceptions of Size of Audit Firm Based on Type of Audit Firm 
The analysis by type of audit firm, as reported in Table 5.14, shows five significant 
differences between local audit firms, Arab or international firms, and local firms 
affiliated to one of the Big Four audit firms (non-Big Four and Big Four) at the 1% 
and 5% levels of significance, respectively, as measured by the Kruskal-Wallis test. 
The level of agreement with the statements The companies audited by the Big firms 
are more attractive to investors and creditors and The Big Four firms are more 
independent and more likely to issue qualified reports at the level 1% of significance 
was significantly higher for Big Four respondents (4.33 and 3.86, mean score, 
respectively) than for local, Arab, and international audit firm (non-Big Four) 
respondents (3.83,2.90 and 3.37,3.21, respectively). This outcome is consistent with 
the study conducted by Michael (2007) who found that clients audited by large audit 
firms tend to have lower unusual accruals, and are more likely to meet the benchmark 
earnings targets of small earnings increases. Jang and Lin (1993) found that trading 
volume on the first trading day was significantly larger for firms audited by the Big 
Eight audit firms than for firms audited by non-Big Eight audit firms. 
In addition, the analysis by type of audit firm in Table 5.14 shows three significant 
differences between local audit firms, local firms affiliated to an Arab or international 
audit firm, and local firms affiliated to one of the Big Four audit firms, (non-Big Four 
and Big Four) at the 5% level of significance, as measured by the Kruskal-Wallis test. 
The level of agreement with these three statements by Big Four audit firm 
respondents was significantly higher than it was by non-Big Four audit firm 
respondents. This disagreement in the responses from the Big Four audit firm 
respondents perhaps indicates the main reasons why, in their view, the Big Four are 
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perceived as producing a higher level of audit quality than the non-Big Four. The 
reasons may be summarised as follows: 
1- The Big Four firms are more independent and more likely to issue qualified 
reports. 
2- The Big Four firms can report the real financial situation of the clients more 
readily than other firms. 
3- The Big Four firms perform more powerful, effective tests and are more 
credible than others. 
4- The Big Four firms can plan the audit process more effectively and can obtain 
a greater variety of clients. 
It is worth mentioning here that these results strongly support previous studies, such 
as the one undertaken by De Angelo (1981a) who argued that audit quality is directly 
related to the size of auditing firm, that conducted by Dopuch and Simunic (1980) 
who reported that the Big Four are perceived as providing a higher level of audit 
quality than non-Big Four auditors because they are viewed as being more credible 
and have more resources, and the research by Morris and Strawser (1999) that found 
that banks receiving modified audit reports from Big Six audit firms were more likely 
to continue, and not be closed by the regulators than those receiving modified audit 
reports from non-Big Six audit firms. In contrast, banks receiving non-modified audit 
reports from non-Big Six (as the Big Four were then) audit firms were more likely to 
be closed than those receiving non-modified audit reports from Big Six audit firms. 
Overall, respondents' perceptions of the relationship between firm size and level of 
audit quality are consistent with the notion that higher audit quality is associated with 
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5.4.2 The Provision of NAS 
Table 5.15 presents the analysis of respondents' perceptions about the relationship 
between the provision of NAS and audit quality. It shows that 84.2% of oil company 
respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement The provision of NAS 
to an audit client gives the auditor more experience of the client's industry and more 
access to the client's accounting system. This statement achieved the highest mean 
score (4.24). Providing NAS to an audit client by a separate department gives the 
auditor more credibility had the highest second mean score (3.50), with (60.7%) of oil 
company respondents either agreeing or strongly agreeing with it. This result might 
reflect the respondents' confidence in the safeguards of auditor independence from 
the segregation of duties by splitting the provision of audit and NAS into separate 
departments, which is consistent with the arguments proposed by Canning and 
Gwilliam (1999) and Pany and Reckers (1984). 
Sequentially, the third highest mean score (3.39) was achieved by the statement The 
prohibition of the provision of NAS to an audit client is only to maintain the 
perception of independence. Again, 48% either agreed or strongly agreed with it. The 
statement with the fourth highest mean score (3.20) was The provision of NAS to an 
audit client reduces the probability of switch threat change auditor, with half (50.4%) 
of respondents either agreeing or strongly agreeing with it. 
In contrast, a third of the oil company respondents (33.1%) either agreed or strongly 
agreed with the statement The provision of NAS to an audit client leads to economic 
dependency on that client and causes a conflict of interests for the auditor. It achieved 
the lowest mean score of (2.50). The statement with the second lowest mean score 
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2.83) was The provision of NAS impairs audit quality, with which 23.7% of 
respondents either agreed or strongly agreed. 
The statement with the third lowest mean score (3.04) was Only a certain type of NAS 
impairs audit quality. Over a third (45.7%) of respondents either agreed or strongly 
agreed with this statement. 
With regard to responses from the audit firms, Table 5.15 shows that the statement 
The provision of NAS to an audit client gives the auditor more experience of the 
client's industry and more access to the client's accounting system, achieved the 
highest mean score of 3.98, with 72.5% of respondents either agreeing or strongly 
agreeing. 
The statement with the next highest mean score (3.58) was The prohibition of the 
provision of NAS to an audit client is only to maintain the perception of 
independence, which gained either agreement or strong agreement from 58.8% of 
respondents. The statement The provision of NAS to an audit client reduces the 
probability of a threat to switch auditor achieved a mean value of (3.53), with just 
over half (51.9%) of respondents either agreeing or strongly agreeing with it. The 
statement with the fourth highest mean score (3.34) was Providing NAS to an audit 
client by a separate department gives the auditor more credibility. Just under half 
(47.5%) of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with this statement, possibly 
reflecting the confidence of the respondents from large audit firms and local firms in 
their ability to separate their staff according to the type of services they were 
commissioned to perform. Indeed, the provision of NAS by staff from separate 
departments has been practised by large audit firms for decades. 
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In contrast, the statement with the lowest mean score (2.43) was The provision of NAS 
impairs audit quality, which attracted agreement or strong agreement from only 
16.9% of respondents. 
The statement with the second lowest mean score (2.57) was The provision of NAS to 
an audit client leads to economic dependency on that client and causes a conflict of 
interests for the auditor. Just less than a third (30%) of respondents either agreed or 
strongly agreed with this statement. The statement with the third lowest mean score 
(3.26) was Only certain types of NAS impair audit quality and in this respect, 48.8% 
of audit firm respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with it. 
Since the overall responses of oil companies and audit firms were not completely 
identical, an attempt was made to isolate the determinants of the disparities. 
Therefore, the extent to which position and type of audit firm might explain 
differences in oil company and audit firm respondents' opinions, was once again 
tested using the Kruskal-Wallis and Mann Whitney U tests. 
Table 5.15, which documents the results, shows two significant differences at the 1% 
level, as measured by the Mann Whitney U test. 
On examination of the level of agreement, oil company respondents were significantly 
higher than audit firm respondents in respect of the statement that the provision of 
NAS impairs audit quality. This difference in the responses is interesting, and perhaps 
suggests that audit firm respondents viewed the provision of NAS from the profit 
perspective, whereas oil companies viewed the provision of NAS as not impairing 
audit quality, but needing some restriction. 
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The level of agreement from oil company respondents was significantly higher than 
that from audit firm respondents in respect of the statement highlighting the 
advantages of the provision of NAS to an audit client as being that it gives the auditor 
more experience of the client's industry and more access to the client's accounting 
system. This result might reflect a preference of oil company respondents to receive 
the provision of NAS from their external auditor. 
However, in general, the above results are consistent with prior literature (Abdel- 
Khalik, 1990; Craswell, 1999; De Fond et al, 2002) that identifies the provision of 
NAS to audit clients as having the potential to increase the auditor's client knowledge, 
and therefore, enhance the probability that problems would be discovered. Therefore, 
for a given level of independence, NAS may increase audit quality. Further, NAS may 
increase a client's dependence on its auditor, thereby reducing the credibility of the 
switch threat. Another commonly-mentioned advantage of providing NAS to audit 
clients is the potential cost advantage to the client arising from knowledge spillovers, 
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5.4.2.1 The Perceptions of NAS Based on Position 
Table 5.16 shows that when comparing the responses of oil company staff and audit 
firm staff using the Kruskal-Wallis test, one significant difference (at the 5% level) is 
observed. Financial managers, accounts managers and internal auditors had 
significantly higher mean scores (4.32,4.31 and 4.09) than audit supervisors and 
auditors (3.96 and 3.98) for the statement The provision of NAS to an audit client 
gives the auditor more experience of the client's industry and more access to the 
client's accounting system. This finding may be due to the belief of financial 
managers and internal auditors, who may feel that the non-provision of audit services 
improves audit quality, and believes that if NAS are not provided, more audit hours 
are needed for new auditor to become familiar with the company system. This result 
is consistent with that obtained by other researchers who support the provision of joint 
services, arguing that this arrangement ameliorates audit independence (Antle et al, 
1997), because it provides the auditor with better knowledge of a client (through 
`knowledge spillover'), and may well enhance the likelihood of problem discovery, 

























C5 b' 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 










(0 C O 
C7 
N 
1- NV N M M N Cl) 




0 O O O 
v N M <") CM N et 
V (si , gig; " N co 0) M M N 
ID M M O N ' N- N 
v N CO) Cv) l+) N M 
w 
' 
O O O O O O O 
b O O O O O 0 0 














0 0 C 0 0 0 0 




Ö Mv) N 
U) 
Co 
C) N N) M N) N Nj 
C3 C) C) C) C3 C5 
y_ 
















Cv) N M v) M N C7 
ö 




O O O 
`$ cv) N rj 
ý co 0) v t as Cl 
N q 
'qt N 6 M Cl) CV C) 10 
O"o oC 
" 




A Cl) M 
V M 
¢ Cl. C 
V Fý p, 
ý 'C7 a 
OC O 




"' y "` .ö Ln 
. r. O 2 a 
cn uc Col Q QE v «. 
ö 
Qcu Qý, ý z u ýý " c° 















Cl) 0 0 O cd 
V 
O - O O C 
OOv 
" Ö 
,,. .ýº .y ", -ý ' C C CD ,Z OO A) 











co a ic ý 
ö 
E- 




5.4.2.2 The Perceptions of NAS Based on Type of Audit Firms 
The analysis by type of audit firm, as reported in Table 5.17, shows that no significant 
differences were found at the 5% level, and that just one significant difference was 
found at the 1% level between local audit firms, local firms affiliated to an 
international firm, and local firms affiliated to one of the Big Four audit firms (non- 
Big Four and Big Four) using the Kruskal Wallis test. 
The level of agreement with the statement: Only certain types of NAS impair audit 
quality was significantly higher from local audit firms and international audit firms 
(non-Big Four) (3.58 and 2.86) than from the Big Four firm respondents (2.62). This 
result might reflect the fact that the Big Four firm respondents believe that all types of 
NAS can potentially impair the level of audit quality, or pose a threat to auditor 
independence. 
This finding is inconsistent with the reports of Abu Bakar et al (2005) and Alleyne 
and Devonish (2006) who found that individual non-audit services may affect auditor 
independence influence audit quality perceptions differently and that the provision of 















0 Ö Ö Ö Ö 0 0 Ö Ö 
st N fV 6 CM N U) 
W ý+ 
r- co fV M U-) C! co 
_ aý r1 M CC! Vt O N st 
M N N c") c) N M 
` 
^ Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö 
9 oOt t7 
Ö 
Q 'd' M M ýt cV st 
t-- c) co co C, 4 co ce) w 
2 V N Cl Cl) CO) fV cM ^. N 
ca 
p O O O O O O O L 1 1 1 1 J 







9 u G) - C .p 7 N 















r N Q 
G 
61 cC "3 t9 
X C 
O 
" _ C 
Ö aý 0 
C bA = - 
. ,. , tom. 
( as C 
C N D) 
W° 
q 



















0 0 ýn 4 w a c 








.. 4. 4. u 
.0 
(C 




z . 2 




5.4.3 The Length of Audit Tenure 
The respondents were asked to indicate their views on issues relating to the 
relationship between the length of audit tenure and audit quality and the analysis of 
their responses is reported in Table 5.18. From this it can be seen that the statement A 
policy of mandatory rotation leads to reduction in any relationship between the client 
and auditor had the highest mean score (3.90) based on oil company respondents' 
opinions, as many as 80.3% of whom either agreed or strongly agreed with this 
statement. The statement with the second and third highest mean scores (3.85) was 
Long tenure with a client impairs auditor independence. Oil company respondents 
(69.3%) either agreed or strongly agreed with it The statements with the third highest 
mean score (3.50 and 3.49) were The auditor will not become economically dependent 
by specking a period of tenure and The mandatory rotation is positively associated 
with audit quality that attracted 52% and 63% of respondents agreement or strong 
agreement. The statement with the fourth highest mean score (3.34) was Long tenure 
with a client gives an auditor more experience and leads to lower audit hours which 
attracted either agreement or strong agreement from 48.8% of respondents. 
In contrast, the statements Mandatory rotation harms the technical competence of 
auditing and leads to reduction in knowledge and familiarity with the client's 
accounting system, Mandatory rotation makes the audit market less competitive and 
causes higher audit fees and Long tenure should only be allowed with large 
companies achieved the lowest, second lowest and third lowest mean scores (2.52; 
2.60 and 2.65, respectively). 
Regarding audit firm respondents' opinions, Table 5.18 reveals that the same number 
of oil companies (77.5%) either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that 
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Policy of mandatory rotation leads to reduction in any relationship between the client 
and auditor. It had a mean score of (3.99). The statements Long tenure with a client 
gives an auditor more experience and leads to lower audit hours and The auditor will 
not become economically dependent by specifying a period of tenure obtained the 
second and third highest mean scores (3.93 and 3.81, respectively), with 77.6% and 
64.4% respectively of respondents either agreeing or strongly agreeing with the 
former and the latter. The statements with the fourth and fifth highest mean scores 
(3.59; 3.40 respectively) were Mandatory rotation is positively associated with audit 
quality and Long tenure with a client impairs auditor independence with 72.5% and 
55.3% respectively of respondents either agreeing or strongly agreeing with them. 
In contrast, the statements that achieved the lowest, second lowest and third lowest 
mean scores (2.56,2.62 and 2.91, respectively) were Mandatory rotation harms the 
technical competence of auditing and leads to reduction in knowledge and familiarity 
with the clients accounting system, Long tenure should only be allowed with large 
companies and Mandatory rotation makes the audit market less competitive and 
causes higher audit fees respectively. The majority of oil companies and audit firms 
agreed with all the advantages of mandatory rotation. This finding is consistent with 
prior literature, for example Dopuch et al (2001) found that rotation requirements 
decreased auditor-subjects' willingness to issue biased reports, Abu Bakar et al (2005) 
found that the mandatory rotation of auditor promotes the perception of auditor 
independence, and Sandra et al (2007) reported that audit firm rotation appeared to 
enhance perception of auditor independence but noting at the same time that the 
rotation of the audit partner did not change the level of confidence in reported 
earnings, and that auditors would not become economically dependent on any one 
client. 
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Once again, the overall responses gained in this study were not completely 
homogeneous. Thus, an attempt was made to isolate the determinants of responses 
according to whether they came from oil companies or audit firms. The overall 
sample was analysed by (1) position of respondents, and (2) type of audit firm, using 
the Kruskal-Wallis and Mann Whitney U tests. 
Table 5.18 shows the analysis comparing the oil company and audit firm respondents. 
It reveals three statistically significant differences in responses at a level of 5%, and 
one statistically significant difference at the 1% level when using the Mann Whitney 
test. 
The level of agreement with the statement Long tenure with a client impairs auditor 
independence was significantly higher from oil company respondents (3.85 mean 
score) than from audit firm respondents (3.40 mean score). The level of agreement 
with the statements The auditor will not become economically dependent by 
specifying a period of tenure and Long tenure with a client gives an auditor more 
experience and leads to lower audit hours were significantly higher in audit firm 
respondents (3.81 and 3.93 mean scores, respectively) than oil company respondents 
(3.50 and 3.34 mean scores, respectively). This result might reflect the lack of 
preference among the oil companies for long tenure. Additionally, it might suggest a 
preference among audit firms for long tenure with clients rather than mandatory 
rotation. This finding supports that of Winters (1976) who reports that auditors who 
serve a client over a continuous period of time tend to become impaired in their 
independence to inform and protect the public, since they may overly comply with 
management's desire to exercise some flexibility in reporting the results of operations. 
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It is inconsistent with the finding of Jackson et al (2008) who observed audit quality 
to increase with audit firm tenure. 
Another statistically significant difference in responses at a level of 5% in respect of 
the amount of agreement with the statement Mandatory rotation makes the audit 
market less competitive and causes higher audit fees was significantly higher in audit 
firm respondents (2.91 mean score) than oil company respondents (2.60 mean score). 
This result might reflect oil company respondents' support for the argument that the 
rotation of auditors would lead to greater competition between auditing firms which 
would enhance the quality of the service that they offered since if companies have to 
frequently change auditors, firms will seek to position themselves in the market 
through offering work of a high quality. 
Moreover, neither oil company nor audit firm respondents were in favour of large 
companies being allowed to engage external auditors for a long tenure, which is 
inconsistent with the argument of Hoyle (1978) that the complexity and size of most 
modern businesses simply do not allow short audit engagements, as it would take any 
external auditor some time to become acquainted with a company's business systems 
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5.4.3.1 The Perceptions of Length of Audit Tenure Based on Position 
The result in Table 5.19 shows the analysis by position revealing some statistically 
significant differences in responses using the Kruskal-Wallis test. Two significant 
differences were found at the 1% level and one at the 5% level of significance. 
The level of agreement with the statement: Long tenure with a client impairs auditor 
independence was significantly higher in the responses from financial managers and 
accounts managers (4.00 and 3.91) than in those from auditors and audit supervisors 
(2.96 and 3.48 mean scores, respectively). This finding supports the findings of 
Winters (1976) who observes that auditors who serve a client over a continuous 
period of time tend to become impaired in their independence to inform and protect 
the public, since they may overly comply with management's desire to exercise some 
flexibility in reporting the results of operations. In the present study, the results may 
be attributed to the fact that financial managers and accounts managers know the 
accounting system in the company better than auditors and hence know the influence 
of companies engaging the same auditors over a long period on audit quality in terms 
of audit hours, personal relationships with company management, etc. 
On examination of the level of agreement with the statement Long tenure with a client 
gives an auditor more experience and leads to lower audit hours it was shown that 
this was significantly higher in auditor and audit supervisor respondents (4.00 and 
3.98) than in financial managers and internal auditors (3.23 and 3.31 mean scores 
respectively). These findings may be due to the fact that the auditors and audit 
supervisors prefer long tenure rather than mandatory rotation, with their clients, for 
several reasons, e. g. long tenure gives auditors the opportunity to develop more 
knowledge, experience and familiarity with clients' accounting systems, and 
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ultimately eases their job. However, it is considered that where the same auditor 
audits a client for a number of years a degree of carelessness intrudes into their work 
and, therefore, the quality of auditing would be enhanced if a fresh approach were 
brought periodically to corporate audits (Brody and Moscove, 1998). In the early 
years of an audit assignment, the approach to audit is likely to be innovative but with 
the passage of time, the audit programme may become tired as the auditor is able to 
predict what the condition of the client's systems will be as well as the control 
procedures. 
Another significant difference at the 5% level was found in respect of the statement 
Long tenure should only be allowed with large companies. Internal auditors had a 
significantly higher mean score (3.07) than audit supervisors (2.33) and accounts 
managers (2.34). This finding may be due to internal auditor recognition that external 
auditors need a longer time with large companies in order to understand their 
accounting systems. If external auditors change periodically, demands will be made 
on financial managers' time and resources, as they will need to introduce them to 
company practices and systems, as reported by Johnson et al (2002), who state that 
short duration relationships between auditors and clients weaken client-specific 
knowledge in the early years of an engagement, resulting in the lesser likelihood of 
detecting material misstatements. Therefore, auditors have a comparative advantage 
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5.4.3.2 Perceptions of Length of Audit Tenure Based on Type of Audit Firm 
The analysis by type of audit firm, as reported in Table 5.20, shows that three 
significant differences were found at the 5% level of significance between local audit 
firms, local firms affiliated to an international firm, and local firms affiliated to one of 
the Big Four audit firms (non-Big Four and Big Four) using the Kruskal-Wallis test. 
Table 5.20 shows that the level of agreement with the statement that The policy of 
mandatory rotation leads to a reduction in any relationship between the client was 
significantly higher in respect of the Big Four audit firms (4.48 mean score) than in 
non-Big Four audit firms (4.05 and 3.85), at the 5% level of significance. The 
proponents of mandatory rotation indicated that it would improve audit quality, 
enhance auditor objectivity, and provide a `fresh look' at clients' financial statements. 
It may be the case that the responses from the Big Four might be a sign of their 
agreement that auditors who are aware of their limited engagement period would 
examine their clients' accounts more objectively, be less afraid to upset clients by 
issuing negative reports, and be in a stronger position to resist management pressure 
(see for example, Gietzman and Sen, 2002). 
Another significant difference found at the 5% level was in respect of the agreement 
with the statement that Mandatory rotation makes the audit market less competitive 
and causes higher audit fees. The level of agreement was significantly higher in non- 
Big Four respondents (3.16 and 2.96 mean scores respectively) than in Big Four 
respondents (2.19 mean score). 
Table 5.20 shows one significant difference at the 5% level of significance, that being 
in relation to the statement Long tenure with a client gives an auditor more experience 
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and leads to lower audit hours. The agreement was significantly higher in Big Four 
respondents (4.38 mean score) than in international audit firm and local audit firm 
(non-Big Four) respondents (3.70 and 3.94, respectively). These findings may be due 
to the fact that the Big Four audit firms preferred long tenure rather than mandatory 
rotation with their clients. Indeed, long tenure would reduce the positive risk caused 
by incoming auditors who may show a lack of knowledge about the client's business 
and the associated cost inefficiencies which could hinder effective auditing in the 
early years of the engagement period. This finding is consistent with the observation 
of Jackson et al (2008) who reported that audit quality increases with audit firm 
tenure. Similarly, Chen et al (2008) found that audit quality improved with audit 
partner tenure in the 1990-2001 periods before audit partner rotation became 
mandatory in Taiwan. Mansi et al (2004) also found that longer audit firm tenure is 


















ö 0 0 0 0 0 ö 0 




co 0 CO Co 0 
a0 h ' 
Y `ýt V' N v N N N fl 
b o 
Ö 0 0 0 Ö Ö 0 
P . H 
.i C') C') C+) CV N C') 'i 
N 
2 
O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 L 
O O O O O O O O 
P N 
xd ý 





U') t0 O F- 5 
M M Ci M N N N M p_ 
1 ý 
3 0 g " 











cr ti aý 4 v' y a c 
" c d aý E 
C 
. C C a) C 
. 





v4 -p vn 
5 c 
" `4%< C D 
1 














' C 3 
° " E .2 ä 
o cd 
.ý 3 .  0 Ö y y y Q 
E 
.° 
ý C co ca b r- C v .2 C ?w O C 
N 
Col 10 0. ) 
o0 a a ý' aý ý' ° ý 













5.4.4 The Level of Competitiveness in the Audit Market 
Table 5.21 shows that 81.1% of oil company respondents either agreed or strongly 
agreed with the statement The audit market in Libya is highly competitive. This 
statement achieved the highest mean score (3.79). 
In contrast, less than a quarter of oil company respondents (26%) either agreed or 
strongly agreed with the statement Audit quality may be impacted if the audit firm 
operates in a highly competitive environment. This statement achieved the second 
lowest mean score of (2.72). The statement with the lowest mean score (2.54) was 
Audit quality may be impacted if there is audit fee discounting or low-balling at initial 
engagement. The percentage of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with this 
opinion was 32.2%. Regarding audit firm respondents' opinions, Table 5.21 shows 
that the statement The audit market in Libya is highly competitive achieved the same 
highest mean score of (3.71), with (72.5%) of respondents either agreeing or strongly 
agreeing with it. 
In contrast, the statement with the lowest mean score (2.64) was Audit quality may be 
impacted if the audit firm operates in a highly competitive environment. Just a quarter 
(25%) of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with this opinion. The 
statement with the second lowest mean score (2.41) was Audit quality may be 
impacted if there is audit fee discounting or low-balling at initial engagement. Under 
a quarter (30.1%) of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with this idea. 
Oil company and audit firm responses were not completely identical, so an attempt 
was made to isolate the determinants of answers using the Mann Whitney U test. 
Table 5.21 shows no significant differences in'the distribution of responses at either 
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5.4.4.1 The Level of Competition in the Audit Market Based on Position 
The analysis by position revealed no significant differences in the distribution of oil 
company and audit firm responses at either the 1% or 5% levels of significance, so the 
analysis by position is not reported. 
5.4.4.2 The Level of Competition in the Audit Market Based on Type of Audit 
Firm 
The analysis of the difference in responses is reported in Table 5.22, which shows one 
significant difference at the 5% level, as measured by using the Kruskal Wallis test. 
The level of agreement with the statement that Audit quality may be impacted if the 
audit firm operates in a highly competitive environment was significantly higher from 
local, Arab, and international audit firms (non-Big Four audit firms) (2.89 and 2.37 
mean scores) than from Big Four audit firms (2.05 mean score), at the 5% level of 
significance. This might reflect the unwillingness of the Big Four firms to 
acknowledge any problems that a highly competitive environment might bring. The 
result seems to indicate that the Big Four firms react by taking steps to protect the 
profession's image, responding in a way that indicates their high levels of confidence 
in their professionalism (Teoh and Lim, 1996). Another possible reason for this view 
is that competition in the audit market for large companies exists among large audit 
firms and a small number of medium size audit firms, due to their capability to offer 
an adequately-sized bundle of resources. The smaller and medium-sized audit firms 
have shortcomings concerned with the lack of staff, inadequate industrial and 
technical expertise, and insufficient global reach to satisfy the large companies' audit 
requirements (see GAO, 2003a; Mautz and Sharaf, 1961), and the Big Tour audit 
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5.4.5 Fees for Audit Services 
Oil company and audit firm respondents' perceptions of the relationship between 
audit fees and audit quality are indicated in Table 5.23. According to the oil company 
respondents, the statement with the highest mean score (3.81) is An audit firm that 
charges high audit fees usually spends more audit hours with its clients and is most 
likely to provide high audit quality. As many as 70.8% of oil company respondents 
either agreed or strongly agreed with this statement. The statement with the second 
highest mean score (3.76) was The Big Four firms usually charge higher audit fees 
and local firms usually charge lower audit fees. The oil company respondents 
(67.7%) either agreed or strongly agreed with this opinion. The statement with the 
third highest mean score of (3.69) Audit fee is positively associated with audit quality. 
As many as 70.8% of the oil company respondents either agreed or strongly agreed 
with it. The statement that had the fourth highest mean score (3.45) was Audit fees 
that are specified by an independent professional body will lead to higher audit 
quality and 59% of respondents reported either agreeing or strongly agreeing with it. 
The fifth highest mean score (3.39) was recorded for the statement Audit fees are 
increased to allow more thorough scrutiny of the clients accounting system. Just half 
of respondents (49.6%) either agreed or strongly agreed with it. 
The statement that had the lowest mean score (2.71) was A company that pays higher 
audit fees is more likely to receive a clean audit opinion. Just over a third of 
respondents (37.7%) either agreed or strongly agreed with it. 
The statement that had the second lowest mean score (3.05) was A company that is 
receiving NAS from its external auditor is most likely to be charged lower audit fees. 
As many as 40.2% of the oil company respondents either agreed or strongly agreed 
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with this suggestion. The third lowest mean score (3.14) was Audit fees remaining 
between a specified minimum and maximum amount will result in higher audit quality 
with 45.7% of respondents either agreeing or strongly agreeing with it. 
Turning to audit firm respondents' opinions, Table 5.23 shows that the statement with 
the highest mean score (3.79) was The Big Four firms usually charge higher audit 
fees and local firms usually charge lower audit fees with as many as 71.3% of audit 
firm respondents either agreeing or strongly agreeing with it. The statement An audit 
firm that charges high audit fees usually spends more audit hours with its clients and 
is most likely to provide high audit quality achieved the second highest mean score 
(3.74), with 68.2% of audit firm respondents in agreement. The statement with the 
third highest mean score (3.65), and 75.1% of respondents supporting it, was The 
audit fee is positively associated with audit quality. The statement Audit fees that are 
specified by an independent professional body will lead to higher audit quality 
achieved the fourth highest mean score (3.46), and 60.7% of respondents supported it. 
The fifth highest mean score (3.34) was recorded for the statement Audit fees are 
increased to allow more thorough scrutiny of the client's accounting system. Over 
half of respondents (51.2%) either agreed or strongly agreed with this. 
The statement that had the lowest mean score (2.71) was A company that pays higher 
audit fees is more likely to receive a clean audit opinion. The statement that had the 
second lowest mean score (2.72) was A company that is receiving NAS from its 
external auditor is most likely to be charged lower audit fees. The third lowest mean 
score (3.29) was Audit fees are increased to allow more thorough scrutiny of the 
client's accounting system. 
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By comparing the responses from the oil company and audit firm participants, it can 
be seen that both samples agreed that the audit fee is positively associated with audit 
quality (70.8 % and 75.1% either agreeing and strongly agreeing, respectively) and it 
may be noted that oil company respondents agreed that the Big Four audit firms 
usually charge higher audit fees (74.8%), which is consistent with some researchers' 
findings that there is a large price premium on the Big Eight, now Four, auditors, and 
hence they conclude that the observation of systematic price differences between 
large and small auditing firms evidences product differentiation between large firms, 
and more importantly, that higher prices were consistent with higher quality audits 
(see, for example; Francis, 1984; Palmrose, 1986a; Gist and Pavlos, 1995). However, 
oil company respondents were more conservative about the idea that the increase in 
audit fees would allow more thorough scrutiny of a client's accounting system 
(57.5%), and hence provide high audit quality. Audit firm respondents agreed on the 
concept, and that might be due to the nature of their work, since they are representing 
the supply side in the market. 
Once again, overall responses were not completely homogeneous. Thus, an attempt 
was made to isolate the determinants of responses by oil company and audit firm 
respondents, using the Mann Whitney U tests. 
Table 5.23 shows one significant difference at the 5% level of significance indicating 
that the level of agreement among oil company respondents was significantly higher 
(3.05 mean score) than among audit firm respondents (2.72 mean score) for the 
statement A company receiving Non-Audit Service (NAS) from its external audtior is 
most likely to be charged lower audit fees. This finding is not surprising since audit 
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firms prefer to provide NAS to their clients and will not, therefore, support this 
statement. 
This result is inconsistent with the observations of Firth (1997a) who examined the 
determinants of audit fees, derived explanatory models used to predict future fees, and 
reported a negative association between audit fees and consultancy fees based on 
whether the audit is used as a loss leader and/or whether there are reductions in audit 
costs, which are returned to clients via lower audit fees. The latter finding supports the 
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5.4.5.1 Fees for Audit Services Based on Position 
The analysis by position revealed no significant differences in the distribution of oil 
company and audit firm respondents' opinions at either the 1% or 5% level of 
significance, so the analysis by position is not reported. 
5.4.5.2 Fees for Audit Services Based on Type of Audit Firm 
Table 5.24 presents the analysis of significant differences between local audit firms, 
local firms affiliated to an Arab or international audit firm, and local firms affiliated 
to one of the Big Four audit firms (non-Big Four and Big Four) by type of audit firm. 
The Kruskal-Wallis test revealed two significant differences at the 1% level of 
significance and one significant difference at the 5% level. 
The level of agreement for two statements, namely, The audit fee is positively 
associated with audit quality and Audit fees that are specified by an independent 
professional body will lead to higher audit quality was significantly higher for Big 
Four audit firm respondents than it was for local, Arab, and international audit firm 
(non-Big Four) respondents. This result is not surprising since non-Big Four audit 
firms claim that they cannot provide such high quality audits as Big Four audit firms, 
as long as large companies continue to pay them less for their audit services than Big 
Four audit firms. It also suggests that Big Four audit firms customarily receive higher 
audit fees than others, and that may be due to their high reputation and global reach. 
That result could indicate that there might be a large premium to local audit firms 
affiliated to one of the Big Four audit firms, which is consistent with the findings by 
Palmrose (1986a) who reported a premium for what were then the Big Eight audit 
firms. 
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O'Keefe and Westort (1992) highlighted the fact that personnel in large firms engaged 
in a greater degree of specialisation, and there is evidence that CPAs in larger firms 
engage in significantly more continuing professional education than CPAs in small 
fines. Therefore, the technological knowledge of audit teams in Big Four audit firms 
is likely to be greater than in small firms, and hence the detection and correction of 
errors will also be greater. The finding shows further satisfaction among Big Four 
audit firms and their desire for an independent body to specify the amount of audit 
fees paid to all audit firms. 
In addition, the level of agreement of Big Four audit firm respondents was 
significantly higher (4.05 mean score) than among local and international audit firm 
(non-Big Four) respondents (3.24 and 3.05 mean score) for the statement Audit fees 
remaining between a specified minimum and maximum amount will result in higher 
audit quality. This mismatch in the responses of Big Four and non-Big Four audit 
firm respondents is interesting, and may be due to the fact that non-Big Four audit 
companies want more freedom to negotiate their audit fees. Such findings are also 
supported by Francis (1984) who concluded that the observation of systematic price 
differences between large and small auditing firms was evidence that higher fees were 
consistent with higher quality audits, and Deis and Giroux (1996) who indicated that 
both audit fees and audit hours were significantly related to audit quality in a manner 
consistent with the explanation that audits are differentiated products in the market. 
More importantly, they found that both audit fees and audit hours were influenced by 
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5.5 Analysis of Section D of the Questionnaire 
5.5.1 Future Development of Audit Quality in Libya 
In an attempt to obtain some insight into the envisaged future development of audit 
quality in Libya, both groups of respondents were asked to indicate on a scale ranging 
from 1 to 5 (where 1 signified strongly disagree and 5 represented strongly agree), the 
extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each of the statements presented in 
Table 5.25 below. 
The statement relating to whether Audit firms in Libya should be restricted to 
undertaking only audit work had the highest mean score (3.97) based on oil company 
respondents, as many as 75.6% of whom either agreed or strongly agreed, with this 
opinion. The statement covering whether The percentage of NAS income for audit 
firms should not be higher than 25% of total audit firm revenue generated from a 
single client had the second highest mean score (3.94), with as many as 80.3% of 
respondents either agreeing or strongly agreeing with it. The statement with the third 
highest mean score (3.76) was The current auditing rules and regulations need to be 
much improved. As many as 69.3% either agreed or strongly agreed with it. The 
fourth highest mean score (3.67) was recorded for the statement The LAAA should 
adopt international auditing and accounting standards to improve audit quality and 
should have strict requirements for granting audit licenses. Again, less than three- 
quarters of respondents (70.9%) either agreed or strongly agreed with it. The fifth 
highest mean score (3.63) was recorded for the statement There should be legal and 
disciplinary actions available to the authorities against non-compliant and dishonest 
auditors. Over half of the respondents (64.5%) either agreed or strongly agreed with 
this belief. 
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Statements with the third, second lowest and lowest mean scores were Audit firms 
should disclose the type and amount of NAS provided to their audit clients and oil 
companies should disclose the amount of audit and NAS fees paid in the annual 
report, Audit firms in Libya should adhere to audit quality requirement, and A range 
of audit fees should be specified by the Libyan regulatory authorities that allocates 
audit clients to audit firms (3.58,3.33 and 2.81 respectively). 
With respect to audit firm respondents, Table 5.25 shows that the majority (76.8%) 
either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement The current auditing rules and 
regulations need to be much improved. This statement achieved a mean score of 
(3.91), almost the same as for the oil company respondents. The statement with the 
second highest mean scores was The LAAA should adopt international auditing and 
accounting standards to improve audit quality and should have strict requirements for 
granting audit licenses (3.63). As many as 67.6% of respondents either agreed or 
strongly agreed with this statement. 
The statement with the third highest mean score (3.52) was that There should be legal 
and disciplinary actions available to the authorities against non-compliant and 
dishonest auditors. As many as 62.5% either agreed or strongly agreed with it. The 
fourth highest mean score (3.43) was recorded for the statement Audit firms in Libya 
should adhere to audit quality requirements. Again, less than three-quarters of 
respondents (61.2%) either agreed or strongly agreed with it. The fifth highest mean 
score (3.39) was recorded for the statement Audit firms should disclose the type and 
amount of NAS provided to their audit clients and oil companies should disclose the 
amount of audit and NAS fees paid in the annual report. Exactly half (50%) of 
respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with this sentiment. 
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Statements with the third, second lowest and lowest mean scores were The percentage 
of NAS income for audit firms should not be higher than 25% of total audit firm 
revenue generated from a single client, Audit firms in Libya should be restricted to 
undertaking only audit work; and A range of audit fees should be specified by the 
Libyan regulatory authorities that allocates audit clients to audit firms (3.33,3.14 and 
3.11, respectively). As can be noted from the descriptive analysis of oil company and 
audit firm respondents presented below, their responses are similar. The analysis of 
significant differences between oil company and audit firm responses produced two 
significant differences at the 1% level and one at the 5% level of significance, as 
measured by the Mann Whitney U test (see Table 5.25). 
A further interesting difference is in the responses to the statement that A range of 
audit fees should be specified by the Libyan regulatory authorities that allocates audit 
clients to audit firms. The level of agreement with this statement by audit firm 
respondents was significantly higher (3.11 mean score) than it was for oil company 
respondents (2.81 mean score), respectively. This result might reflect a lack of 
confidence within the oil companies in the Libyan regulatory authority. Another 
significant difference at the 1% level of significance was in relation to the statement 
Audit firms in Libya should be restricted to undertaking only audit work The level of 
agreement with this statement by oil company respondents was significantly higher 
(3.97 mean score) than it was for audit firm respondents (3.14 mean score). This 
mismatch in the responses of oil company and audit firm respondents is probably due 
to the latter's unsurprising reluctance to have their work remit restricted to audit work 
only, with evidence showing that the share of revenue from the provision of auditing 
services has fallen, while the share of revenue from the provision of other services has 
increased (Abdel-Khalik, 1990; Craswell, 1999; Palmrose, 1986b). 
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Finally, oil company respondents were significantly higher (3.94 mean score) than 
audit firm respondents (3.33 mean score) in respect of the statement The percentage 
of NAS income for audit firms should not be higher than 25% of total audit firm 
revenues generated from a single client. This mismatch in the responses of the two 
sets of participants might reflect auditors' concern about the threat faced by them 
when depending heavily on a single client. The threat lies in whether they are able to 
behave independently without fear despite receiving significant revenue from the 
client (see for example, Flint, 1988). This finding is consistent with Firth (1980), Gul 
(1991), Teoh and Lim (1996), and Beattie et al (1999), who all found that the size of 
audit fees is an important determinant of the perception of auditor independence. 
Beattie and Fearnley (2002) argue that the auditor should be prevented from 
becoming dependent upon one client for audit fees. At present, accounting regulations 
prevent any one client making up more than 10% of an auditor's income. The strong 
support shown by the respondents from oil companies might be a sign of their concern 
about the negative impact of relying on single clients. Also this finding may be due to 
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5.5.1.1 Future Development of Audit Quality in Libya Based on Position 
Table 5.26 shows the analysis by position of significant differences between oil 
company staff and audit firm staff opinions on ways to improve audit quality. The 
Kruskal-Wallis test was used and the analysis reveals two significant differences at 
the 5% level and three at the 1% level of significance. Accounts managers had 
significantly higher mean scores (3.83,4.29 and 4.20) than others for the following 
two statements: Audit firms in Libya should adhere to audit quality requirements and 
The current auditing rules and regulations need to be much improved at the 5% level 
of significance. This mismatch reflects awareness of the requirements of the Libyan 
auditing environment, such as the need to adopt International Auditing Standards or 
stricter requirements for the granting of auditing licences. 
A further interesting difference is in the responses to the two statements that The 
percentage of NAS income for audit firms should not be higher than 25% of total 
audit firm revenue generated from a single client and Audit firms in Libya should be 
restricted to undertaking only audit work The level of agreement with these 
statements by account managers was significantly higher (4.20 and 4.03 mean scores 
respectively) than it was for the auditor, audit supervisors and managing partner 
respondents (3.21,3.31,3.48 and 2.92,3.37,3.13 mean scores) respectively. This 
finding may be due to the concerns of audit firm staff, who may feel that profit will be 
lost through their non-provision of audit services. Also the result might reflect 
accounts managers' beliefs that audit quality and audit independence will be impaired 
if the percentage of NAS income for audit firms becomes higher than 25% of the total 
audit firm revenue generated from a single client. This finding is consistent with that 
found by Beattie and Fearnley (2002), who argue that the auditor should be prevented 
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from becoming dependent upon one client for audit fees. At present accounting 
regulations prevent any one client making up more than 10% of an auditor's income. 
Another significant difference at the 1% level of significance was found in respect of 
the statement A range of audit fees should be specified by the Libyan regulatory 
authorities that allocates audit clients to audit firms., In this case, the managing 
partners had a significantly higher mean score (3.42) than accounts managers (2.29), 
an outcome that possibly reflects the willingness of the managing partner to consent 
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5.5.1.2 Future Development of Audit Quality in Libya Based on Type of 
Audit Firm 
Table 5.27 shows the analysis of significant differences between local audit 
firms, local firms affiliated to an Arab or international firm, and local firms 
affiliated to one of the Big Four audit firms (non-Big Four and Big Four). The 
Kruskal-Wallis test revealed three significant differences at the 5% level. 
The level of agreement for two statements, namely, Audit firms in Libya should 
be restricted to undertaking only audit work and Audit firms should disclose 
the type and amount of NAS provided to their audit clients and oil companies 
should disclose the amount of audit and NAS fees paid in the annual report 
were significantly higher for Big Four audit firm respondents (3.86 mean 
score) than for local and international audit firm (non-Big Four audit firm) 
respondents (2.96,3.19 and 3.45,3.05 mean scores, respectively). This result 
might reflect the awareness of the Big Four audit firms of insufficiencies and 
inadequacies in the Libyan auditing environment, and their consequent support 
for the establishment of rules and procedures in respect of the disclosure of the 
type and amount of NAS provided to clients, as is the practice in developed 
countries. The Big Four audit firms, therefore, appear to be keener than non- 
Big Four respondents for the type and amount of NAS fees provided to the 
client to be disclosed, thereby implying that the Big Four audit firms are in 
favour of the provision of NAS only if their type and amount paid are fully 
disclosed in annual reports. This finding is consistent with that of Lennox 
(1999b) who concluded that when NAS fees are disclosed, the provision of 
NAS does not reduce audit quality. 
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Table 5.27 shows one significant difference at the 5% level of significance in 
respect of the statement A range of audit fees should be specified by the Libyan 
regulatory authorities that allocates audit clients to audit firms. This was 
significantly lower for Big Four respondents (2.48 mean score) than it was for 
local, Arab, and international audit firm (non-Big Four) respondents (3.07 and 
3.26 mean score). This outcome does not coincide with the view that non-Big 
Four audit firms are seen to provide lower audit quality than Big Four audit 
firms. Non-Big Four audit firm respondents, therefore, appear to support strict 
requirements for granting audit licences in order to improve the existing level 
of audit quality. The responses from the non-Big Four and Big Four audit firm 
respondents were to the effect that they received insufficient fees to perform a 
higher standard of audit quality, thus supporting the establishment of an 
independent body to specify audit fees in order to eliminate differences that 
presently exist. 
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This chapter has presented the results of the questionnaire survey undertaken with 
representatives from oil companies and audit firms operating in Libya. In 
discussing these results, the analysis began with descriptive statistics in respect of 
the different participants in the research sample. Variations in the patterns of 
difference in the responses according to background characteristics, such as (1) 
position of respondents, and (2) type of audit firm, were identified by subjecting 
the data to the Mann Whitney U test and the Kruskal Wallis which allowed for a 
comparison of sample means and the detection of statistically significant 
differences. Without doubt, the respondents from both the oil companies and the 
audit firms considered the current level of audit quality in Libya to be 
unsatisfactory, both groups of respondents the Libyan Accountants and Auditors 
Association (LAAA) were considered to be not performing an important role in 
either developing the auditing profession or enhancing audit quality. 
As with other research in this area of work, an attempt was made to measure audit 
quality through the adoption of different variables as surrogates for this construct, 
namely: size of the audit firm, the provision of NAS, the length of auditor tenure, 
the level of competition in the audit market, and the fees charged/received for 
audit services. The examination of the perception of the relationship between firm 
size and audit quality, revealed that both respondent groups (oil companies and 
audit firms), perceived the Big Four audit firms as offering a higher level of audit 
quality than others, for the following main reasons: 
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5.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented the results of the questionnaire survey undertaken 
with representatives from oil companies and audit firms operating in Libya. In 
discussing these results, the analysis began with descriptive statistics in respect 
of the different participants in the research sample. Variations in the patterns of 
difference in the responses according to background characteristics, such as (1) 
position of respondents, and (2) type of audit firm, were identified by 
subjecting the data to the Mann Whitney U test and the Kruskal-Wallis which 
allowed for a comparison of sample means and the detection of statistically 
significant differences. Without doubt, the respondents from both the oil 
companies and the audit firms considered the current level of audit quality in 
Libya to be unsatisfactory, both groups of respondents the Libyan Accountants 
and Auditors Association (LAAA) were considered to be not performing an 
important role in either developing the auditing profession or enhancing audit 
quality. 
As with other research in this area of work, an attempt was made to measure 
audit quality through the adoption of different variables as surrogates for this 
construct, namely: size of the audit firm, the provision of NAS, the length of 
auditor tenure, the level of competition in the audit market, and the fees 
charged/received for audit services. The examination of the perception of the 
relationship between firm size and audit quality, revealed that both respondent 
groups (oil companies and audit firms), perceived the Big Four audit firms as 
offering a higher level of audit quality than others, for the following main 
reasons: 
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1- The Big Four firms have greater independence than smaller firms and 
are more likely to issue qualified reports. 
2- The Big Four firms can report the real financial situation of their clients 
more readily than other firms as they do not need to please 
managements. 
3- The Big Four firms perform more powerful, effective tests and are more 
likely to detect errors, thereby giving them more credibility than other 
firms. 
4- The Big Four firms can plan the audit process more effectively and can 
obtain a greater variety of clients. 
With regard to perceptions of the relationship between the provision of NAS 
and audit quality, both respondent groups, oil companies and audit firms, 
perceived that the provision of NAS would not impair the level of audit 
quality; rather, it was envisaged that this would provide auditors with better 
access to clients' accounting systems, and hence greater familiarity and 
confidence with them. Although both groups of respondents perceived that 
prohibition of the provision of NAS to an audit client was simply a vehicle to 
maintain the perception of auditor independence, they did nonetheless, believe 
that providing NAS by a separate department was a sensible strategy as this 
was perceived by both groups as giving the auditor greater credibility. 
Regarding perceptions of the relationship between the length of audit tenure 
and audit quality, both respondent groups believed that long tenure with a 
client would lead to fewer audit hours by an auditor. More specifically, the 
respondents from both groups perceived mandatory rotation to be 
advantageous as a means to enhancing the level of audit quality. 
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With regard to the perceptions of the relationship between the level of 
competition in the audit market and audit quality, both respondent groups 
agreed that the highly competitive nature of the Libyan audit market should not 
adversely affect audit quality. They also believed that audit quality would not 
be negatively affected in the event of audit fee discounting or low-balling at 
initial engagement. 
When examining perceptions of the relationship between the fees 
charged/received for audit services and audit quality, both oil company and 
audit firm respondents perceived a positive relationship between the amount of 
audit fees paid and the level of audit quality provided by external auditors. An 
audit firm that charges high audit fees is most likely to provide high audit 
quality. Interestingly, the Big Four were perceived to charge higher audit fees, 
in recognition of the large premium attached to their services. It was also 
suggested that if audit fees were to be set by an independent professional body 
this might lead to higher audit quality, a suggestion supported by local audit 
firms which claim they do not provide a higher level of audit quality because 
they do not receive the same high level of fees as foreign audit firms. 
In an attempt to elicit respondents' perceptions on how to improve audit quality 
in Libya in the future, respondents from the two populations were asked to 
express the extent of their agreement with statements suggesting ways to 
improve the level of audit quality in the country. Both groups of respondents 
believed in the need for substantial improvement to the current auditing rules 
and regulations. The LAAA was considered to perform a vital role in its 
adoption of international auditing and accounting standards to improve audit 
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quality and it was also believed that it should impose strict requirements in 
respect of the granting of audit licenses. Interestingly, oil companies and audit 
firms were in agreement with the idea of new legislation to oblige oil 
companies to disclose the amount of audit and NAS fees paid in their annual 
reports, and to require audit firms to disclose the type and amount of NAS 
provided to their audit clients. However, it was not believed to be necessary to 
restrict audit firms to undertake audit work only in an effort to improve audit 
quality. 
Overall, the findings supported those reported by other researchers, such as 
Michael (2007), Sandra et al (2007), DeAngelo (1981a), Krishnan (2003), 
Jackson et al (2008), Craswell (1999), DeFond et al (2002), Chen et al (2008), 
and Vanstraelen (2000). In Chapter Six that follows, the interview survey that 
was undertaken as part of the empirical research will be discussed in order to 
provide further understanding, support and confirmation in respect of the 





The research findings from the questionnaire administered in Libya indicate 
that the issues related to audit quality investigated in this study have been 
generally perceived by the respondents from audit firms and oil companies as 
having a significant impact on audit quality. In an attempt to explore some of 
these issues further, a series of interviews were undertaken with Libyan oil 
companies (internal auditors, financial managers and accounts managers) and 
employees from audit firms working in Libya (managing partners, audit 
supervisors and auditors) and senior managers of regulatory authorities. Details 
of the schedule of interviews are provided in Table 6.1. The main objective of 
the interview survey was to analyse the issues raised by the results of the 
questionnaire survey in more depth. This chapter includes the objectives of the 
interviews, the key outcomes of the interviews and the profile of the 
interviewees. The main part of the chapter reports on the effects of each of the 
five factors identified in the key outcomes of the interviews (section 6.4.2). 
6.2 Objectives of Interviews 
Interviews were conducted in order to approach issues that could not be 
captured properly or analysed through a quantitative approach. The major 
purpose of conducting qualitative research is to understand and gain insight 
into the researched phenomena (Collis and Hussey, 2003; Sekaran, 2003; 
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Saunders et al, 2007). The total number of interviews conducted with the oil 
companies staff was ten; three with internal auditors, four with financial 
managers, and three with accounts managers, and the total number of 
interviews, conducted with the audit firms staff working in Libya, was thirteen; 
four with managing partners, six with audit supervisors, and three with 
auditors. Finally, two interviews were conducted with regulators working for 
the LAAA. Officials at the Libyan oil companies and audit firms are 
represented in the sample of interviewees as they were expected to provide 
information in a private meeting and explain further issues related to the 
significance of information concerning the current perception of audit quality 
and the audit quality variables in Libya such as firm size, the provision of 
NAS, the length of audit tenure, the level of competition in the audit market, 
and fees for audit services. Interviews are considered as an effective means of 
collecting large amounts of data, and were, thus believed to be appropriate to 
offer guidance regarding fruitful interpretations of the quantitative study, and 
extensions of the research findings (Leventis, 2001). 
6.3 Key Outcomes from the Interviews 
Interviewees explained that several factors affected the audit quality, citing 
firm size, the provision NAS, the length of audit tenure, the level of 
competition in the audit market, and fees charged and received for audit 
services. Recognising these influences upon the overall quality of the audit 
exercise, the vast majority of interviewees were not satisfied with the current 
level of audit quality in Libya, and they indicated their dissatisfaction with the 
role played by the LAAA in its efforts to enhance the level of audit quality. 
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The majority of interviewees supported the notion that higher audit quality is 
associated with local audit firms affiliated to foreign audit firms, especially 
those affiliated to one of the Big Four, rather than being associated with 
ordinary local audit firms. The reasons given were quite simply that the 
foreign, (especially Big Four), audit firms are better resourced than local firms 
and have accumulated more experience. With regard to the provision of NAS, 
most interviewees referred to its benefits as they accrued to both auditors and 
clients. They considered that lengthy auditor tenure with a client might impair 
audit quality and that mandatory auditor rotation was expected to improve 
audit quality. On the theme of competition, the interviewees were of the 
opinion that the Libyan audit market is highly competitive, but that audit 
quality would not be threatened by this. They did consider that the audit fee is 
positively associated with audit quality. In other areas, the interviewees 
confirmed that the LAAA should adopt professional auditing and accounting 
standards to improve the audit quality. Details of the interviewees, and the 
positions held by them in their organisations are shown in Table 6.1. 
6.4 Interview Results 
This section explores, in detail, the perceptions of the interviewees concerning 
the various levels outlined above. The interviewees' responses are discussed 
under the headings of audit quality in Libya. 
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6.4.1 Demographic Information Relating to Interviewees 
Table 6.1: The Interview Schedule at the Libyan Oil Companies and Audit 
Firms 
Interviewee Date,, '- Position, Organisation Number of 
Interviews 
12-05-2008 Internal auditors Oil company 3 
28-05-2008 Accounts managers Oil company 3 
16-06-2008 Financial managers Oil company 4 
24-06-2008 Managing partners Audit Firm (Tripoli) 4 
2-07-2008 Auditors Audit Firm (Bengali) 3 
21-07-2008 Audit supervisors Audit Firm (Tripoli) 6 
21-07-2008 Regulators LAAA 2 
TOTAL 25 
The interviews conducted with accounts managers, internal auditors and 
financial managers in Libyan companies, and with managing partners, auditors 
and audit supervisors in audit firms working in Libya were analysed and 
discussed. 
Table 6.2: The Experience Levels of Interviewees 
Experience' -`, Frequency Percentage 
Less than 5 years - - 
5-10 years 7 28 
More than 10 years 18 72 
Total 25 100 
In terms of the length of work experience of respondents, as shown in Table 
6.2, three respondents (72%) had more than 10 years. Of these, two 
respondents (28%) had between 5 to 10 years experience, and no interviewee 
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had less than 5 years work experience. This was encouraging since it provided 
a sample that was genuinely equipped to reflect on the quality of audit 
6.4.2 The Current Perception of Audit Quality in Libya 
According to DeAngelo (1981), audit quality depends on the ability of the 
auditor to carry out a thorough examination of the accounts and detect possible 
errors or anomalies (technical competence), and his or her willingness to 
provide an objective opinion on them (his or her independence). Concerns 
about audit quality are relevant for economies in transition, as is the case for 
Libya. With the movement of many international accounting firms into Libya, 
and the growth of local audit firms, it is particularly interesting, and relevant 
for governmental legislators, to study how the providers of the audit service 
perceive the quality of what they do. The purpose of this section is to report the 
perceptions of professional auditors in Libya concerning how they perceive the 
quality of the service they provide. The section also analyses differences 
between the perceptions of audit firm staff and oil company staff. 
The questionnaire survey findings presented in Chapter Five, section 5.3, 
revealed that 68.5% of oil company respondents and 56.3% of audit firm 
respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement: The current 
level of audit quality in Libya is insufficient. Whilst there was a disparity 
between the two groups, more than half of both populations were, nonetheless, 
of the opinion that there needed to be improvements in audit quality. 96% these 
interviewees thought the current level of audit quality was insufficient, the 
interviewees referred to reasons such as this could be due to the perceived lack 
of auditors' professionalism in Libya, since 51.9% and 43.8% of respondents 
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of oil companies and audit firms either agreed or strongly agreed with the 
statement that the lack of the professionalism of auditors in Libya causes the 
low level of audit quality. Another interesting finding is that just over half of 
the respondents (62.2% and 56.9%) either agreed or strongly agreed with the 
statement that most audit firms in Libya have little idea about new services, 
such as assurance services and internet reporting. 
Additionally, the current rules and regulations are perceived to be weak, 
thereby causing poor audit quality. In this respect, 59% and 61.3% of oil 
company and audit firm respondents respectively believed these to be 
insufficiently comprehensive, and that the LAAA is not performing its role 
either in enhancing audit quality or in developing the accounting and auditing 
profession. On this matter, an audit supervisor in a local firm affiliated to an 
Arab audit firm said: 
In my opinion, there are several reasons that have made the 
level of audit quality in Libya insufficient, such as the lack of 
professionalism of auditors and the lack of strict penalties for 
violators of the rules of audit profession ... In my view, I 
worked in the audit market for more than 31 years, I have 
never heard of any actions against undisciplined auditors. 
This opinion was confirmed by a managing partner in a local audit firm who 
remarked: 
I believe that the current level of audit quality insufficient can 
be referred to reasons such as weakness in the current rules 
and regulations in terms of the absence of punitive fines and 
the accounting and auditing education system in Libya are still 
insufficient to train auditors. 
Likewise, a financial manager in one of the oil companies stated: 
I think the lack of the role of the LAAA could be a cause of the 
level of audit quality being insufficient, because the LAAA has 
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never done anything which could be identified as real to 
develop the auditing profession and to enhance audit quality. 
The issue of staff qualification was also raised by a managing partner in one of 
the Big Four audit firms, who commented: 
I believe that the level of audit quality is insufficient due to 
several reasons such as the absence of qualified and 
specialised staff and the shortage of professional and qualified 
accountants, and the absence of proper related laws that could 
support the LAAA in conducting its roles, and also most audit 
firms in Libya have no idea about new services, they are still 
audited using traditional methods. 
The ineffectiveness of the LAAA was also observed by an auditor in local 
audit firm who added: 
The LAAA should have adopted either American or 
International standards, and focused on how to improve the 
professionalism of accounting and auditing practitioners and 
on quality, from the beginning, ignoring this has contributed to 
the low level of audit quality. 
All of the interviewees (100%) criticised the LAAA for not classifying audit 
firms on the basis of number of employees, revenue, resources, and for not 
formulating any principles or standards of accounting or auditing, which has 
resulted in the lack of any theoretical basis for a Code of Ethics to which 
members of the profession must conform. Clearly, in the absence of such 
action on the part of the LAAA, it is entirely logical that the American 
principles and standards have been followed. 
This failure of the LAAA, despite being established more than three decades 
ago, to build any theoretical base for accounting as a profession in Libya, is 
raised not only by the interviewees in this study, but has been highlighted by 
many researchers who have confirmed the LAAA's failure to develop either 
accounting and auditing standards or a Code of Ethics to guide auditors' 
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behaviour, and its adoption of a very limited role in the area of research, and 
professional control over accounting practices (Bakar and Russell 2003; 
Mahmud, 1997; Kilani, 1988; Ahmed, 2004). This suggests that the LAAA has 
failed to regulate itself and to recognise its obligation towards the public 
interest. Furthermore, it has not achieved its objectives of furthering activities 
such as research, conferences, seminars, and generally promoting a programme 
of continuing education and training, which would include the publication of 
accounting research, all of which would improve the status of the profession 
and accordingly of its members. All these factors suggest that the status of the 
Libyan accounting profession is very weak. The LAAA specifies no uniform 
audit report requirements and no professional examination requirements. The 
main reasons for its limited role and, hence, impact, are as Mousa (2005) 
suggested, its small size and restricted authority. 
One of the regulators who was interviewed commented on the LAAA's failure 
to achieve its objectives, saying: 
It is my view that the LAAA since establishment more than 
three decades ago is just the issue of new licences and taking 
fees from the members for their membership. Furthermore, it 
has not achieved its objectives of furthering activities such as 
research, conferences, and seminars, a continuing education. 
And an accounts manager in an oil company also referred to the length of time 
that the LAAA had had to organise the profession, saying: 
In my view, the level of audit quality is insufficient, even 
though the LAAA has been in existence now for almost three 
decade; some of the reasons identified include the lack of 
supervision by the LAAA, the lack of strong penalties and the 
lack of sufficient rules and regulations. 
This view was echoed by a managing partner in local firm affiliated to an Arab 
audit firm who remarked: 
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I don't think that the LAAA is playing an important role in 
developing the profession of auditing and enhancing audit 
quality. This is because they are not classifying audit firms on 
the basis of number of employees, revenue, resources, and 
number of clients, in order to help the clients decide which 
audit firms are most suitable for them, and this stresses again 
its failure to give attention to small (local) audit firms. 
Its failure to impose a strict regulatory framework was also commented on by 
an accounts manager who added: 
In my view the LAAA haven't imposed strict conditions on 
each applicant for a license to practice the profession which 
reflects the lack of the professionalism of auditors and low 
audit quality. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the profession itself perceives its own work to 
be of poor quality, and that those involved attribute this lack of quality to be 
the result of an ineffective regulatory framework, which should be provided by 
the LAAA. Because of the inaction of the LAAA there is no development of 
the profession, in all its dimensions, and auditors are left to their own devices 
with no threat of punishment for poor performance. 
6.4.3 Factors Impairing and Enhancing Audit Quality 
In this thesis, five research themes relating to audit quality that became 
increasingly obvious within the Libya environment, and hence of concern, are 
explored, these being: the size of audit firm, the provision of NAS, the length 
of audit tenure, the level of competition, and fees for audit services. Briefly, the 
interview survey findings are consistent with the questionnaire survey on all 
of these issues and are presented in the subsequent sections. 
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6.4.3.1 The Size of Audit Firm and Audit Quality 
Audit firm size has been used as a surrogate for audit quality in prior literature 
(e. g. DeAngelo, 1981a). Moreover, prior research (e. g. Becker et al, 1998; 
Francis et al, 1999) has reported that Big Four audit clients present lower 
discretionary accruals than those of non-Big Four firms because Big Four 
auditors may have more expertise, resistance to clients' discretion, and 
awareness of financial and reputation loss, than non-Big Four auditors. 
Therefore, this section aims to demonstrate whether the size of the audit firm 
affects audit quality in Libya, and to identify reasons for possible quality 
difference by firm size. 
The majority of interviewees (88% of oil companies and audit firms) agreed 
that the size of audit firms does indicate different levels of audit quality, and 
that they believe the Big Four audit firms to be more powerful, effective and 
independent than the non-Big Four firms. This finding confirms the 
questionnaire responses (see Chapter Five) which showed that 69.3% of oil 
companies, and 61.9% of audit firms agreed that the Big Four firms perform 
more powerful and effective tests, and are consequently, more credible than 
other firms. 
More than three-quarters of the interviewees (76%) believed that the level of 
audit quality in Libya depends upon the status of the audit firm, e. g. local audit 
firm affiliated to a foreign audit firm, and again, this confirmed the 
questionnaire survey results, which showed that more than half of the oil 
company and audit firm respondents (66.9% and 59.4 %, respectively) 
similarly agreed this was the case. 
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Consistent with the literature (GAO, 2003a; Mautz and Sharaf, 1961), the 
interviewees believed the Big Four firms to benefit from greater organisational 
structure and resources than smaller audit firms. Examples were cited of 
dedicated resources for staff training, and technical support, and the fact that 
this favourable resource base placed the Big Four firms favourably in the 
employment market, being more attractive to better qualified personnel. 
Undoubtedly, the quality of service is dependent upon the quality of those 
providing it, and hence the audit process is improved by well-qualified 
personnel, since they are motivated by their professionalism to comply with 
accounting standards and codes of ethics and not to ignore irregularities in 
clients' accounts. This result confirms the questionnaire finding (see Chapter 
Five) that 66.1% of oil companies and 62.8% of audit firms believed that the 
Big Four firms are more likely to issue qualified reports and to plan the audit 
process more effectively, thereby obtaining a greater variety of clients, and in 
consequence, being able to provide their audit staff with greater experience. 
Furthermore, the issue of job security was raised by the interviewees, who 
believed that the ability of the Big Four firms to provide this served to instill 
confidence in staff regarding their work and in reporting their findings. In this 
situation, management pressure from the client firm is easier to resist. 
On this issue an auditor in one of the Big Four audit firms remarked: 
If it is a Big Four firm, I would have more confidence. There 
is a greater spread of expertise and there is less likely to be an 
independence problem whereas with a smaller audit firm, they 
may be more dependent on one audit. 
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This result confirms the questionnaire finding in respect of the statement The 
companies audited by the Big Four are more attractive to investors and 
creditors which had a high mean score (3.77 and 3.78), resulting from 63.8% 
and 68.1% of oil company and audit firm respondents agreeing or strongly 
agreeing with it. This result might also explain why Big Four auditors have 
been reported as providing higher quality auditing than non-Big Four auditors 
in prior literature (e. g. Becker et al, 1998; Francis et al, 1999; Francis and 
Krishnan, 1999; Teoh and Wong, 1993; Al Mogbel, 2006). 
On this issue of the external perception of audit firm size, a financial manager 
in an oil company remarked: 
There is a greater opportunity to influence a smaller practice 
than a larger practice because the latter is very well organised 
and has its own structures in place. A small firm won't have 
the same resources and will depend on individuals within the 
practice to try and bring the same checks and balances which 
a large firm, by having the structures in place, can 
automatically impose. 
As Big Four audit firms have many audit clients, they might not be 
economically dependent on just a few of them. In addition, large firms have 
more wealth to pay larger potential claims if sued, than smaller firms (Simunic 
and Stein, 1996) and so, might be more concerned about maintaining audit 
quality and their reputation in the audit market than smaller firms. In addition, 
large size companies with good accounting systems and less earnings 
manipulation might possibly hire Big Four auditors because they might be 
concerned about the quality of their financial statement quality and the 
reputation of their companies. Therefore, they might select Big Four audit 
firms to signal a positive company image to the public (Chung et al, 2003). 
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An accounts manager in an oil company remarked: 
I wouldn't necessarily be comfortable that the smaller audit 
firms would have the procedures or methodologies that the Big 
Four would have. 
This overall perception of enhanced professionalism in respect of the Big Four 
firms filtered through to comments about staff training, since it was noted by 
the participants that these firms were financially equipped to ensure their staff 
were properly trained in all the appropriate areas. Moreover, it was noted that 
they encouraged their staff . to gain additional professional qualifications, 
providing study leave under the `article-ship' scheme. This is a bonus that 
many small and medium-sized forms are simply unable to underwrite since 
they cannot afford to lose their staff for any length of time. The Big Four in 
contrast, are sufficiently geared up and financed to be able to offer flexibility 
such that staff can attend classes and examinations. The outcome seemed to be 
that Big Four staff show more loyalty to their employers and are less willing to 
compromise their employers' reputations by surrendering to client pressure, 
than their counterparts from local audit companies. And, because of their 
training opportunities, the Big Four auditors are more skilled and effective in 
their diagnosis of activities that are inconsistent with clients' going-concern 
status, so there is a clear perception that staff from these organisations are more 
professional in their activities than staff from smaller firms. 
An internal auditor in one of the oil companies raised the issue of greater 
objectivity, saying: 
The Big Four are part of international groups which are 
obliged to satisfy international standards. The smaller firms 
don't have such ties, reporting structures or quality standards. 
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The Big Four are less likely to give a personalised approach to 
their clients. 
It was considered by a great majority of participants (84% overall) that 
international reputation, and hence their well-understood brands, was the 
reason why foreign audit firms believed their audit quality to be better than 
local companies. Indeed the international reputation was an important variable 
for these interviewees who noted that the large majority of oil companies 
continued to engage the Big Four firms as their auditors, on the grounds that 
their financial reporting is believed to be consistent with global standards. In 
fact, some of the companies that operate internationally associate themselves 
with reputable auditors in order to facilitate their dealings with foreign 
investors and companies. It was quite apparent from the interviewees' 
comments that their foreign associates always judged the credibility of their 
financial statements by reference to the auditor's name. 
The importance of the auditor being known to be credible was raised by a 
managing partner in one of the Big Four audit firms who commented: 
In the bigger audit firms you would find a huge diversity of 
clients whereas in the smaller audit firms, you may find that 
the auditor is a close friend of the company. 
According to a Big Four managing partner: 
The Big Four firms' auditors are able to maintain a higher 
level of audit quality, possibly due to their organisational 
structure, technology and competency. 
It was also mentioned by participants that in comparison to their counterparts 
in small firms, the Big Four firms have larger customer portfolios, and 
consequently they are not reliant upon any single customer. This places them 
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well in terms of being able to resist management pressure and more able to 
report any negative findings. In contrast, small audit firms are limited in their 
customer base as pointed out by Pearson (1980a), and the termination of any 
audit job could affect their financial standing. Not surprisingly, the temptation 
is there to compromise with clients in order to keep their custom. 
In respect of the size of customer portfolio, one audit supervisor from a Big 
Four firm noted: 
The Big Four can afford to lose customers, are more flexible 
and more powerful than small firms, and they want to keep the 
major companies such as oil companies. 
On the other hand, a small minority of the interviewees disagreed that audit 
quality differs according to the size of audit firms. These participants believed 
this to be a misconception that comes from the clients' management, as a result 
of clients attempting to boost their reporting image by associating with audit 
firms that have a good reputation. It may be the case that the management does 
not have confidence in the company's reporting practices, and tries to find an 
easy way to divert the audience's attention by employing an international audit 
firm. It was pointed out that the differentiation is only to meet the consumers' 
requirements. The small firms' ability is in question simply because they are 
not being tested. Commenting on the difference between the Big Four and non- 
Big Four firms, an auditor of a local audit firm believed that the quality of Big 
Four and non-Big Four auditors in Libya did not significantly differ because it 
depended on individual competence and attitude rather than firm size. Ile said: 
In my opinion, the quality of Big Four and non-Big Four 
auditors in Libya does not differ since I believe that their 
quality depends on individual competence and attitude. Size 
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does not matter. However, auditors in Big Four firms have 
advantages from international working systems and quality 
control, so people may have stereotyped image of Big Four 
quality without considering individual competency. 
However, a chief internal auditor from a large oil company disagreed with this 
view, arguing that: 
The quality of Big Four and non-Big Four auditors differs 
because Big Four firms have more hi-tech resources. They hire 
competent staff and provide them with good training courses 
in order to render good services to their clients. Moreover, 
audit clients come from different groups. Big Four clients are 
large listed companies with higher audit fees whereas non-Big 
Four clients are small or medium size companies with lower 
fees. These differences contribute to differences in audit 
quality. 
Considering all the responses from the interviewees, it seems obvious that the 
Big Four audit firms have more resources at their disposal, and are able to offer 
better on-going training to their staff. This appears to be understood in the 
marketplace and associated with a better quality service, as also is the non- 
reliance on clients to the same extent that smaller firms who have less of a 
reputation are compelled to do. Hence, audit quality might well differ by size 
of audit firm. 
6.4.3.2 Provision of NAS and Audit Quality 
The majority of interviewees did not perceive any reduction in the audit quality 
where NAS was provided. Indeed, they confirmed that they would have 
recommended their clients to use their firms for such services, arguing that the 
audit firm's experience and knowledge of their businesses would result in 
better advice being obtained. Other interviewees argued that they would prefer 
to see audit firms provide NAS to their clients because it would ensure that the 
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standard applied to the audit would be higher and that a better audit opinion 
would result. On this issue, a Big Four managing partner remarked: 
Sometimes, yes, we suggest to clients that they come to us for 
NAS because accountants are the best people to provide these 
services because they already know that company's history 
and business ... and 
by providing NAS as well, the auditor 
learns more about the client and can give more informed 
advice. 
The questionnaire survey findings presented in Chapter Five, section 5.4.2, 
revealed that only a minority of oil company (23.7%) and audit firm (16.9%) 
respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement: The provision 
of NAS impairs audit quality. Similarly, most oil companies and audit firms 
(72%) disagreed that audit quality would be impaired if the auditor were to 
provide NAS to audit clients, and pointed out that both parties would benefit 
from the arrangement. It was indicated that the provision of NAS would 
complement audit duties, as the auditor would be exposed to the audit client's 
business transactions and subsequently gain a better understanding of the 
client's overall enterprise. 
An audit supervisor in a local audit firm affiliated to an Arab audit firm 
summarised the view by saying: 
If you can gain more information about your client, you can 
give a better audit opinion. Your appreciation of the client's 
business is greater so you can consider all the factors, and 
then provide a better service. 
Moreover, a Big Four auditor commented: 
An audit could be of a higher standard overall because the 
auditor is also providing NAS. In this case the auditor would 
not want to lose the client by not giving good quality all-round 
service so the audit might be of an even higher standard ... but 
actually, the auditor knows the company better ' than other 
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consultants, and it is true that the company would want 
someone who did know their business and their systems ... they 
wouldn't have to spend a long time learning everything about 
the company because they already have all the background. 
Another local audit supervisor added: 
I don't see anything that makes me be concerned that the 
audit is not independent. In fact, the auditor is in the best place 
to understand the client's business and its financial 
operations. 
A small minority of oil companies and audit firms (28%) interviewed did, 
however, believe that audit quality would be impaired by the joint provision of 
audit and NAS to audit clients. Their argument was that auditors would build 
close relationships with their clients with the aim of securing other business 
opportunities and may use audit services as a `loss leader' to leverage the audit 
services into other consulting engagements. This belief was well summarised 
by an internal auditor of one of the oil companies, who argued that: 
Not all the NAS can impair auditors' independence, as there 
are some certain types that can impair it and others would not. 
For instance, if the service provided is not related to decision 
making, independence would not be an issue. 
Because the majority of interviewees had a positive attitude towards the 
provision of NAS by audit firms, it led to a discussion on the manner in which 
they perceived that such services were provided by audit firms. In all cases, 
they had assumed that both roles were performed by separate departments. A 
number of them stressed the importance of such separation as a means of 
ensuring that the audit quality was not compromised. The vast majority of oil 
companies and audit firms (96%) interviewed agreed that audit quality and 
auditor independence would not be threatened if the provision'of audit and 
NAS to an audit client was performed by staff from different departments, a 
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perception that is consistent with the results from the questionnaire survey 
(Chapter Five, section 5.4.2). The phenomenon known as the `Chinese Wall' 
(Mikol and Standish, 1998; Sori, 2005) was discussed, whereby the segregation 
of duties allows for NAS to be provided with confidence by personnel totally 
uninvolved with the audit. The interviewees believed that greater monitoring 
would occur in this situation, with different personnel handling different 
matters, and that this monitoring in itself would ensure a professional job. 
On this issue, one of the auditors in one a Big Four firm remarked: 
I would be worried if NAS and audit services were being 
provided by the same department because this is too close, and 
not good for the auditor's independence, but I think this does 
not happen. Different departments offer these services. 
The importance of the demarcation of functions was also confirmed by a 
managing partner of local audit firm, who remarked: 
I would see the separation of functions as very important and 
not prejudicing their independence ... You would assume that 
the audit firm is very rigorous in the separation of the two 
roles. You would have to have an independent person 
performing the audit, one separate from the person who 
recommended the system. 
However, an audit supervisor from one of Big Four firms stressed the reality of 
the situation, saying: 
In the smaller firms, separation can not happen and the 
auditor is less reliable as a consequence ... In the larger firms, 
they are more specialised but in the smaller firms, you have 
the auditors providing a lot of tax expertise and then that is 
audited by them. I think that is where you have the least 
independence. 
It was also mentioned by some participants that the provision of NAS by other 
departments in the audit firm would facilitate the exchange of information 
which can be difficult, and not always achieved, in instances where NAS are 
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provided by other companies. The idea is that those personnel with a sound 
appreciation of a client's business would be used to full advantage, helping to 
accelerate the process and thereby producing high quality financial statements. 
In summary, it can be seen that the general consensus of opinion among 
interviewees was that the provision of NAS alongside audit services was only a 
serious threat to audit quality and independence where the two types of service 
were performed by the same department. However, the minority who disagreed 
with this perspective, believed that some types of NAS, especially those 
including decision-making, impaired audit quality and independence. 
Nonetheless, this result is not consistent with that of Shockley (1981) as his 
findings did not support the need for a separation of the consulting and audit 
function. 
6.4.3.3 Length of Auditor Tenure and Audit Quality 
The Questionnaire survey findings reported in Chapter Five (section 5.4.3) 
revealed that Long tenure with a client impairs auditor independence and that 
Mandatory rotation is positively associated with audit quality. Oil company 
respondents (69.3% and 63%) and audit firm respondents (72.5% and 55.3%) 
either agreed or strongly agreed with these statements. The majority of 
interviewees from both the oil companies and audit firms (80%) believed that 
lengthy auditor tenure with a client might -impair audit quality and that 
mandatory auditor rotation would improve audit quality. The regulator 
commented on this issue, saying: 
In my view, length of auditor tenure with an audit client may 
affect audit quality since auditors may overlook irregularity or 
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ignore some audit procedures since they may believe they 
already know everything in the client's company. 
He believed mandatory rotation to be positively associated with audit quality, 
adding: 
The idea [auditor rotation] is very good because, in my 
opinion, it would preserve the auditor's independence and 
would also keep up the quality of the audit work However, in 
my opinion too, having the auditor rotated after a period of 
five years would be reasonable rather than a three year period 
in terms of gaining familiarity of the client's business which 
would decrease the time needed for the audit. 
And a managing partner of a local audit firm identified another advantage 
when he commented: 
I think mandatory rotation is sensible because it gives the 
opportunityfor other auditors to look at the company from a 
different angle and help to correct some mistakes that the 
previous auditor did not address. In fact, if a strong personal 
relationship with the client starts to occur, mandatory rotation 
would break such a cosy relationship. 
A Big Four auditor outlined the advantages and disadvantages associated with 
long auditor tenure as follows: 
I think lengthy auditor tenure is like two sides of a sword. On 
the one hand, auditors can gain an understanding of these 
clients' businesses which is very crucial for identifying the risk 
area and their audit will become more effective and efficient. 
On the other hand, auditors may ignore a minor mistake that 
may be part of a major scandal due to their `routine 
perceptions'. Moreover, auditors may be too close to their 
clients and they may compromise their independence 
unintentionally. 
When asked about the impact of lengthy audit tenure on auditor independence, 
the interviewees gave mixed responses. The regulator remarked: 
Long tenure would impact on independence, more from the 
point of view of the cosy relationship, people get complacent. 
Moreover. a Big Four managing partner added: 
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Long tenure would result in the auditor beginning to think in 
the same way about the business. So there would be a lack of 
independence in thought which would build up from people 
developing similar ways of thinking about things ... I would 
think that the auditors would become very cosy in such 
relationships and too trusting of management. 
A minority of oil company and audit firm interviewees (20%) did, however, 
see no connection between lengthy audit tenure and independence, one 
accounts manager stating: 
I think that there is an actual benefit from long tenure. The 
practice has built up knowledge about the company itself, the 
management, its style. If somebody wants to fool the auditor, 
I would have thought that this is possible where somebody 
knows very little about the company ... Long-standing 
relationships often mean that the understanding of the 
business is far greater and, therefore, a better audit can be 
done. 
Hence, independence, as well as quality, was identified as being potentially 
impaired in consequence of long audit tenure. Clearly, the longer the tenure, 
the greater the chance for strong relationships to develop between auditor and 
client, and threats to independence are not surprising. Being too close to the a 
client stands as a clear threat to auditor independence because it reduces 
professional detachment and objectivity through relationships that are too cosy, 
and through continued and unchallenged, personal trust (Hudaib, 2003). 
Moreover, such closeness may also influence the mental attitude and opinion of 
auditors and that may cause others to perceive them as not being independent 
(Flint, 1988). Furthermore, Flint (1988) argues that when an auditor-client 
relationship lengthens, both parties become more familiar with each other and 
an emotional relationship in addition to strong loyalty may develop between 
them. Such bonds may weaken the auditor's professional objectivity, audit 
integrity, and, thus, impair his/her independence. 
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Consequently, mandatory rotation of auditors has been adopted in several 
countries as a means of reducing threats to auditor independence arising from 
long-term relationships between auditors and their clients. Under mandatory 
rotation, auditors have a limited time horizon in which to develop relationships 
that could potentially cause their independence to be impaired. Hence, they 
could have stronger incentives for unbiased reporting (Dopuch et al, 2001). 
Nonetheless, a short tenure may be equally problematic in terms of excessive 
switching costs and higher audit risk. This is because auditors may lack 
familiarity with the client's business in the first and second year of auditing, 
which may affect audit quality. Moreover, auditors incur high set up costs each 
time they change to a new client. Objections to mandatory rotation also appear 
in a General Accounting Office (GAO) publication that studied various issues 
related to auditor independence. The GAO concluded that the benefits from 
imposing mandatory rotation of auditors after a set number of periods were 
insufficient to cover switching and other costs that would be incurred by audit 
firms and their clients (GAO, 1996, cited in Dopuch et al, 2001). Moreover, 
Hudaib (2003) found in his study, that all Saudi auditors of Big and non-Big 
audit firms rejected the idea of rotation on the grounds that lengthy audit tenure 
did not represent a threat to auditor. 
However, summarising the data from this study, it can be concluded that oil 
company and audit firm staff in Libya do believe in the concept and 
importance of mandatory rotation which they consider to bring benefits to the 
audit function, especially that of maintaining auditor independence. 
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6.4.3.4 The Level of Competition in the Audit Market and Audit Quality 
The Libyan audit market was considered to be small and highly competitive by 
the majority of the interviewees (76%) of oil companies and audit firms, but 
they nonetheless indicated their belief that this would have no detrimental 
effect upon audit quality. These beliefs confirmed the questionnaire findings 
(Chapter Five, section 5.4.4) obtained from both oil company and audit firm 
respondents, 26% and 25% of whom respectively, either agreed or strongly 
agreed with the statement Audit quality may be impacted if the audit firm 
operates in a highly competitive environment. Hence, the majority believed that 
audit quality was not threatened by the high level of competition found among 
audit firms in Libya. The interview findings also concur with the results 
obtained by Copley and Doucet (1993b) who found that entities receiving a 
greater numbers of bids for their audit engagements were significantly more 
likely to receive an audit of acceptable quality. In addition, competition was 
found to have a negative effect on the level of audit fees, but not audit quality. 
Canning and Gwilliam (1999) researching in the Irish audit market, found that 
the small size of the market, and the closeness within it, served to enhance 
rather than diminish audit independence. In fact, it was revealed by the 
interviewees that currently about 500 audit firms were operating in the Libyan 
market. They indicated that the main players were firmly established and that 
they (the Big Four, and some medium-sized firms) presented a barrier to entry 
as far as the new smaller companies were concerned. The interviewees did not 
believe that negative competition within the market was a threat to the 
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profession, arguing such competition to be insignificant and as having no 
influence on the profession. 
Remarking on this possibility, one of the regulators said: 
In my opinion, competition in the audit market among audit 
firms will increase audit quality by forcing audit firms to try 
to provide good services and provide other services such as 
non-audit services to attract clients. 
Moreover, a local firm auditor commented: 
In my view, I worked in the audit market for more than 26 
years, before was no any competition in Libya's audit market 
and this caused poor quality. This is because the clients just 
need any one to audit their companies and the choice was 
limited but now there are around 500 audit firms in the 
market and different type of audit firm such as the Big Four, 
medium size and small size. 
Without doubt, the belief that the Big Four firms played a key role in the 
auditing of Libyan oil companies was held by the interviewees, and this 
situation was attributed to these firms' international reputation and their ability 
(through resources) to provide the service required by the oil companies. The 
nature of the market was considered, the point being made that more than 65% 
of it was under the Big Four firms' control creating a tight oligopoly-type of 
audit market, the remaining 35% being serviced by medium size audit firms. 
Strong competition was said to exist among the small and medium audit firms 
in respect of securing contracts. 
It was perceived by the interviewees that the Big Four auditors were 
completely professional, doing a good job, and observing rules and regulations. 
It was the desire to protect the firm's reputation, the risk of professional 
sanctions and litigation from the regulators that the interviewees believed were 
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prime motivators of the Big Four firms' approach, and these subsequently 
resulted in safeguards to audit quality and independence, as observed in prior 
studies (Canning and Gwilliam, 1999; Farmer et al, 1987; Trompeter, 1994; 
Sori, 2005). Moreover, an audit supervisor in a Big Four audit firm stated: 
Let me say, the competition started to get very stiff when 
international foreign audit firms and Arab firms came into 
Libya. These firms brought international standards, 
technological knowledge and they initially invested in both 
human resources and software, which, in turn, helped to 
build and develop a good auditing infrastructure and high 
reputation. 
In contrast, a small minority (24%) of oil companies and audit firms indicated 
that a highly competitive market would affect auditor independence, and 
consequently, quality. Small firms mentioned this as a factor, being aware that 
their reliance on a relatively smaller number of clients for audit fees in such a 
competitive environment is perceived as a threat to audit quality and auditor 
independence both by large audit firms and the LAAA, causing the latter to 
propose the merging of smaller audit firms to reduce the unhealthy 
competition. One auditor from a local audit firm remarked: 
To be honest with you, my independence is constantly under 
pressure not only due to the high competition of the audit 
market but also demanding clients. This makes me very 
uncomfortable. For instance, if I choose to qualify my audit 
report, the client could easily switch and find another firm 
willing to give him a clean opinion, it means poor quality. In 
such situations, it will decrease audit quality ... the practice 
of cutting down fees (low-balling) to attract audit clients 
should be banned. This may be done via some sanction to be 
put in place to forbid other firms from such conduct. 
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This finding is very consistent with that of Gray and Manson (2005) who found 
that there are possible negative effects on perceived audit quality arising from 
competition within the auditing profession. 
However, summarising the findings as a whole on this variable, it can be seen 
that a highly competitive environment is perceived as improving audit quality. 
This outcome is consistent with economic theory that predicts a positive 
relationship between competition and quality. Copley and Doucet (1993b) 
found that entities receiving a greater number of bids for their audit 
engagements were significantly more likely to receive an audit of acceptable 
quality. 
6.4.3.5 Fees for Audit Services and Audit Quality 
The questionnaire survey findings presented in Chapter Five, section 5.4.5, 
revealed that as many as 70.8% of oil company respondents and 75.1% of audit 
firm respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement: Audit fee 
is positively associated with audit quality. Moreover, just less than three- 
quarters of the oil company respondents (67.7%) and audit firm respondents 
(71.3%) either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement: The Big Four firm 
usually charge higher audit fees and local firms usually charge lower audit 
fees. These two results were confirmed by 80% of the interviewees. 
Speaking about audit fees, an internal auditor of one of the oil companies said: 
In my view, the audit fee is closely associated with the quality 
of audit services, any more fees increased hours of work that 
gives better services. 
And an audit supervisor in a local audit firm added: 
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The low audit fees could directly impact on audit hours, by 
reducing the number of audit hours and the number of 
samples taken from the client's system. 
This finding supports the results of the questionnaire survey presented in 
Chapter Five, section (5.4.5), which show that 70.8% of oil company 
respondents and 68.2% of audit firm respondents agreed with the statement: An 
audit firm that charges high audit fees usually spends more audit hours with its 
clients and is most likely to provide high audit quality. 
This is another finding that is strongly in tune with the literature which reports 
(Deis and Giroux, 1992) that in a study relating to the effect of auditor changes 
on audit fees, audit hours and audit quality, the number of audit hours seemed 
to be an acceptable surrogate for audit quality differences among audit firms of 
similar size. Deis and Giroux (1992) argued that audit hours could also be 
linked to audit fees saying that if the audit effort declines with audit fees on 
initial audits, audit quality should also decline. 
Just under three-quarters of the interviewees (72%) expressed the belief that 
the Big Four audit firms charge higher audit fees, and that these higher audit 
fees were associated with higher audit quality. 
In this respect, an audit supervisor of one of the Big Four audit firms said: 
When a financial statement is prepared and audited according 
to professional standards in a Big Four audit firm, it gains the 
appreciation of the readership. Hence, Big Four audit firms 
rely on this appreciation and ask for high audit fees for the 
privilege of using their name, reputation and logo on the 
client's financial statements ... you have to know, that the Big Four audit firms initially invested quite heavily in both 
infrastructure and high reputation. The Big Four audit firms 
usually get support from their head offices with any difficulties 
they face through a direct Internet connection. 
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Another financial manager in an oil company commented: 
In fact, the Big Four audit firms take large fees for their 
services and most of the oil companies in Libya want to deal 
with these firms because they give good services and the high 
quality is better than the local audit firms. 
A negative outcome on local audit firms was highlighted by an audit supervisor 
from one such firm, who remarked: 
To be honest with you, a lot of local audit firms have left the 
market because they could no longer reduce their fees, as this 
would affect the quality of their work Providing a 
comprehensive audit with a reasonable level of quality 
entails considerable expense, which has to be covered by the 
audit fees, but local audit firms cannot increase their fees 
because their clients will not accept this from them, whereas 
local audit firms affiliated to foreign audit firms can. 
However, almost a third (28%) of those interviewed were of the opinion that 
higher fees were not necessarily an indication of audit quality, and one such 
interviewee, an auditor in a local audit firm said: 
I think that higher audit fees are not related to audit quality 
... 
I agree that Big Four audit firms charge high audit fees 
but I disagree that local audit firm charge lower audit fees. 
Finally, in terms of differentiation in audit fees between local audit firms and 
foreign audit firms, Karim and Moizer (1996) examined the level of audit fees 
among auditors affiliated to foreign audit firms and those affiliated to purely 
domestic audit firms, finding that auditors affiliated to foreign audit firms 
secured higher audit fees than purely local audit firms. Audit firms provide 
differing quality audits, increasing with the size of firms, in response to varying 
demands for quality amongst clients because different companies have 
different levels of agency costs (Arrunada, 1999). 
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6.4.4 The Future Development of Audit Quality in Libya 
The results of Section 5.5 of the questionnaire survey, presented in Chapter 
Five, revealed that a large majority (64.5% and 69.3%) of oil company 
respondents and (62.5% and 76.8%) of audit firm respondents either agreed or 
strongly agreed with the statements: There should be legal and disciplinary 
actions available to the authorities against non-compliant and dishonest 
auditors and The current auditing rules and regulations in Libya need to be 
much improved. Likewise, the interview data confirmed that the absence of 
severe penalties and the failure to publish details of audit firms that acted 
unprofessionally, had caused the overall audit quality in the country to drop. 
The majority of interviewees (92%) felt this way and stressed the need for 
improvements to the current auditing rules and regulations in Libya. Indeed, 
twenty three interviewees cited the absence of severe penalties as sanctions in 
the current rules and regulations, as the prime cause of poor quality. 
In this respect, an auditor of a local audit firm said: 
The absence of severe penalties and not publishing the name 
of audit firms performing unprofessional work caused a low 
level of audit quality ... The LAAA needs to shut down any 
audit firm found to be carrying out unprofessional world as 
happens in developed countries. 
And an audit supervisor of one of the Big Four audit firms remarked: 
There is a need for legal and disciplinary actions to be 
available to the authorities against non-compliant and 
dishonest auditors and also the need for current auditing 
rules and regulations to be much improved. 
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Without exception, all the interviewees (100%) believed that the LAAA should 
adopt professional auditing and accounting standards to improve the audit 
quality. This finding was entirely in support of the questionnaire survey results 
presented in Chapter Five, section 5.5, that showed a large majority of oil 
company respondents (70.9%) and audit firm respondents (67.6%) either 
agreed or strongly agreed with the statement: The LAAA should adopt 
international auditing and accounting standards to improve the audit quality 
and should have strict requirements for granting audit licenses. 
In this respect, one of the regulators commented: 
After opening to the world, and the entry of international 
companies and oil companies, Libya must adopt international 
accounting standards leading to a distinct improvement in the 
level of qualityfor accounting in Libya. 
Furthermore, over three-quarters of the interviewees (88%) insisted that an 
auditor should have experience before being granted a licence to open an audit 
office, as in their view experience in a profession is more important than 
qualifications. However, a regulator pointed out that: 
The LAAA already require experience and qualifications. In 
terms of experience, they must have at least five years 
experience of accounting work in an accounting office after 
graduation before a licence is obtained and no audit firm can 
audit any company unless it has at least five years auditing 
experience. 
On the same theme, another regulator added: 
Only those holding an accounting qualification can apply for 
the licence. Those without it must take recommended courses 
to acquire the approved knowledge and skills and should 
have five' or more years' experience in a full time accounting 
job and pass a special examination designed by the LAAA. 
An internal auditor of one of the oil companies remarked: 
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The LAAA should force audit firms to attend continuing 
education courses for professional accountants and auditors, 
and an audit firm should not be able to renew its licence 
unless it has acquired a certain number of points from its 
employees'attendance on such courses. Courses focus on the 
latest developments in accounting and auditing practice 
around the world as well as practical solutions to accounting 
andauditing problems. 
This issue of licensing was commented upon by an accounts manager in one of 
the oil companies, who said: 
In my view the LAAA should impose strict conditions on each 
applicant for a licence to practise the profession. 
Summarising the opinions of the research population in relation to the future 
development of the audit profession in Libya, it is clear that overwhelmingly, 
they all believe that the LAAA does not have sufficient power to impose a 
strict regulatory framework, and that the current requirements of auditors in 
Libya, are not enough to keep them up to date and fully aware of all 
developments in their line of work. It is felt that particularly with trade and 
economic liberalisation in Libya, the need to raise the level of professionalism 
is paramount and that enforceable legislation with appropriate penalties for 
misconduct, is very much, and urgently needed. 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter has presented the data from the interview exercise, conducted with 
staff from Libyan oil companies, and from audit firms in the Libyan market. 
The descriptive statistics showed that in total 25 interviews were undertaken, 
and that no participant had less than five years' experience in the auditing 
profession. This was encouraging since it indicated that the opinions that were 
being given, were considered and likely to be reflections of interviewees' true 
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beliefs formed over some years. Having found particular issues of interest 
emerging from the questionnaire survey, the researcher probed seven different 
areas concerning the prevailing level of audit quality in Libya, these being: 
firm size, the provision of NAS, auditor tenure, the level of competition in the 
audit market, and fees for audit services. After considering these particular 
issues, which were believed to be the most important when evaluating the audit 
quality function, the researcher also asked interviewees for their opinions 
regarding desired improvements to the Libyan auditing environment. 
The interviews were informative, and helpful in confirming the data gathered 
during the questionnaire survey. Unfortunately, the vast majority of 
interviewees (96%) believed the current level of audit quality to be inadequate. 
They attributed this to a perceived lack of professionalism among auditors in 
Libya, which was considered to be a direct outcome of the LAAA's failure as a 
regulatory authority for the profession. In this respect, it was noted that the 
LAAA had not undertaken any classification exercise to indicate the size and 
resources of individual audit firms, nor had it provided any accounting or 
auditing principles or standards, or a Code of Ethics, as is observable in most 
other professions. 
In their consideration of the main audit quality variables, interviewees 
generally believed that higher audit quality is associated with local audit firms 
affiliated to foreign audit firms, and especially those affiliated to one of the Big 
Four, rather than with ordinary local audit firms. The reason for this was 
basically the fact that international firms have greater resources and 
experience, and can as a result, sponsor their staff for ongoing professional 
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development. Small and medium firms are unable to compete on these 
dimensions. Moreover, it was pointed out that because of their better treatment, 
the staff in the Big Four firms are more loyal to their companies, and more able 
to resist client pressure than their counterparts from local audit firms. 
In terms of the provision of NAS and the potential for this to jeopardise 
independence, the general consensus among interviewees was that this was an 
unfounded concern, and that provided separate department in the audit 
company were involved, there were only benefits to be realised. Indeed, 
interviewees confirmed that they would recommend their audit clients come to 
them for NAS because the auditor's experience and understanding of their 
businesses results in better consultancy advice being given. Long tenure, was 
generally, believed to be risky and mandatory rotation, although over a five- 
year rather than a three-year period, was favoured, especially in oil companies. 
Oil companies were very much aware of their importance to the country's 
economy, and the need to retain reputation in the investment market, which it 
was felt mandatory rotation of auditors would give them. 
On the issue of competition in the audit market, it was revealed that in Libya 
there is a highly competitive audit environment and that the need to perform a 
quality audit service was important in order to keep abreast of the competition, 
although there were simultaneous fears that in an environment where there are 
more suppliers than demand, price under-cutting might be detrimental to 
quality. This issue of price was taken up again in discussions of the relationship 
between audit fees and audit quality, with it being reported quite definitely that 
a positive association was seen between the two. The Big Four audit firms were 
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perceived as charging a premium (therefore being expensive) but providing a 
quality job, the local firms were perceived as being less expensive but not 
providing the same quality audit staff, and the local audit firms affiliated to 
foreign audit firms were perceived by the vast majority of respondents to be in 
the middle - providing high audit quality and at a reasonable audit fee. 
The last area for discussion, how to improve audit quality, centred entirely on 
the role and power of the LAAA, which it was felt should adopt professional 
auditing and accounting standards, and implement a more rigorous regulatory 
framework with a system of monitoring and penalties as a means of enhancing 
professional performance. Chapter Seven draws the thesis to a conclusion and 
offers a number of recommendations to raise the level of professionalism 
within the Libyan audit environment. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the entire thesis and draws it to a 
conclusion. It summarises the main findings and sets out the individual 
conclusions which can be drawn in each of the main areas that have been 
investigated. It also provides recommendations that might be of interest and 
assistance not only to the environment studied, that being the Libyan auditing 
profession, but also to the auditing environment in other countries, in bringing 
about improvements to audit quality, and thus increasing the quality of the 
audit work with the ultimate aim of restoring and enhancing public trust in the 
audit profession. Furthermore, the chapter considers the limitations of the 
thesis and opportunities for further research. 
There are six sections, including this introduction, within the chapter. Section 
7.2 provides a summary and review of the findings and discussions presented 
in the previous chapters. Recommendations of the study are presented in 
section 7.3. Section 7.4 discusses the limitations of the work, showing how 
these were dealt with during the actual research process. Section 7.5 proceeds 
to suggest avenues for future research, and Section 7.6 draws the thesis to a 
final conclusion. 
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7.2 Summary and Review of Findings 
This thesis has examined the current perceptions of the level of audit quality in 
Libya. The scope of the study was restricted to involve an exploration of five 
major variables, these being: the size of the audit firm, the provision of non- 
audit services (NAS), auditor tenure, level of competition in the audit market, 
and the fees charged for audit services. As a means of exploring the central 
issue from both dimensions, the study was conducted on the demand side 
(Libyan oil companies) and on the supply side (audit firms working in Libya). 
It seemed logical to start the research work by addressing specific issues 
including the identification of the area of study, research objectives and 
questions, the epistemological and methodological framework, contribution to 
knowledge, and structure of the thesis. There were several reasons for 
conducting this study, the most pressing being that most previous studies have 
focused on auditor independence only, and on examining the relationship 
between one or two variables of audit quality in the developed countries. No 
emphasis has been given to audit quality, and it was in response to this 
apparent gap in the literature that this study was originally undertaken. In 
addition to this shortfall in the literature, two other important points were 
highlighted. The first concerns the fact that most of the literature in this 
research field has been written with reference to developed countries and that 
research in developing countries, of which Libya is one, has received scant 
attention. Secondly, no similar study to the one reported in this thesis has been 
conducted either in Libya or North Africa as a wider region. 
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Notably, the Libyan audit profession offers a valuable research context in that 
it is a developing market and one that is not totally dominated by the large 
multinational audit firms. Consequently, the Libyan context allows for a 
comparison of such firms against smaller, national audit firms. 
Additionally, it is argued that the findings of this thesis are pertinent given the 
current level of debate internationally over the role, regulation and quality of 
auditing services and concerns over the potential impact of recent corporate 
scandals on auditor reputation. 
By reviewing previous literature relevant to this study, the researcher was able 
to identify where contributions to the existing literature are needed. The 
literature review was used to generate a frame of reference for developing the 
issues raised and discussed in the thesis, and helped in formulating the 
experimental instrument as well as the questions addressed in the semi- 
structured interviews. The results of the present study will undoubtedly, help 
auditors, audit clients and regulators to take pre-emptive measures to improve 
monitoring activities and instil investor confidence in the Libyan audit market. 
7.2.1 The Current Perceptions of Audit Quality in Libya 
The results of the questionnaire survey and the interviews revealed that the vast 
majority of respondents disagreed with the idea that the Libyan Accountants 
and Auditors Association (LAAA) plays an important role in developing the 
auditing profession, and thereby enhancing quality. Respondents were, in fact, 
dissatisfied with the current level of audit quality in Libya, and indicated a 
preference for Big Four audit firms other than local audit firms because they 
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are perceived to offer a better quality product. Indeed, because most oil 
companies prefer to engage audit firms that are affiliated to a foreign audit 
firm, as confirmed by the majority of participants, these firms tend to dominate 
the Libyan audit market. Again, the majority of the respondents involved in 
this study were of the opinion that most audit firms in Libya are unfamiliar 
with new audit services, such as assurance services and internet reporting. This 
situation may arise either because the majority of audit clients in Libya are still 
audited using traditional ways of auditing services, or because oil companies 
that provided the sample for the study, do not themselves have any idea about 
such new services. This particular finding is consistent with the literature (see 
Mautz and Sharaf, 1961). 
In respect of the interviewees, they felt it was as a huge shortcoming of the 
LAAA that it had not undertaken any classification of audit firms in Libya on 
the basis of number of employees, revenue, and resources, and that it had not 
provided the profession with any principles or standards of accounting or 
auditing, nor formulated a Code of Ethics as is present in most other 
professions as a soft regulatory mechanism. 
In fact, it can be seen that the LAAA has actually failed to regulate itself since 
had this been done, it would have recognised its obligation towards the public 
interest. Furthermore, it has not achieved its objectives associated with the 
promotion of activities such as research, conferences, academic publications, 
and seminars. This failure, together with the lack of any programme of 
continuing education and training has resulted in the absence of any effort to 
improve the status of the profession and accordingly, the individual status of its 
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members. Moreover, the LAAA specifies no uniform audit report 
requirements, or professional examination requirements. Clearly, it can be 
concluded that the Libyan accounting profession is extremely weak when 
evaluated against that in other countries, especially in the advanced nations. 
Hence, the interviewees' opinions were not favourable about the current level 
of audit quality. The lack of the professionalism among auditors in Libya, the 
weaknesses in the current regulatory framework, the ineffectiveness of the 
LAAA, the ignorance of audit firms in Libya in respect of new services, and 
the inability of Libya's education system to produce graduates of a good 
enough calibre, all combine to cause the low level of audit quality that the 
profession itself wishes to improve. 
7.2.2 Factors Impairing and Enhancing Audit Quality 
In relation to the impact of different sizes of audit firms on audit quality, a 
clear majority of oil companies and audit firms agreed that Big Four firms are 
superior to their non-Big Four counterparts in all of the reputation issues 
presented to them, and that the size of the audit firm is positively associated 
with audit quality. 
Firstly, the questionnaire respondents concluded that Big Four audit firms are 
more attractive to investors and creditors because they are seen to provide 
reliable information that enables investors to properly assess risk and return 
profiles. Investors usually trust audit firms with a professional approach to 
auditing and a high level of audit quality. In the same manner, oil companies 
usually engage audit firms with a good reputation because they wish to 
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enhance their own attractiveness to investors and creditors, and Big Four audit 
firms are considered to be better able to resist management pressure in conflict 
situations, thereby bringing enhanced credibility to any company that uses their 
auditing services. A further point in their favour is that as noted in the literature 
review in Chapter Three, the Big Four auditors have greater resources, 
technical knowledge and global reach, which allows them to deal with clients 
more efficiently, and they are thus able to freely express their opinions without 
fear of their engagement being terminated by the client. In fact, Big Four audit 
firms may also exhibit higher levels of ethical reasoning and attract a greater 
variety of clients because of their appeal on quality grounds, and the associated 
benefits their reputation brings. Indeed, as the Big Four audit firms have 
greater resources and possess technological capabilities, they can plan the audit 
process more effectively, perform more powerful tests, and be more likely to 
publish more precise information. 
Secondly, the majority of oil companies and audit firms agreed that Big Four 
audit firms are more risk averse and consequently, more disinclined to be 
associated with public scandals and/or audit failures than non-Big Four audit 
firms. These opinions might be an indication of the faith that the respondents 
still have in the ability and competence of the Big Four to undertake their 
duties effectively and professionally, despite the well-publicised audit failures 
involving large firms that have occurred in different economic, political, 
geographical and cultural settings, which may not be applicable to the Libyan 
audit market. It is possible that the invention of communication technology that 
allows business to be done in real-time has made the Big Four auditors more 
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careful in conducting their business and more risk averse, with the result that 
their reluctance to be associated with any wrongdoings is enhanced, since the 
availability of such technology would result in faster spread of negative news. 
Finally, the majority of the respondents to the questionnaire recorded their 
belief that Big Four audit firms are more independent than non-Big Four 
auditors. Indeed, the Big Four auditors are likely to become the subject of 
interest to the public and regulators, especially when they are suspected of 
exhibiting negative behaviour. Therefore, Big Four audit firms have more 
incentive to behave independently than non-Big Four audit firms. 
The results of the interview survey revealed that the perceived relationship 
between firm size and level of audit quality is consistent with the notion that 
higher audit quality is associated with foreign audit firms, in general. 
In this connection, the interviewees were of the opinion that the Big Four firms 
were more independent than their counterpart non-Big Four firms, and this was 
seen as a direct result of their size, since this provided them with more 
resources that in turn filtered through to organisational practices, such as the 
provision of more training that ensures staff are skilled and effective in 
diagnosing activities that are inconsistent with a client's going-concern status. 
Such elements of organisational culture allow for the recruitment of more 
professionally-minded people, who subsequently provide a higher quality of 
service. It was felt by the interviewees that such high quality staff would 
naturally comply with international professional standards and work ethically, 
thereby being predisposed to resist management pressure. Overall, the Big Four 
firms were reported to be more powerful, effective and independent than the 
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non-Big four firms, not least because after various accounting scandals and 
litigation concerning fraud and irregularities, they have more incentive to 
protect their reputation and continue with their high earnings. 
The provision of non-audit services (NAS) that has been debated in the 
literature as a cause of impaired audit quality, was considered by the majority 
of this study's respondents not to be a serious concern, and the statement that 
the provision of NAS-would impair the level of audit quality did not secure 
very much agreement. In fact, the majority of respondents believed that the 
provision of NAS to audit clients gives the auditor more experience of the 
client's industry as well as more access to the client's accounting system, 
thereby functioning in a complementary capacity. Hence, such an arrangement 
was considered to increase the auditor's overall client knowledge, and 
therefore enhance the probability that problems would be discovered. In such 
circumstances, the provision of NAS was argued to have the potential for 
actually increasing audit quality. Furthermore, from the auditor's perspective, 
the provision of NAS was considered favourable, since the arrangement has the 
potential to increase a client's dependence on its auditor, thereby reducing the 
credibility of the switch threat, although such dependence, when viewed from a 
different perspective, could be perceived as a negative feature. Another 
commonly-mentioned advantage of the joint provision of audit and NAS, is the 
benefit arising from knowledge spillovers, which are transfers of knowledge 
that may occur when NAS are provided by the incumbent auditor 
It was, however, agreed by the majority of the respondents that the 
maintenance of audit quality would require the provision of NAS to come from 
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a separate department from the audit department. This degree of faith was 
interesting, and testified to the respondents' belief in the `Chinese Wall' 
approach, which works to minimise communication between the audit and 
NAS providers despite them being under the ultimate control of the same 
organisation. Given that the government licenses individual auditors, and these 
people have to ensure that their personal image is protected, it is argued that 
auditors would not behave in a way as to compromise this, and in fact, 
welcome greater monitoring of their own activities. 
The general feeling among interviewees was that they would recommend their 
own firms to their clients for the provision of NAS, since they believed this 
would not result in any reduction in the audit quality, and indeed, enhance it. 
In relation to the impact of long tenure on audit quality, discussed in Chapter 
Three, the majority of respondents in this study were of the opinion that long 
tenure provided an auditor with more knowledge and experience about a 
client's specific operations and business processes, but that it brought with it 
the potential for relationships that might eventually impair auditor 
independence, and hence, the level of audit quality. One way in which this 
might occur is as a result of the auditor believing him/herself to be so familiar 
with the client that audit hours could be reduced, thereby risking effectiveness 
and engendering complacency. 
As a means to combat the potential for the development of cosy relationships, 
the majority of respondents believed that mandatory rotation would provide a 
solution since this would prevent auditors from becoming economically 
dependent on particular clients. It would also place auditors in a better position 
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to disagree with management on professional matters, and the specification of a 
certain period of time would be such as to prevent the development of bias. 
Consequently, it was felt overall, that mandatory rotation of audit firms would 
enhance audit quality since it would prevent a lessening of objectivity. 
Interviewees also were generally in favour of mandatory rotation of audit 
firms, believing that this practice would enhance audit quality since lengthy 
tenure may well lead to a negative impact on quality, arising from overly 
strong relationships with the board of directors and general manager. 
At the same time, however, caution was expressed in terms of excessive 
switching costs and higher audit risk that might arise with too short a period of 
tenure. Certainly, in the first and second year of auditing, it was reported that 
auditors put in many hours in order to become familiar with the client's 
business and that once such a level of expertise has been gained, it should be 
capitalised upon, otherwise there will be a continual round of high set-up costs 
to be faced by clients, and the possibility that the auditor's expertise will not be 
fully developed when s/he comes to the end of the engagement. Consequently, 
the research population in this study favoured a five-year audit contract period 
rather than a three-year period. 
In respect of the degree of competition in the audit market, the impression 
gained from the questionnaire survey was that audit quality would not be 
negatively influenced by a highly-competitive environment. In addition, the 
majority of respondents disagreed with the statement that audit quality may be 
impaired if there is audit fee discounting or low-balling at initial engagement. 
These findings seem to suggest that the respondents were confident that the 
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players in the large companies' audit market are able to maintain their 
independence, and to provide good audit quality, possibly because of their 
concern with maintaining their good reputation, a factor that acts as a deterrent 
to inappropriate behaviour. Also, the Libyan audit market is concentrated in 
audit firms that are affiliated to foreign audit firms, and this has the potential 
for enhancing the regulators' role in terms of monitoring the behaviour of a 
small number of key players. 
The Libyan market was generally accepted by respondents as being highly 
competitive and to follow the theoretical predictions that a positive relationship 
exists between competition and quality, especially as it was reported that some 
audit firms had left the market because they were unable to rise to the 
challenge to provide better services. They did not consider that audit quality 
may be negatively influenced if audit fee discounting occurred at initial 
engagement. It was believed that there was no unfavourable impact on quality 
as a result of the small but highly-competitive environment because the Big 
Four audit companies, and firms that were affiliated to them, were players 
within it and their reputations were such as to inspire confidence. 
Indeed, as the interviewees noted, the facets providing the Big Four firms with 
competitive edge were indicated as amount of resources, technical knowledge 
and experience, and global reach, all unavailable to the majority of the small 
local audit firms which are left to service the residual market. The interviewees 
commented that around 500 audit firms operate in the Libyan audit market but 
that the Big Four and medium size audit firms pose barriers to entry to the 
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smaller local firms, which do compete with each other, but not in a way as to 
affect the profession as a whole. 
Regarding the relationship between the fees for audit services and audit quality, 
the majority of respondents believed the relationship between the audit fees 
and the level of audit quality is positive, and that clear differences could 
be 
seen between local firms, local firms affiliated firms to one of the Big 
Four 
audit firms, and the Big Four audit firms themselves. In this respect, the 
local 
audit firms expressed their dissatisfaction with the level of audit fees they 
received, and consequently, they suggested the establishment of an 
independent body to specify the amount of audit fees paid to all audit firms. 
However, it was acknowledged that the Big Four audit firms customarily 
receive higher audit fees than others, recognising that such a premium was a 
reflection of more audit hours, the ability to use more and better resources, and 
a better quality service, especially in respect of initial audits. 
The majority of interviewees disclosed that the audit fee is linked closely 
associated with the audit quality. Also the majority of interviewees did hold the 
opinion that local audit firms affiliated to foreign and one of the Big Four audit 
firms were providing a high audit quality and that they were seen to make 
initial heavy investments in their infrastructure. Such investments were seen in 
the use of particular diagnostic software, and in efforts to develop human 
resources, which in turn helped in the promotion of a good reputation. In 
addition, firms associated with the Big Four audit firms are usually supported 
in technical areas (direct Internet connection) and in the provision of academic 
publications in the area of accounting/auditing, and specialist team visits. 
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7.2.3 Potential Improvements to the Libyan Auditing Environment 
The majority of the respondents believed strongly in the need for legal and 
disciplinary sanctions as a means of regulating the audit environment and 
ridding it of non-compliant and dishonest auditors. They also strongly 
advocated for an improvement to the current auditing rules and regulations to 
bring them into line with international auditing and accounting standards, and 
therefore put into place a framework for improving audit quality. Additionally, 
it was believed that there should be stricter criteria imposed when granting 
audit licences. 
In respect of the provision of NAS, it was felt by the majority of respondents 
that whilst this was essentially considered by them to be a good thing, audit 
firms should, nonetheless, disclose the type and amount of NAS provided to 
their audit clients, and likewise, oil companies should disclose in their annual 
reports, the amount of audit and NAS fees paid. 
A large majority of oil company respondents, compared to audit firm 
respondents, believed that the percentage of NAS income for audit firms 
should not be higher than 25% of total audit firm revenue generated from a 
single client. Unsurprisingly, the perceptions of the respondents seem to be 
consistent and this might reflect their concern about the threat faced by auditors 
when depending heavily on a single client, since such an arrangement may 
compromise their ability to behave independently (see for example, Flint, 
1988). 
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The majority of interviewees suggested ways in which the LAAA should 
enhance its role and influence on audit firms in order to encourage and monitor 
their professional performance, such as adopting severe penalties for audit 
firms behaving unprofessionally, and publishing their names. It was felt by 
most interviewees that the criteria for obtaining a licence to open an audit 
office should be tightened to require experience, as they considered experience 
in the profession to be more important than qualifications. The suggestion was 
that people could become registered as Chartered Accountants once they had 
accumulated five or more years' experience in a full-time accounting job, and 
passed a special examination designed by the LAAA. Finally, it was 
overwhelmingly believed that it was necessary for the LAAA to adopt 
international auditing and accounting standards as a means to improving audit 
quality. 
7.3 Recommendations of the Study 
The findings reported in this study highlight as a general and urgent concern, 
the fact that audit quality in Libya needs to be improved, and that it is perhaps 
the developing country context that is a major problem in relation to the 
smaller, local audit firms. Clearly, the peculiar and very special nature of the 
Libyan environment, as one in which a highly-prized resource (oil) forms the 
backbone of the economy and makes a substantial international economic 
contribution also, means that the audit environment is characterised by the full 
range of audit providers, covering local audit firms, local audit firms with some 
affiliation to foreign audit firms, and the Big Four audit firms themselves. This 
is a reflection of the need for confidence amongst investors in the Libyan oil 
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industry. Given the heterogeneity of the market, it is not surprising that audit 
quality is seen to operate on a spectrum, with the Big Four at one end, and the 
small local firms at the other. As recommendations to create more uniformity 
in the market, moving in the direction of improved quality, the study derives 
the following from the findings: 
1. The LAAA should be given new powers to strengthen its role as the 
national regulator for the accounting and auditing profession in Libya. 
It should be empowered to ensure that standards and sanctions related 
to audit quality are formulated, in place, and enforced. This will 
require considerable reform in respect of the LAAA's role and 
responsibilities. 
2. The LAAA should adopt international auditing and accounting 
standards and impose strict criteria in respect of the issue and renewal 
of audit licences. 
3. The audit practice of current auditors should be strengthened by the 
provision of ongoing training by all audit firms, which should be a 
requirement imposed and monitored by the LAAA, and form part of the 
conditions for licence renewal. As part of this ongoing training, it is 
recommended that auditors be given experience across different 
industries to broaden their skills and expertise. Moreover, the LAAA 
should be responsible for providing its members with scholarly material 
in respect of international auditing practice, as well as practical 
solutions to accounting and auditing problems. 
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4. The current accounting and auditing curriculum in the Libyan education 
system should be revised and updated to ensure the appropriate training 
for auditors, and sufficient scholarly research should be undertaken in 
the HE environment to ensure that the auditing model in use in Libya is 
appropriate when compared with international models, and the needs of 
the Libyan system. 
5. Among the standards to be set by the LAAA, should be the requirement 
for the separation of duties in respect of the provision of audit services 
and NAS, and for audit firms' percentage of NAS income from a single 
client not to exceed 25% of the fees obtained from that client. 
Additionally, the LAAA should require audit firms to disclose the type 
and amount of audit and NAS fees obtained from all clients. 
6. Legislation should be passed to require all companies (specifically oil 
companies) to report the respective fees paid to their auditors for audit 
services, and NAS. 
7. Local audit firms should be encouraged by the LAAA to merge to 
create 8 st ongggOlp ýýeýýe 
wes Cafýablc ofcompeting effectively 
with those that are affiliated to foreign audit 
fr111s TýJeyShould creole 
their own international reach through affiliation with renowned 
" international firms or open up international offices to cater for their 
clients' needs. Global reach is important for multinational companies 
that operate in various countries, which need such a service to tackle 
international business and reporting issues. 
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for auditors, and sufficient scholarly research should be undertaken in 
the HE environment to ensure that the auditing model in use in Libya is 
appropriate when compared with international models, and the needs of 
the Libyan system. 
S. Among the standards to be set by the LAAA, should be the requirement 
for the separation of duties in respect of the provision of audit services 
and NAS, and for audit firms' percentage of NAS income from a single 
client not to exceed 25% of the fees obtained from that client. 
Additionally, the LAAA should require audit firms to disclose the type 
and amount of audit and NAS fees obtained from all clients. 
6. Legislation should be passed to require all companies (specifically oil 
companies) to report the respective fees paid to their auditors for audit 
services, and NAS. 
7. Local audit firms should be encouraged by the LAAA to merge to 
create a strong group of enterprises capable of competing effectively 
with those that are affiliated to foreign audit firms. They should create 
their own international reach through affiliation with renowned 
international firms or open up international offices to cater for their 
clients' needs. Global reach is important for multinational companies 
that operate in various countries, which need such a service to tackle 
international business and reporting issues. 
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8. The mandatory rotation of auditors on a five-year basis should be a 
feature of the Libyan environment, overseen by the LAAA. The period 
of five years will allow auditors to gain an appropriate length of 
experience with particular clients, and hence the type of business in 
which they are engaged. 
9. Attention should be paid to the development of the audit profession in 
Libya to ensure there is no monopolisation by the Big Four audit firms, 
and to ensure the development of national cadres and local audit firms 
as a means of expanding competition within the audit market. 
10. Further research, as documented in section 7.5 should be undertaken. 
7.4 Limitations of the Research 
As with all research, this particular study has some limitations, most of which 
are connected to the nature of the exercise (PhD study with limited resources). 
The various shortcomings of the data collection methods (questionnaire and 
semi-structured interviews) adopted for the study have been discussed in detail 
in Chapters Five and Six. Consequently, this section will ignore these. 
Firstly, the findings and conclusions should be treated with some caution since 
the study was concerned with the perceptions of only two groups of subjects, 
namely audit firm and oil company staff. Hence, it is not possible to make 
widespread generalisations (for instance among shareholders, industrial 
sectors, listed companies, public companies, bank sectors). 
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Secondly, as the research population was exclusively comprised of people with 
experience based on Libyan rules, practices and procedures, the results and 
explanations are not necessarily applicable to other jurisdictions. There may be 
room for generalisation to other North African countries, and possibly to the 
wider Arab World, but cultural differences may prevent wider applicability. 
Thirdly, a review of the literature indicated that no studies had been conducted 
on the topic under investigation in Libya, and consequently, the research 
framework was developed according to constructs that have been developed in 
other environments, particularly, Anglo-Saxon countries. The focus was on 
five factors identified as potentially impairing audit quality, and it may be that 
other factors are influential in the Libyan environment. 
Finally, it must be acknowledged that there are limitations when drawing 
conclusions from a perceptual-based survey, since the respondents 
subjectivities may could their ability to respond objectively. This may arise, for 
instance, in the situation where a respondent wishes to support his/her 
organisation and answers in a particular way to do so, when in fact, the truth of 
the matter is different. 
7.5 Suggestions for Future Research 
As indicated in the previous section, the results reported in this study suggest 
room and directions for more research. In this respect, three major 
opportunities present themselves. Firstly, the study could be replicated to 
include the opinions of people in different industrial sectors in an attempt to 
gain a wider picture of the perception of audit quality in Libya, and the factors 
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influencing it. Secondly, the study could be replicated in other oil-producing 
countries to determine whether the oil industry brings to the audit environment 
any peculiarities. Thirdly, the study could be replicated with other industrial 
sectors across other North African countries and/or countries in the Arab 
World generally, to establish whether cultural influences are at work in 
perceptions of audit quality. Such a study might highlight the existence of new 
and additional factors that might come into play, that are not reported in the 
western literature. 
7.6 Overall Conclusion 
The study has been exploratory in nature, and has considered the Libyan audit 
environment using the oil sector as the unit of analysis. Given the international 
nature of Libya's oil industry, it is believed that the findings of the study 
provide important directions for the Libyan government in regulating the audit 
profession and thereby promoting Libya to foreign investors, not just in the oil 
sector but in other areas of the economy. It is believed, therefore, that the 
study has made several contributions in terms of both the literature, and the 
future development of a nation. 
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Appendix 1: The Questionnaire Survey 
Liverpool John Moores University 
An Investigation into the Perception of Oil Companies and 




I am currently engaged in research for PhD at Liverpool John Moores 
University, UK. I am particularly interested in Audit Quality in Libya. So, the 
purpose of this survey is to collect some of the research data. 
I would like to invite you to participate in this research by completing this 
questionnaire (from your own experiences) which should take no longer than 
15 minutes to complete. I have left space to write if there are any notes you 
think that might contribute in improving this research. 
I would like to assure you that all responses to the questionnaire will be kept 
confidential. 
Thank you very much for your cooperation. 
Yours faithfully 
Nedal Sawan 
Ph. D. student 
Business school 
Liverpool John Moores University 
Email: N. SAWAN(c-)2007. ljmu. ac. uk 
Ne2000dal @hotmail. com 
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SECTION A: GENERAL INFORMATION 
Please answer by filling in the blank or ticking as appropriate: 
1-Please tick to indicate your gender: 
Male () Female () 
2-Please tick one answer to indicate your age: 
20 to 29 () 30 to 39 () 
40 to 49 () over 50 years () 
3- Please indicate your current position (for Audit Firm Staff only). 
Managing Partner () Audit Supervisor () Auditor () 
4- Period of experience. 
Less than 5 years () 
5-10 years () 
More than 10 years () 
5- Please indicate the highest academic qualification you possess. 
High school () 
First university degree () 
Higher diploma () 
Masters degree (or its equivalent) () 
PhD degree (or its equivalent) () 
6- Please indicate which of the following professional qualification(s) you 
possess 
None () 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) () 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) () 
Arab Society of Certified Accountants (ASCA) () 
Libyan Association of Accountants and Auditors (LAAA) () 
Other (please specific) () 
7-Please indicate the status of your external audit firm. 
Local audit firm 
Local affiliated to an Arab audit firm 
Local affiliated to an International audit firm 




NO 1 :1 
SECTION A: GENERAL INFORMATION 
Please answer by filling, in the blank or ticking as appropriate: 
1-Please tick to indicate your gender: 
Male () Female () 
2-Please tick one answer to indicate your age: 
20 to 29 () 30 to 39 () 
40 to 49 () over 50 years () 
3- Please indicate your current position (for Companies Staff only) 
Internal Auditor () Financial Manager () Accounts Manager () 
Other (please specific) 
4- Period of experience. 
Less than 5 years () 
5-10 years () 
More than 10 years () 
5- Please indicate the highest academic qualification you possess. 
High school () 
First university degree () 
Higher diploma () 
Masters degree (or its equivalent) () 
PhD degree (or its equivalent) () 
6- Please indicate which of the following professional qualification(s) you 
possess 
None 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 
Arab Society of Certified Accountants (ASCA) 
Libyan Association of Accountants and Auditors (LAAA) 
Other (please specific) 










SECTION B: CURRENT PERCEPTION OF AUDIT QUALITY IN LIBYA. 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements by ticking. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree .. <, ; ." 
No View 
.. ', ý.. ° Agree, --,: Strongly Agree 
12345 
No .« 
: 1, 2' 3. 4 5 
Rules and regulations in Libyan are not 
1 comprehensive provisions that lack and cause low 
audit quality 
The current level of audit quality in Libya is 
2 insufficient 
The Libyan Accountants and Auditors Association 
3 (LAAA) plays an important role in developing the 
profession of auditing and enhances audit quality. 
The accounting and auditing curricula in the 
4 Libyan education system are insufficient to train 
auditors. 
The lack of professionalism of auditors in Libya 
5 causes the low level of audit quality 
Most oil companies in Libya prefer audit firms 
6 that are affiliated to foreign audit firm and audit 
quality depends on the status of the audit firm e. g. 
local affiliated to a foreign audit firm 
Most audit firms in Libya have little idea about 
7 new audit services, such as assurance services and 
internet reporting. 
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SECTION C: FACTORS IMPAIRING AND ENHANCING AUDIT 
QUALITY 
Cl) Audit Firm Size: please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree 
with the following statements by ticking. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree No View Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
No 1 :2 3 4 5 
The size of the audit firm is positively associated 
1 with audit quality. 
The Big Four firms can report the real financial 
2 situation of the clients more readily than other 
firms. 
The Big Four firms are more risk averse in 
3 respect of damage to their reputation from public 
scandals and/or audit failures. 
The Big Four firms perform more powerful, 
4 effective tests and are more credible than others 
The Big Four Firms achieve a high level of audit 
5 quality 
The local audit firms achieve a lower level of 
6 audit quality 
The companies audited by the Big firms are more 
7 attractive to investors and creditors. 
The Big Four firms can plan the audit process 
8 more effectively and can obtain a greater variety 
of clients. 
The Big Four firms more independent and more 
9 likely to issue qualified reports 
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C2) Non-Audit Services (NAS): please indicate the extent to which you agree 
or disagree with the following statements ticking. 
Strongly Disagree Disagree > No View . . 'Agree Strongly Apxee 
1 2 3 4 5 
No . 
*. ý.. '. , 1 2 3 4 5 
The provision of NAS to an audit client gives the 
1 auditor more experience of the clients industry 
and more access to the clients accounting system. 
The provision of NAS to an audit client leads to 
2 economic dependency on that client and causes a 
conflict of interests for the auditor. 
Only certain types of NAS impair audit quality. 
3 
The prohibition of the provision of NAS to an 
4 audit client is only to maintain the perception of 
independence. 
Providing NAS to an audit client by a separate 
5 department gives the auditor more credibility. 
6 The provision of NAS impairs audit quality. 
7 The provision of NAS to an audit client reduces 
the probability of switch threat change of auditor. 
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C3) Auditor Tenure: The relationship between an auditor and his clients is 
always under scrutiny. In this context, please indicate the extent to which you 
agree or disagree with the following statements by ticking. 
Strongly Disagree 
, 
Disagree No View , ; Agree ° -Strongly Agree , 
1 2 3 4 5 
No l 3 4 5 
Policy of mandatory rotation leads to reduction in 
any relationship between the client and auditor 1 
The mandatory rotation is positively associated 
2 with audit quality. 
Long tenure can impair auditor independence. 
3 
Long tenure with a client gives an auditor more 
4 experience and 
leads to low audit hours by an 
auditor 
Long tenure should only be allowed with large 
5 companies 
Mandatory rotation harms the technical 
6 competence of auditing and leads to lack of knowledge and familiarity with the clients 
accounting system. 
Mandatory rotation makes the audit market less 
7 competitive and causes higher audit fees. 
The auditor will not become economically 
8 dependent by specifying a period of tenure. 
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C4) Audit Market Competitiveness: 
Agree;.,, Strongly Disagree :, °'. ` Disagree No View -=. " Agree 'Strongly 
12345 
No E, . ., 1 -, 2 3 '4 
The The audit market in Libya is highly competitive. 
1 
Audit quality may be impacted if the audit firm 
operates in a highly competitive environment 2 
Audit quality may be impacted if there is audit fee 
discounting or low-balling at initial engagement. 3 
C 5) Audit Fees: It is suggested that "The more you pay the more professional 
work you receive". In this context, please indicate the extent to which you 
agree or disagree with the following statements by ticking. 
ýý .. Strongly Disagree,:, 
Disagree No View Agree Strongly Agree 
12345 
No 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Audit fee is positively associated with audit quality. 
An audit firm that charges high audit fees usually 
spends more audit hours with its clients and is most 
2 likely to provide high audit quality. 
Audit fees that are specified by an independent 
3 professional body will lead to higher audit quality. 
Audit fees are increased to allow more thorough 
4 scrutiny of the clients accounting system. 
A company that pays higher audit fees is more likely to 
5 receive a clean audit opinion. 
A company that is receiving NAS from its external 6 
auditor is most likely to be charged lower audit fees 
The Big firm usually charge higher audit fees and local 7 firms usually charge lower audit fees 
Audit fees remaining between a specified minimum and 8 
maximum amount will result in higher audit quality. 
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SECTION D: FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF AUDIT QUALITY IN LIBYA 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements by tickin . 




ý 1 2 3 
4S 
Audit firms in Libya should adhere to audit quality 
1 requirements. 
The LAAA should adopt international auditing and 
accounting standards to improve audit quality and 
2 should have strict requirements for granting audit 
licenses. 
There should be legal and disciplinary actions 
available to the authorities against non-compliant 3 
and dishonest auditors. 
Audit firms in Libya should be restricted to 
4 undertaking only audit work. 
The current auditing rules and regulations need to 
5 be much improved. 
A range of audit fees should be specified by the 
6 Libyan regulatory authority that allocates audit 
clients to audit firms 
Audit firms should disclose the type and amount of 
NAS provided to their audit clients and oil 
companies should disclose the amount of audit and 
NAS fees paid in the annual report. 
The percentage of NAS income for audit firms 
8 should not be higher than 25%of total audit firm 
revenue is generated from single client. 
If you have any comments or propositions you might think regarding the issues 
presented and covered by this questionnaire, please do not hesitate to write 
them down here. 
............................................................................................. 
.............................................. 
Thank you for your cooperation 
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Appendix 2: Interview Survey Questions in English 
Section A. Demographic Information 
Name of Interviewee 
Name of Audit Firm 
Could you please tell me a little about yourself in terms of your 
experience? 
Section B: The Current Perception of Audit quality in Libya 
- Do you think that audit quality in Libya is still insufficient; could 
you please explain why do you think this might be? 
- Do you think the LAAA is playing an effective role to enhance 
audit quality? 
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Section C: Factors Impairing and Enhancing Audit Quality 
Firm Size 
- Do you think audit quality in Libya depends on the status of the audit 
firm e. g. local audit firm affiliated to a foreign audit firm? If so, what 
are the problems in terms of audit quality with local audit firms? 
- Is there any different in term of audit quality if a Big Four audit firm 
and a non-Big Four audit firm audits client? 
1. Provide a higher level of audit quality 
2. Damage of reputation. 
3. Independence. 
4. More powerful, effective and attractive to investors and 
creditors 
5. Resist management pressure 
In what perspective? How this situation happens 
The Provision of Non-Audit Service (NAS) 
- Do you believe non-audit services offered to audit clients affect the 
audit quality or perceived audit quality 
- Do you think that providing Non-Audit Service (NAS) by a separate 
department gives the audit more credibility? 
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The length of auditor tenure: 
- Do you think that the mandatory rotation has positively associated 
with audit quality? 
- Do you think that long-term audit tenure impairs audit 
independence? If so, why do you think this is? 
The Level of Competition in the Audit Market 
- In your view, to what extent does stiff competition 
for audit client 
in audit market impact audit quality? 
Fees for Audit Services 
- Do you think that the audit fee has positively associated with audit 
quality? 
- Do you think the Big Four audit firms charge higher audit fees than 
non-Big Four and these higher audit fees associated with higher audit 
quality? 
Section D: The Improvements of the Level of Audit Quality 
- What would change things for the better, in terms of improving 
the audit and enhancing audit quality in Libya? And what might be 
the role of the LAAA in that sense? 
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Appendix 3: The Questionnaire Survey Questions in Arabic 




, SSA Ll of u. WI +%rzl "ISAJ X31112=1 
ýý Zýýº'F (0) ý yýýº - : JjjI e 
t (ý 
.ý 
(t : cruel-1 
39LA30CD- 39u! 20c (t :ja. %: ýºs11-2 
, 
ß, J50(. 1 ZI- 49 LA 40W(r 
('ý'"d. ýiº ý-"S" cssl' y° iY'ý-ýI ° r'=); ýI mill J3 u. ai. 
Sl 
. ý, ýi o1. ß y11(i -3 
ö}ýOl 3 _4 
"ºy-10j "I y" 5 c's:! to _ý+ 
D ý:, I rºý c c: N Jsl _t 
VIc ül. aý L, -Asl 
I-, JA 
, 
j,, I ý1ti o1ý, 11 _5 
L)AU 
p ß, i1 _ý p (iýlleu- , I) el, yiS111_s p , ai, raýojl _ý 
1L-3 a: iil cr4A]I JA3, JI . 141-3 6l? -b-6 
tJ -t 
() JJ º. º wý. Y º tý. v1º 24- -y 
() is$,, oYº va. Lw1º ütýJ Ucj? 1Aix o1º t jsuýl aol) 
1ºae, ý. ->.. 
S, 34 -e 
pl+Ji rya ýSiS J. ' ý, o ýj, oWý ýi1º tiuº ybý,. ºiS. ii a., -Iii 4lß 1I-7 
, LSlº L4_)V L4J 14 awl, lzü,. ý, 




4ýsZ, (0) Zaa e4-, I -: JJ MM 
(i : csº-1 
39A30394A20W(i v. yý1º%WU-2 
-Al Ji50(1 ' 49 LA406"(C 
65, Ic cr4'ý° 'GIs. vrill Lsýbý11 u. c; 4 .y yä oý 
ýl(j 
-3 
uLl.. ý , y, 
so _ý v 




................................ cS3Zý -. J 
ý1 1O ýtyý 5 -' 
D 





z &. l -C 
jý 1yýot)-5 
ýLJI tyl'ý1 
uIll LA-11 c3A, Wº v4-Sº-6 
() . 
).. » +. t tsi o0y'Zt 0--Wu- 4- - () ý: ýu týYl &-Wý., 'Lý1t rya. -L-.. SI L-- 
() wir &LLytslt U., 1t A-% yj 
() ; ýSýy. Yt ä ý, NSt ýLy r isý 11 ,; y LýJt yý .ý-e 
() sýýt º ý, ý Ot t ý. rý ýý4. ' -ý 
() ý}uýIl,, yýtitl jal, yslý ýsu. ýtutt ýl ýüw r°ý - 
() layl -r_ 
d (-8 
C. - A2A 
Y2 
348 
:, ý. º,, ýý oý ýýº ýwº ý Yº: i ii 







4321 L. I,: 2_1: 
iAll C%A L%l t4 
432 it (; 
















AJL 1JJ II; J, * JAIJO ; 41L'+11 fAAMI 
cj. giA* 4. r9 
; ý, "(I ý a-C.. c jl üj }+. oý Vol ýý. iý : i?, , cZMA 
J, )i 3 ; 4-1 c. r'' 'ý"°9 ýj °, cris sth . 




J41 *UIA ; Uji--j oli-A 
"i JL41 Z--4, P I L-. AJU-ý A-= 
Cjýlj 1.! L=l U11.1 
S_Jýi ý. ýijAll 
LL. All U. 
ý 
1 : L-4- 4, -! JL41, Z--j v1 (4 
_)All 
LralS., L. tA. >A C>. 
_Xl 
1 ; L4- L'A -)L?! 
Ul ; L-, Uj 'il "-, Lcll 61--3 (5 
C. - Lqlx- L; -a- 
543 L+L-. Zl Z. Xýljýzl "'JI-SWI diz (6 
543 -xL-33 (7 










ýtý J, , )L ; ýr.: 
x, tJJYl ý: ºLsý11-2 
: 1ý1 iýº üº, t4,31 4. J w, :» ,'1 













L; a, )4 
543 
L; -Aý, A 4 
5432 1 4L:?. l . 41 (j4-3 C). 1"-Tj U-% Lri ; -,. I 
LOJI A_LN, 




IJAU Z: Olaý. 
All 
32 1 
L--I-ýJ I-: AJL-L. LLXU- UJI 
J4.4 
351 
Lýl 61-5 Wa J, JºJ ýºýº L .Wº :c1& ý'I-y'111'4U 
Y 2-}++. 311 'es. 11-3 
0. c öýilJ &cji `IJ3J; 





2 31ij LA 41. )4 W-I-Al aau: 21; ý4ý. (I 
2 1 W-A, ý71 . 1-L'D (2 
-44A 2 1 ý,; 'l zi a. -Sun sa-. (3 
2 1 a-4-33 (4 
-)J 
J 






ew LSI-- 1 LSJLýý',, -1-k-: 21 




:. L Ij l LU" v3 
Lit º, JI -4 
543 2 1 ý, LL ýº v . ý- 
(1 
543 2 1 º 
ýýts ºýº ju . ý;.... ýºý01º sýY (2 
543 2 1 UA1 sv, w1yJ1 
;11 c=tla I -5 
ýl yli+ 
j %ý ý-ýIyo11 öýy y LiS t_ j_to 1, Jl 
äýeýlyol) c_tLül ml 
c. s.. tiol) ý. 9 }II 




C)A A4:?, J 
L4 
3 2 1 (3 
3 -)J 
LA-r- "L-51 Ld 2-4-P (4 
3 2 1 YWI ti-14 all, (5 Zi4hý 
3 2 eh--4 Cýýt. L4 (6 
3 2 17LU 
U 14 (7 
i Z. XýU- YL41 L4- 
yLJ 
3 YL-S'l L"--A L; -4-- 
L;.. 4-- NIL "ll ('saali CN61 ) 
-- 





4,, ßt ) la+I. WI eJJ-eº ýgJ u4M' i a. iI : ý: ýýý MMMI 
OIJA - dA 4ýj L)A 
JJ4 ... ... 











5432 Zýý 00-0 A14 CJP cil Q 






54321 ý -Jý :p (7 ý A_. A. LAII; kýJL-=. Ikjj i 
L-A-iS J 
t+a-j 
I cA.. 1-ol o-r- 









GL2. t YIj ltltl%ui 
, jjj5tA ýyýti 
. ývsýsyi &Jir-i 
.................................. 
........................... u3J YI -b-)b 
jýilº ý, ý, ý, 
I ý', ý s11 ý yo ý9 
ktkz 43 tL JI ülslyýl Jº Cat" url 
4. ti 
(A III 
. ýt ,. yº ºýa : gis., 
es. 
-S. -i ºJ U,,. tº Lli. -º 41: ºL ouý.. P ,1ý 
355 
Appendix 4: Interview Survey Questions in Arabic 
Att I 
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